Risinger v. Supreme Court, I. O. F.

• Decision Date: 06 June 1911
• Parties: RISINGER v. SUPREME COURT, I. O. F.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

138 S.W. 552

158 Mo. A. 226

RISINGER v. SUPREME COURT, I. O. F.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 6, 1911.

Rehearing Denied June 30, 1911.

INSURANCE (§ 805)—FRATERNAL INSURANCE—ACTIONS—APPEAL TO SUPREME LODGE—NECESSITY.

The by-laws of a foreign benefit society subdivided into high courts, subordinate courts, companion courts, etc., provided that the right of appeal should be vested in a beneficiary of a deceased member, and an appeal should lie against the decision of any officer of any high court or encampment, except that of the Executive Council, whose decision should be final, and that the party aggrieved by a judgment of the Executive Council might appeal to the Supreme Court, and declared that no action should lie in favor of a beneficiary until he exhausted all the remedies provided in the by-laws, are unreasonable because requiring a beneficiary to appeal to the supreme court of the order, meeting in a foreign country triennially or quadrennially as the Supreme Court might determine, and, where a claim was rejected by an officer to whom the claim was properly presented, the beneficiary could sue without resorting to the remedy prescribed in the by-laws.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; George H. Williams, Judge.

Action by Maud Risinger, curatrix of the estate of Maude Wilson and others, against the Supreme Court, Independent Order of Foresters. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Ernest C. Dodge and R. P. & C. P. Williams, for appellant. John C. Robertson, for respondent.

NORTONI, J.

This is a suit on a certificate of life insurance. Plaintiff recovered and defendant prosecutes the appeal.

Defendant is a benevolent society incorporated in a foreign country, but authorized to do the business of life insurance in this state. Plaintiff is curatrix of the estate of three minor children, who are the beneficiaries in a certificate of insurance for $1,000, which their mother, Mrs. Rose A. Wilson, held in defendant order at the time of her death. It is conceded throughout the case that all of the assessments and dues were paid by the insured during her lifetime, and that the certificate was in full force and effect when she died, but its payment was sought to be evaded on other grounds which the jury rejected.

The principal argument put forward here for a reversal of the judgment goes to the effect that the suit may not be maintained for the reason plaintiff failed to exhaust the remedies within the order by prosecuting several appeals through its tribunals before instituting suit on the certificate. It appears the claim was rejected by defendant's Supreme Chief Ranger, which officer, according to the constitution and by-laws, is the ex officio president and general manager of the order. He was a proper person to whom such claim should be presented and it was rejected by him. The by-laws provide for an appeal from the Chief Ranger in cases such as this to the Executive Council of the order, and provide, too, that an appeal may be had from such council by a party to the Supreme Court of the order. It appears the Supreme Court of the order meets triennially or quadrennially at Toronto, Canada, as the Supreme Court may determine from time to time. By-law No. 201 of the order provides substantially that no person may prosecute a suit against the order on a certificate "until he shall have exhausted all of the remedies provided in the constitutions and laws, by appeals or otherwise." It provides, too, that, if any person or his or their legal representatives institute a suit against the order "before he shall have exhausted all remedies" within the order by appeals and otherwise, he shall ipso facto forfeit all rights, claims, and demands therein and thereto. Because of this by-law, it is argued the judgment should be reversed for the reason no appeal was prosecuted by plaintiff within the order itself from the ruling of the Chief Ranger in rejecting the claim.

The circuit court declared peremptorily as a matter of law that these by-laws constituted no defense to the action, and it is said here this was error, as they are entirely reasonable and impose no undue burden. We are not so persuaded, for it appears when the two by-laws material to the controversy are read together that they are most unreasonable, indeed. By-law No. 196 confers the right of appeal on either party to the controversy as will appear by reference thereto: "In Whom the Right of Appeal is Vested. 196. (1) The right of appeal shall be vested in every member of the order, and in case of the death or disability of a member the right of appeal shall be vested in his beneficiary or legal or personal representative or other person deriving legal rights from him or them or any of them. (2) The right of appeal shall also be vested in every High Court, Subordinate Court, Companion Court, Juvenile Court and Encampment of Royal Foresters, and an appeal shall lie against the action or decision of any officer, or of any High Court, Court or Encampment, except that of the Executive Council whose action or decision shall be...