Risser v. City of Little Rock

Decision Date04 July 1955
Docket NumberNo. 5-724,5-724
Citation281 S.W.2d 949,225 Ark. 318
PartiesE. H. RISSER et al., Appellants, v. CITY OF LITTLE ROCK et al., Appellees.
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

John R. Thompson, Bernal Seamster, Joseph C. Kemp and Cooper Jacoway, Little Rock, for appellants.

O. D. Longstreth, Jr., City Atty., Dave E. Witt, Asst. City Atty., and Mehaffy, Smith & Williams, Little Rock, for appellees.

ROBINSON, Justice.

This is an effort by some of the residents of the Fourche Dam community, which is east of Little Rock in Pulaski County, to prevent the City of Little Rock from relocating a small portion of East 10th Street and East 26th Street in that city.

East 10th Street is on the north side of the Little Rock Municipal Airport and East 26th Street is on the south side. To facilitate the operation of modern aircraft, it is necessary for the city to install additional equipment at the ends of the northeast-southwest runway at the airport. In order to do this, the city seeks to abandon a small portion of East 10th Street and establish a new route one block north on 9th Street. This will require traffic to make two sharp turns in traveling from 10th to 9th Street. By actual timing, it takes 35 seconds longer to travel the new route than it does the old one. On the south side of the airport, the city has relocated East 26th Street for a distance of a little over half a mile. This was done by building a crescent shaped loop which makes the new route approximately 600 feet longer than the old route. The old route is in such a condition that it cannot be traveled, hence the comparative time it takes to travel the two routes is not shown, but it requires a total of one minute and 15 seconds to drive the entire new route at a usual rate of speed.

Appellants filed suit to enjoin the city from abandoning the old routes in favor of the new ones. The chancellor denied the injunction and the residents of the Fourche Dam community have appealed. Appellants contend that 'the City did not comply with the statutory requirement of securing approval from the Pulaski County Planning Commission; the City had no control or jurisdiction to close the roads in question; the City has failed to provide comparable roads that are equally safe and convenient; the fact that the plaintiffs' property does not abut on the portion of the road closed does not prevent the plaintiffs from suffering damages for which they are entitled to reimbursement; the court should have sustained the plaintiffs' plea of res adjudicata.' Appellants also contend that the city is precluded from closing the roads by a contract made with the residents of the area. There are three points that merit discussion: first, is the city bound by a contract; second, is the cause res judicata; and third, have appellants suffered special and peculiar damages.

As to the question of whether the city is bound by an agreement heretofore made with the residents of the Fourche Dam area, appellants introduced evidence to the effect that, in 1934, the city undertook to close East 17th Street and the county road known as Fourche Dam Pike; that the residents of the Fourche Dam community objected, resulting in an agreement between the city officials, the county judge and the residents of that area, that the residents would not oppose the closing of East 17th Street, or seek damages for the closing of that street, if the city and county would construct a paved road on the north side of the airport; and that, in 1940, the agreement was modified whereby the city was to improve East 10th Street, and improve and maintain East 26th Street with a right of way of 160 feet. Appellants contend that this was a valid and binding contract between the Fourche Dam residents and the city, and that the city is not now at liberty to change the location of East 10th and East 26th Streets, which are the roads furnishing access to the Fourche Dam community.

Any attempt on the part of the city to enter into a contract relating to the permanent establishment or abandonment of its public streets would be ultra vires. In establishing, maintaining or abandoning its streets, the city acts in a governmental capacity and no city administration has the authority to bind a future administration in such matters. Cities have the authority to control, supervise and regulate all streets within their corporate limits. Ark.Stats. §§ 19-2313, 19-2304. 'A municipality cannot bind itself by a perpetual contract or by one which lasts an unreasonable length of time. Thus, a municipal corporation cannot obligate itself to keep a particular street open forever.' 38 Am.Jur. 174. It is also said in 25 Am.Jur. 553: 'It is established that the governmental power to control and regulate the use of highways in the public interest cannot be surrendered, or impaired by contract. Particularly as to municipalities, control over streets is given to them for the benefit of the public. It is in the nature of a trust held by the corporation, from which arises a continuing duty on the part of such corporations to exercise legislative control over their streets at all times and places when demanded by the public good. They have no power, by contract, ordinance, or bylaw, to cede away, limit, or impair their legislative or governmental powers, or to disable themselves from performing their public duties in this regard, at least without the explicit consent of the legislature, or to delegate the exercise of such powers and the performance of such duties to others, so as to relieve themselves of responsibility in this respect.' In 37 Am.Jur. 735, 736, it is said: 'It is declared to be against public policy to permit a municipal corporation to part with any of its legislative power. In the absence of a clear grant of power from the legislature, the municipal authorities can do nothing which amounts in effect to the alienation of a substantial right of the public. It cannot obligate itself not to exercise such powers, and a contract in which it purports to do so, even upon valuable consideration, is void. Thus, a municipal corporation cannot, by contract or otherwise, divest itself of its general police power, or of the power of eminent domain which has been delegated to it by the legislature, or of the power of taxation.' The law is clear that a city cannot contract away perpetually its rights, obligations and duties in connection with the public streets.

Next we reach the question of res judicata. Ordinance 9004 was adopted by the Little Rock City Council on September 22, 1952. Under the provisions of the ordinance, the portions of East 10th and East 26th Streets involved herein were abandoned. The ordinance set out that the city council had ascertained that portions of such streets 'have not been actually used by the public generally for a period of at least five years subsequent to the filing of the plat.' It is perfectly obvious that the ordinance was adopted on authority of Ark.Stats. § 19-3825, which provides: 'In all cases where the owner of property within a city or town shall have dedicated, or may hereafter dedicate, a portion of such property to the public use as streets or alleys by platting such property and causing such plat to be filed for record, as provided by law, and any street or alley, or section thereof, shown on the plat so filed shall not have been actually used by the public as a street or alley for a period of five (5) years, and in all cases where all property abutting any such street or alley, or section thereof, is owned by any educational institution or college, whether the same shall have been actually used by the public as a street or alley for a period of five (5) years or not, the city or town council shall have power to vacate and abandon the street or alley, or any portion thereof, by proceeding in the manner hereinafter set forth.' After the adoption of Ordinance 9004, appellants in the case at bar filed a suit to enjoin the city from enforcing the ordinance by closing a portion of East 10th and East 26th Streets. The complaint alleged, inter alia, that 'The defendants are now attempting to close, block, obstruct and barricade a portion of said 10th Street and have already begun to tear up the roadway and to interfere with travel along said road.' An intervention was filed alleging that 'The defendants are purporting to act under the authority of Ordinance No. 9004 of the City. Said ordinance is void and a nullify. Said ordinance was not enacted in the manner required by law and contains a recitation and finding that the road or street in question has not been used for a period of at least five years subsequent to the filing of the plat. In truth and in fact, said road has been constantly and continuously used by the public including ...

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22 cases
  • City of Little Rock v. Linn
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • September 30, 1968
    ...by the vacation of streets and alleys in another block. Many of these authorities were reviewed in the case of Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949, wherein residents of another part of Little Rock sought to prevent the abandonment of a small portion of East Tenth Str......
  • Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Union Planters Nat. Bank
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 28, 1960
    ...time and again that a property owner cannot recover damages because a right of way has been changed or closed. See Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949, and cases cited By purchasing the 250-foot right of way across the Woollard land in 1952, the State acquired the va......
  • Anderson, By and Through Doss v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority, 53194
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • September 8, 1982
    ...In Arkansas, the following municipal functions have been considered "governmental": maintenance of city streets, Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949, Patterson v. City of Little Rock, 202 Ark. 189, 149 S.W.2d 562 (1941); operation of electrical system, City of Little......
  • Anderson v. Jackson Municipal Airport Authority
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • November 15, 1982
    ...In Arkansas, the following municipal functions have been considered "governmental": maintenance of city streets, Risser v. City of Little Rock, 225 Ark. 318, 281 S.W.2d 949, Patterson v. City of Little Rock, 202 Ark. 189, 149 S.W.2d 562 (1941); operation of electrical system, City of Little......
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