Riste v. General Elec. Co., 33360
| Decision Date | 03 November 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 33360,33360 |
| Citation | 289 P.2d 338,47 Wn.2d 680 |
| Parties | Milo E. RISTE, Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and Phillip Fuqua, Respondents. Curtis T. SWEARINGEN, Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, a corporation, and Phillip Fuqua, Respondents. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Critchlow & Williams, Richland, for appellants.
Gavin, Robinson & Kendrick, Yakima, for respondents.
These are indistinguishable cases that have been consolidated upon appeal. Only one need be discussed. It will be the Riste case.
A demurrer was sustained to the second amended complaint upon the grounds that the statute of limitations had run; that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and that several causes of action were improperly united.
Appellant was employed as a chemical utility operator by the respondent, General Electric Company, hereinafter called the company, for several years prior to his quitting on August 1, 1953. The company maintained an industrial medical service in charge of its agent, respondent Dr. Phillip Fuqua. The appellant was physically examined on April 20, 1949, and August 8, 1950, when X-rays were taken which revealed active tuberculosis in his right lung. After each of the physical examinations, the company notified appellant in writing that there was nothing seriously wrong with him. The appellant did not know he had tuberculosis. The company knowing he had tuberculosis, assigned him to tasks involving physical exertion, which worsened his tuberculosis and caused it to infiltrate two segments of his right lung. Hospitalization and surgery became necessary. The fair intendment of the allegations in the second-amended complaint, is that the physical exertion entailed in the labor to which appellant was assigned by the company, aggravated his existing tuberculosis. The appellant does not seek damages for the original disease, but only for the aggravation of it.
These allegations bring the cause of action within the purview of the rule that it is negligence for an employer to knowingly assign an employee to work which is beyond his physical capacity to safely perform, and the employer is liable for any injuries proximately caused thereby in the absence of an assumption of risk or contributory negligence. See 175 A.L.R. 982. The second-amended complaint states a cause of action against the company.
It is not alleged that the respondent, Dr. Phillip Fuqua, the agent of the...
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Volk v. Demeerleer
...does not recognize a cause of action for medical malpractice absent a physician/patient relationship. See Riste v. Gen. Elec. Co., 47 Wash.2d 680, 682, 289 P.2d 338 (1955). Pursuant to ROW 4.04.010, this common law approach is the law of Washington, and we have previously declined to adopt ......
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Peace v. Weisman
...or job applicant not liable (Lotspeich v. Chance Vought Aircraft, Tex.Civ.App. 5th Dist., 369 S.W.2d 705 (1963); Riste v. Gen. Elec. Co., 47 Wash.2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955). As the above-cited cases show, "[o]rdinarily recovery for malpractice or negligence against a doctor is allowed only......
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Judy v. HANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
...could not be held negligent because the doctor was not the worker's physician. He was an agent of the company. Riste v. Gen. Elec. Co., 47 Wash.2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955). In Washington, the medical malpractice act, chapter 7.70 RCW, extends malpractice liability beyond traditional physici......
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Ervin v. American Guardian Life Assur. Co.
...Vought Aircraft, supra at 710. See also: Wilcox v. Salt Lake City Corp., 26 Utah 2d 78, 484 P.2d 1200 (1971); Riste v. General Electric Co., 47 Wash.2d 680, 289 P.2d 338 (1955); New York Central R.Co. v. Wiler, 124 Ohio St. 118, 177 N.E. 205 (1931). Cf. Thomas v. Kenton, 425 So.2d 396 (La.A......