Ritchhart v. Daub
| Decision Date | 29 April 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. S-98-224,S-98-224 |
| Citation | 256 Neb. 801,594 N.W.2d 288 |
| Parties | Kimberly RITCHHART, Appellee, v. Hal DAUB, Individually, and in his Official Capacity as Mayor of the City of Omaha, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties: Judgments: Appeal and Error. Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party's case because only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court; determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from that of a trial court.
2. Standing: Jurisdiction: Parties: Courts. Because the requirement of standing is fundamental to a court's exercising jurisdiction, a litigant or court before which a case is pending can raise the question of standing at any time during the proceeding.
3. Standing. In order to have standing to invoke a tribunal's jurisdiction, one must have some legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject of the controversy.
4. Standing: Jurisdiction. Standing relates to a court's power, that is, jurisdiction, to address the issues presented and serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process.
5. Standing: Jurisdiction. As an aspect of jurisdiction and justiciability, standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court's jurisdiction and justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on the litigant's behalf.
6. Standing. Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline to determine the merits of a legal claim because the 7. Standing: Proof. In order for a party to establish standing to bring suit, it is necessary to show that the party is in danger of sustaining direct injury as a result of anticipated action, and it is not sufficient that one has merely a general interest common to all members of the public.
party advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial determination.
8. Municipal Corporations: Actions. A person seeking to restrain the act of a municipal body must show some special injury peculiar to himself aside from and independent of the general injury to the public unless it involves an illegal expenditure of public funds or an increase in the burden of taxation.
Thomas O. Mumgaard, Assistant Omaha City Attorney, for appellants.
Thomas F. Dowd, of Dowd & Dowd, Omaha, for appellee.
The appellants, Hal Daub, Thomas Graeve, and Mark Conrey, were, respectively, the mayor, the fire chief, and the communications chief for the city of Omaha (collectively the defendants). They appeal from a judgment of the district court purporting to void certain oral agreements that Daub had made with Graeve and Conrey. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the appellee, Kimberly Ritchhart, did not have standing to prosecute this action. Accordingly, the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider the issues presented, and we reverse the district court's judgment and remand the cause with directions to dismiss Ritchhart's amended petition.
The Omaha home rule charter, art. III, § 3.11, provides that public safety functions for the city of Omaha shall be performed by the fire department headed by the fire chief, the police department headed by the police chief, and the communications department headed by the communications chief. The communications chief is responsible for the operation of the city's 911 emergency dispatch service. Each of these department heads is part of the city's "classified service ." Omaha home rule charter § 3.11. See, also, Omaha Mun.Code, ch. 23, art. III, §§ 23-92 and 23-93.
An employee in the classified service, if dismissed, has the right to appeal the dismissal within 10 days of receipt of the letter of dismissal. Omaha Mun.Code, ch. 23, art. III, § 23-296. Appeals are taken to the city of Omaha's personnel board, and in such an appeal, the city has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the action was taken for just cause and in good faith. Omaha home rule charter, art. VI, § 6.04(3). Just cause may include, but is not limited to, substance abuse, conviction of a crime, abuse of a person in custody, offensive conduct or language, insubordination, incompetence, negligence, violation of regulations, willful violation of the city charter, bribery, failure to pay debts, or absence from duty. Omaha Mun.Code, ch. 23, art. III, § 23-291.
Daub became mayor of Omaha on January 9, 1995. On December 31, he appointed Graeve to be the fire chief, and on January 8, 1996, he appointed Conrey to be the communications chief. As part of the hiring process, Daub asked Graeve and Conrey whether they would, if discharged, be willing to waive their right to appeal to the personnel board. They both agreed.
Ritchhart filed suit in the district court against the defendants, alleging that she was a "resident, registered voter, and citizen of Omaha." In her operative amended The defendants demurred, arguing that Ritchhart lacked legal capacity to bring the action. The district court found:
petition, Ritchhart alleged that the agreements among the defendants violated her right, under the Omaha home rule charter and the Omaha Municipal Code, to have the public safety functions of the city of Omaha performed without political influence or control.
In the present case, [Ritchhart] has alleged that she has a legal or equitable interest in the rights, benefits and protections granted to her by the Charter, as adopted and amended by the voters of the City of Omaha. Police protection, fire service, and emergency communications are such essential services of government that any citizen should have the right to sue if these services are not being provided in compliance with applicable law. As such, the Court finds that [Ritchhart] has standing to bring this suit in equity to enjoin city officials from violating the letter and intent of the City Charter.
Based on this determination, the district court overruled the demurrer and set the case for trial.
At trial, Daub testified that his inquiry regarding waiver of the right to appeal was more of a "gentleman's agreement," as opposed to a legally enforceable obligation. Daub stated that his agreements with Graeve and Conrey were not conditions of employment and that Daub understood that the agreements would not have been enforceable or legally binding in any way. Daub also testified that when appointing a police chief, which had not occurred at the time of trial, he did not intend to require a binding agreement from his appointee regarding waiver of the right to appeal, nor was he even certain that he would discuss the issue with the appointee.
The testimony of Graeve and Conrey was generally consistent with that of Daub. Both Graeve and Conrey testified that although they intended to abide by the terms of the agreements, they both understood the agreements not to be legally binding upon them.
The district court, after trial, entered a permanent injunction against Daub. The court found, "regardless of how you label this agreement, that the Defendant Daub's actions constitute an overt effort to rewrite or to change the Charter and that such action would cause irreparable harm to the integrity of the classified positions involved." The court found that the agreements Daub had with Graeve and Conrey were null and void, that Daub should be permanently enjoined from enforcing his agreements with Graeve and Conrey, and that Daub should be enjoined from entering into any agreement with the prospective police chief, or any other prospective member of the classified service, whereby the individual's appeal rights under the Omaha home rule charter were waived or modified. This appeal followed.
The defendants argue that the district court erred (1) in finding that Ritchhart had standing to sue, (2) in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction in the action, and (3) in finding that Ritchhart's amended petition stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Standing is a jurisdictional component of a party's case because only a party who has standing may invoke the jurisdiction of a court; determination of a jurisdictional issue which does not involve a factual dispute is a matter of law which requires an appellate court to reach its conclusions independent from that of a trial court. Hawkes v. Lewis, 255 Neb. 447, 586 N.W.2d 430 (1998).
The first issue we must address is whether Ritchhart had standing to bring this action. Because the requirement of standing is fundamental to a court's exercising In order to have standing to invoke a tribunal's jurisdiction, one must have some legal or equitable right, title, or interest in the subject of the controversy. Id. Standing relates to a court's power, that is, jurisdiction, to address the issues presented and serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process. Cotton v. Steele, 255 Neb. 892, 587 N.W.2d 693 (1999); Hawkes v. Lewis, supra. As an aspect of jurisdiction and justiciability, standing requires that a litigant have such a personal stake in the outcome of a controversy as to warrant invocation of a court's jurisdiction and justify the exercise of the court's remedial powers on the litigant's behalf. Id. Under the doctrine of standing, a court may decline to determine the merits of a legal claim because the party advancing it is not properly situated to be entitled to its judicial determination. Cotton v. Steele, supra.
jurisdiction, a litigant or court before which a case is pending can raise the question of standing at any...
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