Ritchie v. City of Green Bay

• Decision Date: 03 April 1934
• Citation: 215 Wis. 433,254 N.W. 113
• Parties: RITCHIE v. CITY OF GREEN BAY ET AL.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

215 Wis. 433

254 N.W. 113

RITCHIE

v.CITY OF GREEN BAY ET AL.^a1

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

April 3, 1934.

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Brown County; Henry Graass, Circuit Judge.

Action by Carrie F. Ritchie against the City of Green Bay and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Affirmed.

The action was commenced on January 2, 1932, by the plaintiff, Carrie F. Ritchie, against the city of Green Bay, Brown county, Ole Hansen, as treasurer of Brown county, and his successors in office, Harold J. Neville, as clerk of Brown county, and his successor or successors in office, and the Nicolet Securities Company, and sought to have the assessment and extension of taxes for the years 1929 and 1930 upon certain real estate owned by plaintiff adjudged void. The complaint asks cancellation of tax certificates, and that defendants be enjoined from issuing tax deeds upon such certificates. The action was tried to the court without a jury, upon a stipulation of facts. Judgment was ordered and entered for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.

Facts necessary to an understanding of the question involved will be stated in the opinion.

Thos. C. Dwyer, of Green Bay, for appellants.

Strehlow & Cranston, of Green Bay, for respondent.

WICKHEM, Justice.

At the time of the assessment of the tax, the property involved was held by Green Bay Lodge No. 359, Loyal Order of Moose, under a land contract, and the question presented is whether the interest of the lodge as such vendee constituted it an “owner” under section 70.11 (4), Stats., which reads as follows:

“(4) Personal property owned by any * * * benevolent association * * * fraternal societies, orders or associations operating under the lodge system, * * * and the real property necessary for the location and convenience of the buildings of such institution or association and embracing the same, not exceeding ten acres * * *” is exempt from taxation.

The lodge purchased the property under land contract February 16, 1924. Judgment of foreclosure against the lodge was entered November 25, 1930, the redemption period expiring on January 18, 1931, at which date the vendors came into complete and unconditional ownership.

[1] The question involved in this case is very narrow. Is the term “owner” as used in section 70.11 (4) broad enough to include the vendee under a land contract which is actually using the land for purposes that would entitle it to exemption if it is properly to be considered the owner of the property? At the outset it may be stated that there is no authority in this state directly upon this point. Hence the problem is to be solved by the application of such principles as have heretofore been laid down with respect to the subject. Statutes conferring tax exemptions are to be strictly construed against the person claiming the exemption. Douglas County Agr. Soc. v. Douglas County, 104 Wis. 429, 80 N. W. 740;Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N. W. 745, 80 N. W. 41;Merrill R. & L. Co. v. Merrill, 119 Wis. 249, 96 N. W. 686. In the latter case it is said:

“It has been held in this state that statutes exempting property from the general rule of taxation are to be construed with the utmost strictness, and that, as so construed, the word ‘owned,’ in statutes describing exempt property, must receive its most limited meaning, and be satisfied only by complete and entire ownership, or at least not by leasehold title.”

It will be noticed that the court, in the Merrill Case, qualified its statement that the word “owner” is to be taken to mean complete and entire ownership, by stating that at least it does not include a leasehold interest or title. That case involved a leasehold title, which accounts for the caution of the court.

In Katzer v. Milwaukee, 104 Wis. 16, 79 N. W. 745, 80 N. W. 41, the Catholic archbishop of the diocese of Milwaukee claimed exemption for certain property, the title to which was in him individually but which under the laws of the Catholic Church, he held for the use and benefit of the archdiocese. The court held that the absolute character of his individual ownership precluded any conclusion that there was a valid trust in favor of any legal person entitled to exemption. Upon rehearing the court deliberately stated that it did not decide whether, had there been sufficient proof that the property was held for a cestui entitled to exemption, a different result would have been reached. The court proceeds to state:

“If such equitable title be provable at all, the latter question might well turn on whether, by the terms of the trust, the control over the use and title of the property was sufficiently complete to constitute practical ownership by the association, or was so restricted as to leave such practical ownership in the holder of the legal title.”

In City of Milwaukee v. Milwaukee County, 95 Wis. 424, 69 N. W. 819, 820, the city of Milwaukee entered into possession of certain land for park purposes under a contract which this court held to be an option to purchase without any liability on the part of the city to make future payments in lieu of which they could abandon the premises. It was claimed that the property should be exempt on the ground that it was owned exclusively by the city. The court said:

“The legal title was in the vendors, and the city simply had an option to purchase with the right to possession until default. It was not bound to pay the purchase...