Ritchie v. Davidson
| Decision Date | 19 April 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 36719,36719 |
| Citation | 158 N.W.2d 275,183 Neb. 94 |
| Parties | Dorothy A. RITCHIE, Appellant, v. Beverly J. DAVIDSON, Appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Section 39--773, R.R.S.1943, requires that every motor vehicle shall be equipped with brakes, including two separate means of applying the brakes, each of which shall be effective and so constructed that no part which is liable to failure shall be common to the two.
2. An automobile operator is required to be familiar with the proper use of the braking system on his vehicle and to use it in a proper manner, if necessary, to avoid accidents.
3. It is a general rule, subject to exceptions not applicable to this case, that it is negligence as a matter of law for a motorist to drive an automobile on a public highway, at any time, at a speed or in such manner that it cannot be stopped or its course changed in time to avoid a collision with an object or obstruction discernible within his range of vision in the direction he is traveling.
4. The basis of the foregoing general rule is that the driver of an automobile is legally and mandatorily obligated to keep such a lookout that he can see what is plainly visible before him and to operate his automobile in such a manner that he can stop it and avoid collision with any object in front of him.
5. It is the duty of the district court, on its own motion, to submit to the jury only the issues upon which there are controverted questions of fact which must be determined by the jury in order to properly arrive at its verdict.
John J. Lawler, Omaha, for appellant.
Gross, Welch, Vinardi, Kauffman, Schatz & Day, Omaha, for appellee.
Heard before WHITE, C.J., and CARTER, SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, SMITH, McCOWN and NEWTON, JJ.
This is an automobile accident case in which the defendant failed to apply her emergency footbrake and ran into the rear end of plaintiff's car which was stopped at a stop sign. The jury verdict and judgment thereon were for the defendant and plaintiff appeals. We reverse the judgment.
There are several questions presented and argued. The only one necessary for a determination of this case is the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict and judgment.
The accident occurred at Fifty-second and Blondo Streets, Omaha, Nebraska, at about 4:30 p.m., June 16, 1965, a clear, dry, sunny day. The intersection is protected by four stop signs and plaintiff, going east, stopped her car at the west stop sign on Blondo Street. Defendant, also proceeding east on Blondo Street, was coming down a slight incline at 15 to 25 miles per hour, started to slow for the stop sign and the plaintiff's parked car, her regular footbrake did not hold, and instead of using her emergency footbrake, she pulled at the brake release lever, she was unable to stop or turn her car aside, and collided with the rear end of plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant had 15 years' experience as a driver, and since March 1965 had driven almost daily the automobile she was operating. The regular footbrake failed because of a sudden leak in the hydraulic system. The 'emergency' footbrake was in good working order. There is no allegation or suggestion in the evidence of negligence on plaintiff's part.
Our statute, section 39--773, R.R.S.1943, requires that every motor vehicle shall be equipped with brakes, 'including Two separate means of applying the brakes, each of which means shall be effective * * * and so constructed that no part which is liable to failure shall be common to the two, * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.) The defendant's car was equipped with dual brakes. They had an obvious statutory and practical purpose. It seems self-evident to us that the other or 'emergency' braking system is for the purpose of bringing a car to a stop in a sudden or unexpected occurrence or circumstance, and is particularly designed for the very situation we have here, where the footbrake failed. And elementary due care as to brakes requires that the operator be familiar with their use and that he use them, if necessary, to avoid accidents.
A case directly in point is Davis v. United Services Automobile Assn. (La.App., 1963), 159 So.2d 398, wherein it is said: ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Chlopek v. Schmall
...with an object or obstruction discernible within his range of vision in the direction he was traveling. See Ritchie v. Davidson, 183 Neb. 94, 158 N.W.2d 275 (1968). In Ritchie we went on to say at 97, 98, 158 N.W.2d at " 'The basis of the foregoing general rule is that the driver of an auto......
-
Starns v. Jones
...207 (1959), rev'd, 171 Neb. 347, 106 N.W.2d 468 (1960), appeal dismissed, 172 Neb. 414, 109 N.W.2d 724 (1961); Ritchie v. Davidson, 183 Neb. 94, 158 N.W.2d 275 (1968).5 Nebraska Jury Instructions (1969), prepared by the Nebraska Supreme Court Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, contains......
-
Miller v. Reilly
...of that theory appellants rely upon Fink v. East Miss. Elec. Power Assn., 234 Miss. 221, 105 So.2d 548 (1958), and Ritchie v. Davidson, 183 Neb. 94, 158 N.W.2d 275 (1968). In Fink the court held that a driver who was proceeding on a highway behind a truck that suddenly slowed was guilty of ......
-
Newkirk v. Kovanda, 36942
...this holding and its application to facts substantially similar to those present in the case at bar. In Ritchie v. Davidson, 183 Neb. 94, 158 N.W.2d 275 (April 19, 1968), this court held a driver who, in broad daylight, ran into an automobile parked at a stop sign, was guilty of negligence ......