Ritchie v. Widdemer

• Decision Date: 09 November 1896
• Citation: 59 N.J.L. 290,35 A. 825
• Parties: RITCHIE v. WIDDEMER.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

35 A. 825

59 N.J.L. 290

RITCHIE

v. WIDDEMER.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 9, 1896.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to court of common pleas, Monmouth county; Conover, Judge.

Action by Howard T. Widdemer against William N. Ritchie. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Affirmed.

The action was in tort, and the declaration contained three counts. It stated, by way of inducement, inter alia, that the plaintiff was "a clergyman of the Presbyterian Church of the United States of America, duly ordained, and in good and regular standing therein," and that he was acquiring a livelihood in his profession at Asbury Park, in Monmouth county. It then charged, in the first count, that the defendant, for the purpose of causing it to be believed that plaintiff had conducted himself improperly and immorally, and without integrity, in his profession, and that he was not a clergyman as before stated, had spoken these words, "Mr. Widdemer has had trouble with a girl in every church he has ever had"; and the meaning of the words so spoken was charged to be that the plaintiff had committed disgraceful and immoral practices, and was "unfit to follow and practice his said profession. In the second count it charged that defendant, for a like purpose, had spoken these words, "When he (meaning the plaintiff) first went to Passaic to preach, he got in with a girl, and, when his wife found it out, she threatened to leave him," and ascribed the same meaning to those words. In the third count it charged that defendant, for a like purpose, had spoken these words, "He (meaning the plaintiff) is not an ordained minister, and has no right to perform marriages nor baptism," and that the meaning of those words was that plaintiff was wholly incapacitated to perform the duties appertaining to his said profession, and without power or authority to exercise the functions of a minister of said church. The declaration stated that, by the speaking of the words, plaintiffi was injured in his good name and in his profession; that his neighbors and others had been thereby induced to believe him guilty of disgraceful and immoral practices, and unfit to practice his profession, and also to be without authority to perform the duties incident to his profession, and 'in consequence had refused to make use of his services in marriages and baptisms. The plea was the general issue, and a verdict passed for the plaintiff. The judgment thereon has been removed to this court by writ of error, and errors have been assigned upon exceptions taken in the course of the trial.

Argued June term, 1896, before the CHIEF JUSTICE, and GARRISON, LIPPINCOTT, and MAGIE, JJ.

Flavel McGee, for plaintiff in error.

S. A. Patterson, for defendant in error.

MAGIE, J. (after stating the facts). The first assignment of error is based upon an exception taken to the refusal of the trial court to nonsuit the plaintiff below. The request to nonsuit was put upon two grounds,—oue applicable to the first two counts, the other applicable to the third count only. The first two counts, as will be seen from the statement prefixed to this opinion, charged the defendant below with speaking certain words of plaintiff below in respect of his profession as a minister of the Presbyterian Church, and attributed to those words a meaning injurious to his professional character. The contention was that the evidence before the court was insufficient to justify the jury in finding that the words proved to be spoken bore the meaning which was attributed to them, or were injurious to the professional character of the plaintiff below. It is unnecessary to review the evidence in detail. The words proved to have been spoken by the defendant below were substantially those set out in these counts. They were spoken art a time when there was a controversy between the Presbyterian Church of Asbury Park, in which plaintiff below was then preaching, and the presbytery of Monmouth, to which that church belonged, respecting his services. From the circumstances under which the words were spoken, as detailed by the witnesses, the jury might well conclude that they were spoken of plaintiff below in his character as minister, and were intended to convey a meaning derogatory to that character, as charged in these counts. To say of a minister, whose employment as such was then in controversy, that wherever he had previously exercised ministerial functions he had had trouble with the female sex, and that in one instance the trouble was such that his wife threatened to leave him, may well and naturally be understood as attributing to him conduct improper, and inconsistent with the ministerial character. Derogatory words spoken of one in the way of his profession are actionable without proof of special damage. Odgers, Sland. & L. p. 64. The court below were therefore right in submitting the evidence to the jury upon these counts.

The third count charged defendant below with saying of plaintiff below that he was not an ordained minister, and had no right to perform marriages nor baptisms, and the meaning attributed to those words was that he had no power or authority to exercise the functions of a minister. It is upon this count that the allegation of special damage arising from persons refusing to engage his services in the performance of marriages is based. By our statute, marriages may be solemnized by any "stated and ordained minister of the gospel." 2 Gen. St. p. 2005, § 7. The words charged were proved to have been spoken. But the contention was that the plaintiff below had failed to prove that he was such a minister as he had averred he was, and such as could lawfully solemnize marriages. When the alleged slanderous words...