Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc. v. Lichtman

• Decision Date: 28 February 2023
• Docket Number: 1807 EDA 2021,J-A20029-22
• Parties: RITTENHOUSE PLAZA, INC. v. JOAN LICHTMAN Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

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RITTENHOUSE PLAZA, INC. v. JOAN LICHTMAN Appellant

No. 1807 EDA 2021

No. J-A20029-22

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

February 28, 2023

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Order Entered August 4, 2021 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at No.: 071003964

BEFORE: STABILE, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J. ^[*]

MEMORANDUM

STABILE, J.

Appellant Joan Lichtman pro se appeals from the August 4, 2021 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which denied her petition to strike judgment. Upon review, we affirm.

The facts and procedural history of this case are undisputed. Briefly, this appeal stems from a landlord-tenant action between Appellant and Appellee Rittenhouse Plaza, Inc. ("Rittenhouse"), the operator of a housing cooperative under which individual proprietary tenants occupy apartment units under proprietary leases between the tenants and Rittenhouse. From 1992 to 2007, Appellant resided in Unit 8C of Rittenhouse Plaza, located at 1901 Walnut Street in Philadelphia (the "Property").

On September 26, 2007, Rittenhouse filed a landlord-tenant action against Appellant in Philadelphia Municipal Court seeking past due rent and possession of the Property. On October 19, 2007, the court entered judgment in favor of Rittenhouse for money damages and possession. Appellant appealed de novo to the trial court, which eventually, on May 9, 2008, also found in favor of Rittenhouse in the amount of $47,081.19 and awarded Rittenhouse possession of the Property. Appellant's appeals to this Court were unsuccessful and she was evicted from the Property on June 16, 2008.^[1]

On January 28, 2010, Appellant filed an emergency motion to stay the sheriff's sale, which was denied the same day. On February 2, 2010, Appellant's cooperative interest in the Property was sold following active bidding. On April 6, 2010, the sheriff's deed was recorded. On May 28, 2010, the trial court denied Appellant's motion to set aside the sale and this Court affirmed the order on March 11, 2011.

Appellant pro se filed several petitions to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment, all of which were denied.^[2] On July 18, 2021, Appellant filed yet another petition-her fifth-to strike the judgment.^[3] The trial court denied the petition on August 4, 2021. Appellant pro se timely appealed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents seven issues for our review, reproduced verbatim below.

[I.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion in this Landlord-Tenant matter, when failing to get the correct set of facts; failing to inform himself of Philadelphia's law governing evictions, i.e., specifically Philadelphia Code, Chapter 9-1600, entitled Prohibition against Unlawful Eviction Practices; and failing to read Defendant's pleadings and submitted paperwork, thereby, rendering his premises to be incorrect and his conclusions not supported by law nor the evidence?

[II.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion, when wrongly concluding that Defendant's unopposed motion for extraordinary relief, which sought enforcement of Philadelphia Code, Ch. 9-1600, entitled Prohibition against Unlawful Eviction Practices, was, instead, an untimely petition to open a judgment, and, therefore, barred by the coordinate jurisdiction rule and doctrine of res judicata?

[III.] Did the trial court err or abuse discretion when failing to acknowledge and to give due judicial consideration to the reality that Defendant's motion was unopposed?

[IV.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion and/or violate the Canons of Judicial Conduct, nos. 1 and 2, when the Court acted on bias and prejudice, especially against pro se's; failed to carefully read and consider Defendants' pleadings; failed to examine supplied and/or available evidence; and/or when the judge incorrectly applied a convenient legal standard as a contrived excuse to deny Defendant's guaranteed, constitutional rights to due process and a full, fair hearing?

[V.] Did the trial judge err or abuse discretion, while refusing his mandatory, nondiscretionary duty-under the Court's own motion-to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment for possession and money, due to its being void, as a matter of law?

[VI.] Did the trial judge commit a crime(s), when denying Defendant's Motion for Extraordinary Relief, and/or while improperly refusing to sign the mandatory Order to Strike the void May 9, 2008 judgment, and thereby, the trial judge erred in declining to demand the judiciary's, public servants', landlords' and private attorneys' compliance with, and obedience to, Philadelphia Code, Ch. 9-1600?

[VII.] Are the trial judge and/or any other person(s), including public officials or private citizens, subject to prosecution, discipline, and/or sanctions for failing to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct, especially nos. 8.3 and 8.4; failing to obey/enforce Philadelphia Code, Ch. 9-1600; and/or for conspiring with fellow members of the Bar in their engineered demand for Defendant's permanent Silence, i.e., as in Defendant's untimely Death?

Appellant's Brief at 2-3 (emphasis in original) (sic).^[4]

Here, upon review of the entire record, Appellant's petition to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment must be dismissed under the law of the case doctrine. See Ario v. Reliance Ins. Co., 980 A.2d 588, 597 (Pa. 2009) (explaining that "a court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter"). This Court previously dismissed an appeal from the denial of petition to strike the May 9, 2008 judgment that was based on the same allegations that Appellant makes in the instant-her fifth-petition: that the 2008 judgment allegedly was secured through perjury and corruption. Rittenhouse v. Lichtman, No. 2538 EDA 2009 (Pa. Super. Order filed November 30, 2009). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing Appellant's latest petition to strike. See Plasticert, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 923 A.2d 489, 492 (Pa. Super. 2007) ("[W]e may affirm the trial court's order on any valid basis.").

Furthermore, as the trial court observed, the coordinate jurisdiction rule also would prevent Appellant from obtaining relief. As noted, and is apparent from the face of the record, Appellant's instant attempt to strike the judgment entered against her in the 2008 landlord-tenant dispute against Rittenhouse is indistinguishable from her first four unsuccessful attempts.

In Zane v. Friends Hospital, 836 A.2d 25 (Pa. 2003), our Supreme Court explained that the "coordinate jurisdiction rule," provides that judges of coordinate jurisdiction should not overrule each other's decisions. Zane, 836 A.2d at 39. The rule is "based on a policy of fostering the finality of pre-trial applications in an effort to maintain judicial economy and efficiency." Starr, 664 A.2d at 1331. Consistent with the law of the case doctrine generally, it "serves to protect the expectations of the parties, to ensure uniformity of decisions, to maintain consistency in proceedings, to effectuate the administration of justice, and to bring finality to the litigation." Id. The "prohibition against revisiting the prior holding of a judge of coordinate jurisdiction, however, is not absolute." Id. We recognize that a departure from the rule is warranted in "exceptional circumstances" where there has been a change in controlling law, a substantial change in the facts or evidence, or where "the prior holding was clearly erroneous and would create a manifest injustice if followed." Id. (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court explained the clearly erroneous exception as follows.

To accede to a coordinate judge's order that is clearly erroneous would be not only to permit an inequity to work on the party subject to the order, but would allow an action to proceed in the face of almost certain reversal on appellate review. Moreover, the requirement that the prior holding also create a manifest injustice serves as a significant curb on the exception so that it would apply to only those situations in which adhering to the prior holding would be, in essence, plainly intolerable.

DiGregorio v. Keystone Health Plan E., 840 A.2d 361, 368-69 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (quoting Zane, supra at 29-30)) (emphasis added).

As the trial court aptly reasoned:

Beyond her sensational and unfounded conspiracy allegations, [Appellant] does not contend that there has been a change in controlling law or a substantial change in the facts or evidence. Thus, for [Appellant] to be successful, she had to show that the orders of the prior judges were clearly erroneous and a manifest injustice occurred.

It is not enough for the prior orders to simply have been erroneous. The standard is the prior ruling had to have been so clearly erroneous that following it would create a manifest injustice. Adherence to a clearly erroneous order in this context "would allow an action to proceed in the face of almost certain reversal on appellate review." Zane, 836 A.2d at 29-30. A manifest injustice occurs where adherence to the prior order would be "plainly intolerable." Id. As previously noted, [Appellant] does not raise any credible facts that would case any doubt whatsoever on the prior orders and rulings of judges of equal jurisdiction. Thus, this [c]ourt is bound by the prior orders of judges of equal jurisdiction.

Trial Court Opinion, 11/19/21, at 6. We agree with the trial court's reasoning. Separately, we also agree with the trial court's conclusion that Appellant's instant petition "raises identical issues she previously raised on several occasions. As a result, [Appellant'...