Ritter v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co.
Decision Date | 26 September 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 84-C-841. |
Citation | 593 F. Supp. 1279 |
Parties | Alex RITTER, Plaintiff, v. COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS COMPANY, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
Donald P. MacDonald, Hornbein, MacDonald, Fattor & Buckley, P.C., Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.
Stephen G. Koerner, Colorado Interstate Gas Company, Colorado Springs, Colo., for defendant.
This is an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. Defendant has moved to dismiss the plaintiff's pendent state law contract claims. The motion has been thoroughly briefed and oral argument would not materially assist my decision.
Plaintiff is presently fifty-six years old. He was employed by Colorado Interstate Gas Company ("CIG" or "the company") in Colorado Springs, Colorado from April 4, 1952 until February 11, 1983, when he was discharged. His most recent position with the company was as supervisor of the capital budget. His complaint alleges that his job performance with CIG was always satisfactory or better. Moreover, he alleges that, when he was fired, his duties were transferred to younger, less expert employees.
Plaintiff asserts three claims for relief. First, he claims he was discharged because of his age in violation of the ADEA. Second, he claims breach of contract based upon a 1952 oral representation that he would be employed as long as his job performance remained satisfactory. Third, he claims the defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising from the long and continuous employer-employee relationship. The second and third claims are the pendent state claims targeted by the motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff requests reinstatement, back pay including loss of retirement and other benefits, compensatory damages, liquidated damages as provided in the ADEA 29 U.S.C. § 626(b), punitive damages, and attorneys' fees.
CIG moves pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and (6), Fed.R.Civ.P., to dismiss the second and third claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. I will discuss first the jurisdictional issue.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), provides the guidelines for determining whether, under Article III, a federal district court can exercise jurisdiction over state claims appended to a federal claim. First, the federal claim must be of sufficient substance to confer federal jurisdiction. There is no question that the ADEA claim here meets that requirement.
Second, the federal and state claims must arise out of a "common nucleus of operative fact which the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try ... in one judicial proceeding ...." 388 U.S. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. A loose factual connection between the claims has generally been held sufficient to satisfy this second requirement. See Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction, § 3567, pp. 445-47.
All three claims here joined arise from CIG's termination of the plaintiff's employment. Evidence of the parties' conduct at the time of the termination, the plaintiff's job performance, and the company's motivation for discharging him would have to be introduced to prove each of the claims. But the contract claims would require evidence not needed to prove the ADEA claim — such as proof of the existence and terms of the alleged 1952 oral agreement. The "common nucleus of operative facts" test, however, does not require that the facts giving rise to the state and federal claims be identical. In my view, the pendent contract claims meet the second Gibbs test. Accordingly, this court is empowered by Article III of the United States Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state claims.
The Supreme Court has recently declared, however, that there are statutory as well as constitutional limits on the exercise of pendent jurisdiction. Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). This issue was explored in Frye v. Pioneer Logging Machinery, Inc., 555 F.Supp. 730, 732-3 (D.S.C. 1983), an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.:
The plaintiff in Frye alleged sex discrimination under Title VII and also alleged state law claims for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court in Frye concluded that Title VII and its judicial history reveal an implied congressional command negating the exercise of pendent jurisdiction over the state claims set forth in the plaintiff's complaint.
In so deciding, the court followed the reasoning and holding in other Title VII actions. Bennett v. Southern Marine Management Co., 531 F.Supp. 115 (M.D. Fla.1982); Jong-Yul Lim v. International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit, 510 F.Supp. 722 (E.D.Mich.1981); Kiss v. Tamarac Utilities, Inc., 463 F.Supp. 951 (S.D. Fla.1978). These courts have held that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction would be inconsistent with, and would tend to subvert, Title VII policies, rights and remedies.
First, the relief Congress provided under Title VII is limited to reinstatement, back pay, and other equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The joinder of state law claims, under which a plaintiff might be entitled to compensatory and punitive damages, would directly conflict with the congressional intent of limited relief.
Second, Title VII contains specific procedural limitations designed to expedite resolution of these cases. Title VII claimants are not entitled to a jury trial. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(4). Claims under Title VII should be adjudicated within 120 days after issue has been joined. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(5). If a case cannot be set for trial within the 120 days, the court may appoint a master to adjudicate the case. Id. The court in Jong-Yul Lim v. International Institute of Metropolitan Detroit, supra, 510 F.Supp. at 725-6, expressed the conflict between Title VII and the adjudication of pendent state claims as follows:
"The joinder of state law claims which expand the scope of issues to be resolved and preclude the possibility of referring the matter to a master would frustrate the express congressional intent, as evidenced by the foregoing provisions, of having employment discrimination cases under Title VII resolved in the most expeditious manner possible."
Other courts, however, have found no statutory limits on the exercise of jurisdiction over state claims pendent to Title VII claims. See, e.g., Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Services, Inc., 711 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir.1983); Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 518 F.Supp. 521 (D.N.J.1981); Palazon v. KFC National Management Co., 28 FEP 458 (N.D.Ill.1981).
Apparently no court has performed an Aldinger v. Howard/Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger type analysis of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.
The ADEA, like Title VII, contains remedial limitations. An employee discharged in violation of the ADEA is entitled to reinstatement, back pay, and, if the violation was willful, liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). Relief not expressly provided for within the enforcement scheme of the ADFA, such as compensatory and punitive damages, is not recoverable. Perrell v. Finanaceamerica Corp., 726 F.2d 654, 657 (10th Cir.1984); see also Blim v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 731 F.2d 1473 (10th Cir.1984).
The ADEA does not, however, contain the procedural limitations of Title VII. The ADEA was amended in 1978 to guarantee trial by jury of any fact issue. 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2). There is no provision for expedited adjudication nor for referral to a master. I find no significant conflict between the statutory procedures required by the ADEA and the adjudication of pendent state claims.2
The arguments supporting congressional negation of the exercise of jurisdiction over a state claim pendent to a federal statutory claim are thus more persuasive for Title VII claims than for ADEA claims. I do not find that Congress in the ADEA has "expressly or by implication negated the exercise of jurisdiction"3 over the plaintiff's pendent breach of contract or implied covenant of good faith dealing claims.
Assuming that this court has power to hear the pendent state claims, it does not follow that they must be heard here. Exercise of pendent jurisdiction is committed to the informed discretion of the district court. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, supra, 383 U.S. at 726-7, 86 S.Ct. at 1139, the Supreme Court identified a number of factors that counsel against the exercise of jurisdiction...
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