Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College

• Decision Date: 28 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-3015,86-3015
• Citation: 814 F.2d 986
• Parties: 43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 654, 28 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 4, 42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,928, 55 USLW 2555, 106 Lab.Cas. P 34,895, 38 Ed. Law Rep. 424 Madeline RITTER, Appellant, v. MOUNT ST. MARY'S COLLEGE, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 986

814 F.2d 986

43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 654, 28 Wage & Hour

Cas. (BN 4,

42 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 36,928, 55 USLW 2555,

106 Lab.Cas. P 34,895, 38 Ed. Law Rep. 424

Madeline RITTER, Appellant, v. MOUNT ST. MARY'S COLLEGE, Appellee.

No. 86-3015.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued Oct. 8, 1986.

Decided April 2, 1987.

Rehearing Denied May 28, 1987.

Carol E. Tracy (Dona S. Kahn, Harris and Kahn, Philadelphia, Pa., on brief), for appellant.

Neil J. Dilloff (Jonathan D. Smith, Piper & Marbury, Baltimore, Md., on brief), for appellee.

Before ERVIN, CHAPMAN, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

CHAPMAN, Circuit Judge:

This suit alleging age and sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, et seq., the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 621, et seq. involves both legal and equitable claims. The district court dismissed the plaintiff's legal claims under EPA and ADEA and conducted a bench trial on the equitable claim under Title VII. This court remanded the case for trial on the legal claims, finding their dismissal to be error. ¹ The question presented in this appeal is whether the findings of fact made by the trial judge in the Title VII equitable suit should collaterally estop the relitigation of those facts before a jury on the remanded EPA and ADEA legal actions. Although the plaintiff has been denied her right to a jury trial on the legal theories, we are persuaded by Parklane Hosiery Company, Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979), that the interests of the judicial system in the prudent use of its limited resources permit the doctrine of collateral estoppel to operate to preclude relitigation of these issues before the jury. Thus, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the plaintiff's legal claims.

I.

Mount Saint Mary's College ("College") is the oldest independent Catholic institution of higher learning in the United States. Located in Emmitsburg, Maryland, it provides a liberal arts education to its students. Its faculty consists of both laymen and clergy.

The College employed Madeline Ritter, the appellant, as an assistant professor of education from September 1973 until June 1980. Mrs. Ritter is a Caucasian woman, at that time in her fifties. In addition to her teaching duties, Mrs. Ritter served as acting chairman of her department and developed elementary education courses. She received favorable evaluations from her students during the course of this employment.

Before 1977, tenure for faculty members at the College was easily attained after seven years service. In 1977, the Board of Trustees of the College appointed Robert J. Wickenheiser as President and instructed him to establish a standard of academic excellence. He was directed to upgrade the quality of the College's faculty by the imposition of a new tenure policy. The College's new policy held that tenure "is not automatic, but the result of demonstrated excellence as a teacher and scholar." In particular, the handbook specifies that a tenure applicant should demonstrate "continued scholarly growth and commitment." Whether a candidate possessed a terminal degree in his field (a Ph.D. or the highest degree granted in the particular academic discipline) was also listed as one of the relevant criteria in the tenure decision. Mrs. Ritter lacked a terminal degree and had never published, although she had apparently taken some graduate courses at the University of Maryland.

Mrs. Ritter became eligible for tenure consideration in 1978. As part of the new tenure process, Dr. Wickenheiser received evaluations and recommendations from academic department chairmen, the Faculty Affairs Committee, and the Dean of the College.

Several department chairmen criticized Mrs. Ritter's lack of scholarly achievement, citing her failure to publish articles or books in her field. They concluded that her prospects for scholarly growth were poor. The new chairman of the Education Department, John Popenfus, recommended that the College grant Mrs. Ritter tenure subject to several restrictive conditions not usually associated with a tenured college or university faculty member. He also rated Mrs. Ritter "poor" in several evaluation categories. The Faculty Affairs Committee also recommended that Mrs. Ritter receive tenure. Several members of that committee, however, testified that Dr. Wickenheiser's later decision to deny tenure was academically defensible and implied that their recommendation was prompted more by their sympathy for Mrs. Ritter (who had an ill husband) than by their respect for her scholarly attainment. Finally, Dean John Campbell recommended that the College deny Mrs. Ritter's tenure application. He found that Mrs. Ritter lacked the academic preparation and accomplishments necessary to justify the granting of tenure.

After considering these evaluations, Dr. Wickenheiser concluded that Mrs. Ritter fell short of the requirement of demonstrated excellence in various academic categories, and "unequivocally judged Mrs. Ritter not to be qualified for tenure." Mrs. Ritter appealed the denial, but the Executive Committee of the College Board of Trustees upheld Dr. Wickenheiser's decision.

In 1980 Mrs. Ritter filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. She alleged that the College had violated her rights as secured by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.

The College filed a Motion to Dismiss which was treated by the district court as a Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On August 5, 1980, the district court granted the Motion to Dismiss the EPA and ADEA claims on the grounds that the Supreme Court's ruling in NLRB v. Catholic Bishops of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 59 L.Ed.2d 533 (1979), dictated that the two acts did not apply to religious institutions such as the defendant college. The district court, however, denied the motion to dismiss the Title VII claim. In light of the dismissal of the EPA and ADEA claims, the College filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's jury trial demand, which motion was unopposed. ²

The district court, sitting as the fact finder, conducted the trial of Mrs. Ritter's Title VII claim. The trial consisted primarily of an attack upon the qualifications of John Popenfus, who was granted tenure by the College in 1979. The district court found that (1) Mrs. Ritter was not qualified for tenure at the College, and (2) Dr. Popenfus was clearly more qualified than the plaintiff. The court thus awarded judgment for the College with costs.

The plaintiff and defendant thereupon filed cross-appeals to this court. Mrs. Ritter appealed the dismissal of her EPA and ADEA claims as well as the denial of her Title VII tenure claim. On June 8, 1984, this court reversed the district court's decision that the provisions of the EPA and the ADEA do not apply to a church-sponsored college, and remanded these claims for "further consideration." This court affirmed the judgment against Mrs. Ritter on the Title VII claim. Specifically, this court declined to disturb the district court's factual finding that Mrs. Ritter was not qualified for tenure. This court also affirmed the district court's denial of the College's request for its attorney's fees.

After remand, the College petitioned the district court for summary judgment on the EPA and ADEA claims. The college argued that, because the ADEA and EPA claims had common elements with the Title VII claim, the issues determined by the court in the Title VII claim collaterally estopped the relitigation of those issues before a jury.

Recognizing that the issues involved were identical, the plaintiff filed, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(5), a motion to vacate the judgment on the Title VII claim, in order to permit the jury to find the facts free of the court's judgment. On September 3, 1985, the district court found that it lacked authority to vacate this court's Title VII affirmance, and consequently denied the plaintiff's motion. The district court then found that the factual findings reached in the Title VII suit collaterally estopped the plaintiff from establishing a prima facie ADEA claim, because the two causes of action contained the identical element: that the plaintiff must demonstrate that she was qualified for tenure at the College. The motion on the EPA claim was denied without prejudice to permit the plaintiff to conduct further discovery. The district court informed Mrs. Ritter, regarding her EPA claim, that she "must show comparisons with individuals other than John Popenfus, a person the court has already ruled more qualified than the plaintiff during the relevant time period." On November 1, 1985, Mrs. Ritter submitted her memorandum on the EPA claim, again identifying John Popenfus as her "only valid job comparator." The district court then granted the College's Motion for Summary Judgment on the EPA claim.

On December 5, 1985 the College filed a bill of costs in the district court, which bill was reduced by the clerk of the court. Mrs. Ritter filed a motion to review the taxation of costs, which the district court denied.

Mrs. Ritter appeals the district court's denial of her motion to vacate the Title VII judgment, and its refusal to allow the ADEA and EPA claims to be tried before a jury. She also appeals the award of costs.

II.

Had the district court not erroneously dismissed the appellant's legal claims, a jury, and not the court, would have determined the facts arising out of Mrs. Ritter's denial of tenure. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 79 S.Ct. 948, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 82 S.Ct. 894, 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962), stand for the proposition that, where legal and...