Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins Co. of New York

• Decision Date: 04 April 1895
• Citation: 69 F. 505
• Parties: RITTER v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

69 F. 505

RITTER v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO. OF NEW YORK.

United States Circuit Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

April 4, 1895

Barnes Wintersteen & Bispham, for plaintiff.

John G Johnson and Chas. P. Sherman, for defendant.

BUTLER District Judge (charging jury, orally).

This case, as it has been said to you, is one of great importance one which deserves your careful attention; which can only be decided justly by understanding the law that governs it and adhering strictly to the evidence.

As frequently occurs, a good deal of testimony has been heard and several questions raised that will be found in the view the court now takes of the case, to be entirely unimportant. I only regret that we could not know at the outset how the case would present itself to our minds at the close that we might have avoided the unnecessary expenditure of time, and unnecessary taxing of your strength and patience, and devoted ourselves to what turns out to be the consideration upon which the case must be decided.

The counsel for plaintiff have presented to the court several points on which we are asked to charge, for the purpose of getting their view of the law before you. The plaintiff's first, second and third points are disaffirmed. The fourth is also disaffirmed for the reasons given in answering the defendant's first point, of which I will speak directly.

The fifth point reads as follows:

'If one whose life is insured intentionally kills himself when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired by insanity that he is unable to understand the moral character of his act, even if he does understand its physical nature, consequence, and effect, such self-destruction will not of itself prevent recovery upon the policies.'

This is affirmed.

I will say, however, that we must understand what is meant and intended by the term 'moral character of his act.' It is a term which has been used by courts, and it is correctly inserted in the point; but it is a term that might be misunderstood. We are not to enter the domain of metaphysics in determining what constitutes insanity, so far as the subject is involved in this case. If Mr. Runk understood what he was doing, and the consequences of his act or acts, to himself as well as to others; in other words if he understood as a man of sound mind would, the consequences to follow from his contemplated suicide, to himself, his character, his family and others, and was able to comprehend the wrongfulness of what he was about to do as a sane man would, then he is to be regarded by you as sane. Otherwise he is not.

The defendant's first point reads as follows:

'There can be no recovery by the estate of the dead man of the amount of policies of insurance upon his life, if he takes his own life designedly, whilst of sound mind.'

This point is affirmed. The defendant's first point which I have just read to you and affirmed, and the plaintiff's fourth point which I have disaffirmed, raise the same question and it is one of very great difficulty. It is very remarkable that the question has never been directly passed upon by any court of last resort, nor so far as has been discovered, by any other, in this country or in England. When the points were presented I said in your presence that in the absence of authority, or of custom on the part of insurance companies, or the business of insuring, bearing on the subject, I would feel little hesitation in holding that suicide by the insured, while in a sane condition of mind, constitutes a defense to the payment of the policy, but that I was inclined to believe there is authority to the contrary.

It is conceded, however, that there is nothing to be found on the subject but dicta; and this is conflicting, and there is no evidence before the court of any custom in the business of insurance bearing on the subject.

I regret that I must pass on the question without opportunity for examination or reflection. It seems to me, however, that every contract of life insurance contains an implied condition that the insured will not intentionally terminate his life, but that the insurer shall have the benefit of the chances of its continuance until terminated in the natural ordinary course of events. It is upon these chances that the premium is calculated and based, and the contract is founded. It cannot be doubted that if one having a policy on his buildings, insuring against fire, should intentionally burn them, his act would be a defense to the policy; nor that one taking a policy on the life of his debtor, whom he subsequently murders, cannot recover the insurance. In...