Ritter v. Norman

• Citation: 129 P. 103,71 Wash. 563
• Parties: RITTER v. NORMAN.
• Decision Date: 20 January 1913
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington

129 P. 103

71 Wash. 563

RITTER v. NORMAN.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 20, 1913

Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, King County; R. B. Albertson Judge.

Action by May Ritter against Charles Norman. Judgment for plaintiff and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Kellogg & Huntoon, of Seattle, for appellant.

John E Humphries and Geo. B. Cole, both of Seattle, for respondent.

CHADWICK, J.

Defendant was the proprietor of a hotel, and plaintiff was on March 31 1910, and for some time prior thereto had been a lodger therein. Plaintiff occupied a room on the sixth floor. On the day mentioned the elevator was out of commission, and plaintiff undertook to go from her room to the ground floor by way of the stairway leading down from floor to floor. The stairway was somewhere near the center of the building, as we suppose, not having the drawings to which the witnesses referred when upon the stand. The stairway ran at a right angle from the hall, descended a few steps to a landing making a square turn, and then running parallel to the first flight and landing on the floor below. The testimony of the plaintiff shows that there were no windows to light these stairways, nor was there any artificial light; that the stairways and landings were dark, and, in the exercise of reasonable care for her own safety, she fell on the landing which was between the fourth and third floors and was injured. A jury has returned a verdict in her favor. From the judgment upon the verdict, defendant has appealed.

It is the contention of appellant that respondent was guilty of contributory negligence, or rather, having notice and knowledge of the darkened stairway, assumed the risk, and therefore cannot recover. Several cases, including the case of Glass v. Colman, 14 Wash. 635, 45 P. 310, are cited to sustain this argument. The discussion of the principle of contributory negligence was not necessary to the decision in that case. What is said is a broad statement of the general rule, but it does not follow that the same rule is applicable here. In the Colman Case the plaintiff had sought lodgings in a cheap lodging house having board walls covered with cloth and paper. The building took fire, and plaintiff was injured while escaping from it; the injury resulting from the manner of construction, of which the plaintiff had notice. The court held that he could not recover, saying: 'If the construction was in fact such as to make it dangerous for a guest to occupy a room in the hotel, the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence when, with a knowledge of the defective construction, he remained a guest of the hotel.' But that case and the others cited by appellant do not fit the case at bar. Here there is no question as to the construction of the building. It was, so far as the record goes, a building of modern type, with an elevator and stairways, and was fitted up in a way to attract the patronage of the public. It had lights in the hallways and on the stairways, which might have been lighted while the elevator was out of use. It will be seen that the injury to respondent resulted, not from any defect that was so open and obvious as to put a traveler or lodger on his guard and send him on his way, but from the failure of the appellant to use his property in such a way, and to exercise those precautions which the nature of the use of the property demanded, and which he had provided to be used in just such emergencies. A guest in a hotel has a right to depend upon a stairway, and the fact that it is open and stands as an invitation at all times, and especially when the elevator, if there is one, is out of use, puts a burden upon the proprietor to put the means...