Ritterhoff v. Puget Sound Nat. Bank

• Decision Date: 16 February 1905
• Citation: 37 Wash. 76,79 P. 601
• Parties: RITTERHOFF et al. v. PUGET SOUND NAT. BANK OF SEATTLE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

79 P. 601

37 Wash. 76

RITTERHOFF et al. v. PUGET SOUND NAT. BANK OF SEATTLE.

Supreme Court of Washington

February 16, 1905

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; W. R. Bell, Judge.

Bill by William Ritterhoff and another against the Puget Sound National Bank of Seattle. From a decree in favor of plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Carr & Preston, for appellant.

Robert H. Lindsay, for respondents.

CROW J.

This is an action in equity to enjoin appellant from asserting any demand against respondents, or either of them, upon a certain pretended promissory note, or in any manner transferring or indorsing the same. The complaint, which was verified on February 12, 1904, in substance alleges that the plaintiff William Ritterhoff is an unmarried man, a resident of Seattle, King county, Wash.; that he has been at all times mentioned in the complaint, and still is, an invalid suffering from paralysis, and that he owns real and personal property within King county, Wash., of the reasonable value of $75,000; that plaintiff Lena Krug is a widow, and has real and personal property within King county, Wash., of the value of $7,000; that ever since the 15th day of January, 1903, the said defendant has been, and still is, asserting that it of right has and holds a certain claim and demand against said plaintiffs for the sum of $5,000, by virtue of a pretended promissory note purporting to be executed by one Adolph Krug now deceased, and also by the said plaintiffs William Ritterhoff and Lena Krug, as joint and several makers, and that said note is now in the possession of the defendant that said defendant, by written notice, has, prior to the commencement of this action, demanded payment of said note from plaintiffs, and from each of them; that the names of plaintiffs, as appearing on said pretended note as their signatures, are each of them false, fraudulent, and forgeries, and that plaintiffs did not, nor did either of them, ever execute or authorize the execution of said note that prior to the commencement of this action plaintiffs, and each of them, notified defendant that, as to them and each of them, said pretended note was false, fraudulent, and a forgery, and that, notwithstanding said notification, said defendant still claims to hold said note as a valid demand against said plaintiffs, and each of them; that said plaintiffs never at any time received any consideration for said pretended note. Plaintiffs also allege danger of irreparable damage, that they have no speedy or adequate remedy at law, and pray equitable relief as above stated. To this complaint appellant interposed a general and special demurrer, which being overruled, appellant elected to stand upon its demurrer, and declined to plead further. Thereupon a decree was rendered in accordance with the prayer of the complaint, adjudging said note, as against respondents, to be false, fraudulent, a forgery, and null and void, and forever enjoining and restraining appellant from asserting any demand against respondents, or either of them, upon said pretended note, and from transferring or dealing with said pretended note as against respondents, or either of them. From said final judgment and decree this appeal is taken.

The only ground of demurrer seriously urged upon this appeal is that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Appellant contends a court of equity has no jurisdiction, for the reason that respondents have an adequate remedy at law; urging that from the facts alleged in the complaint it clearly appears that, as soon as appellant shall bring its action upon said note, it will only be necessary for respondents to deny the execution of the note, and thereupon appellant will be put upon proof of the genuineness of the disputed signatures. For the purposes of the demurrer, it is admitted that the pretended signatures are forgeries. It does not clearly appear from the complaint that the note has matured, although possibly its maturity may be inferred by reason of demand for payment having been made. Appellant urges that a forged note is void always and everywhere; that it cannot bind the alleged maker, in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, either at common law or under our statute (Sess. Laws 1899, p. 345, c. 149, § 23); that the note is past due, and, even if genuine, has passed the day of innocent purchase; that, therefore, drawing proper deductions from the allegations of the complaint, the note in suit can never be collected from respondents; and that, in the event appellant should attempt to collect it from them by action at law, they would have nothing to do but deny its execution.

In defining the jurisdiction of courts of equity, it is a well-established principle that equity will not relieve when there is a full, adequate, and complete remedy at law. To deprive such courts of jurisdiction, it is not sufficient that there may be some remedy at law which may be enforced at some indefinite time in the future, but such remedy must be plain, adequate, and complete. 'In general, courts of equity will not assume jurisdiction where the powers of the ordinary courts are sufficient for the purposes of justice. And therefore it may be stated as a general rule, subject to few exceptions, that where the plaintiff can have as effectual and complete a remedy in a court of law as in a court of equity, and that remedy is direct, certain, and adequate, a demurrer, which is in truth a demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court, will hold. But where there is a clear right, and yet there is no remedy in a court of law, or the remedy is not plain, adequate, and complete, and adapted to the particular exigency, then and in such cases courts of equity will maintain jurisdiction.' Story's Equity Pleading (10th Ed.) § 473. 'The remedy at law which precludes relief in equity must be as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the remedy in equity.' Fletcher's Eq. Pl. & Pr. § 208; Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, 3 Pet. 210, 7 L.Ed. 655. The Supreme Court of Indiana, in the case of Otis v. Gregory, 111 Ind., at page 511, 13 N. E., at page 42, says: 'Whatever may have been formerly held in other jurisdictions in respect to the cancellation of void contracts, the doctrine that a party to an instrument which is of no legal force or validity whatever may ask the aid of a court of equity in procuring its surrender and cancellation, is now fully set at rest here. It is regarded as against conscience that one party should persist in holding a deed or other instrument against another, of which he can make no possible use except as a means of embarrassing his adversary.' 1 Story, Eq. Jurisprudence, § 700. 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jurisprudence, § 1377.

What is the practical effect of the remedy at law which appellant contends respondents have in this action? Simply to permit present conditions to remain entirely undisturbed; to allow appellant to continue holding said note against respondents as a possible cause of action at law; to sue or not sue thereon as it--appellant--may elect; to keep or dispose of said note at appellant's pleasure, while respondents await an indefinite...