Rivera-Flores v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1995
• Docket Number: RIVERA-FLORE,P,No. 94-1977,94-1977
• Parties: 4 A.D. Cases 1450, 11 A.D.D. 576, 7 NDLR P 77 Iris v.laintiff, Appellant, v. PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee. First Circuit. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 742

64 F.3d 742

4 A.D. Cases 1450, 11 A.D.D. 576, 7

NDLR P 77

Iris v. RIVERA-FLORES, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. PUERTO RICO TELEPHONE COMPANY, Defendant, Appellee.

No. 94-1977.

United States Court of Appeals,First Circuit.

Heard March 7, 1995.

Decided Sept. 6, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 28, 1995.

Harry Anduze Montano, for appellant.

Edgardo Colon Arraras, with whom Ina M. Berlingeri Vincenty and Goldman, Antonetti & Cordova were on brief, for appellee.

Before TORRUELLA, Chief Judge, COFFIN, Senior Circuit Judge, and CYR, Circuit Judge.

CYR, Circuit Judge.

Iris Rivera-Flores ("Rivera") challenges certain district court rulings relating to various commonwealth and federal claims against appellee Puerto Rico Telephone Company ("PRTC"), her former employer, for condoning the harassment she experienced at work on account of her visual handicap, and for terminating her employment. We vacate the district court judgment and remand for retrial.

I BACKGROUND ¹

Rivera began working the night shift for PRTC as a traffic operator in 1984. In January 1986, PRTC acceded to her request for reasonable accommodation of her visual impairment--congenital cataracts in both eyes and secondary angle closure glaucoma--by transferring her to a day-shift position as a service representative. During her four-month tenure as a service representative, Rivera's supervisors and co-workers harassed her by making derogatory remarks about her visual handicap; her supervisors reported her work performance as unsatisfactory; and in April 1986, she was reassigned to her former position as a traffic operator on the night shift.

Rivera's labor union filed a successful grievance in opposition to her reassignment, and in November 1988, Rivera was reinstated, with back pay, as a sales representative on the day shift. Her supervisors resumed their complaints that Rivera's visual problems were adversely affecting her job performance; provided her with inadequate on-the-job training; refused to give her a desk or work assignments for several weeks; brushed aside her repeated requests for reasonable accommodation (e.g., a special magnifying glass to facilitate reading, and overtime compensation for catching up on a preexisting three-month work backlog); and attempted to coerce her into accepting an unfavorable job evaluation. Her day-shift supervisors and co-workers resumed their derogatory comments (e.g., calling her "little blind lady," "mentally retarded," "mutant," cross-eyed, and physically repulsive), and hid or defaced her paperwork.

In April 1989, Rivera reported to the State Insurance Fund ("Fund"), and was diagnosed with, and treated for, an emotional and mental condition attributable to the job-related Thereafter, Rivera filed her final amended complaint, which included two federal claims. First, she alleged that PRTC, an instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, had violated her procedural due process rights by terminating her employment without a pretermination hearing. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV. Second, she pleaded a Rehabilitation Act claim, based on her termination and on PRTC's negligent condonation of the discriminatory harassment she experienced at the hands of its employees. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794 (prohibiting discrimination based on handicap by any program "receiving federal financial assistance"), Sec. 794a (prescribing equitable and legal remedies for violation); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000d-7 (waiving State's Eleventh Amendment immunity for damages in actions under Rehabilitation Act).

                harassment. 2  She filed suit in December 1989 against PRTC in federal district court, seeking compensatory and punitive damages, front and back pay, injunctive relief, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees.  When Rivera sought to return to work following her discharge from the Fund in December 1991, PRTC informed her that her position was no longer available because the Puerto Rico workers' compensation statute obligated employers to hold jobs open for only twelve months after the onset of the disability.  See P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 11, Sec. 7 (1991).  PRTC sent its formal termination letter to Rivera on December 14, 1992, without according Rivera a pretermination hearing
                

Rivera's claims under commonwealth law alleged that PRTC (1) violated P.R. Const. art. II, Sec. 8 (providing that "[e]very person has the right to the protection of law against abusive attacks on h[er] honor, reputation and private or family life"), (2) violated the Commonwealth's statutory analog to the Federal Rehabilitation Act, P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 1, Sec. 511, and (3) intentionally or negligently inflicted personal injury, see P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 31, Secs. 5141-5142 (cause of action for damages against employer for injury inflicted by employer and its employees). Rivera demanded jury trial on all claims.

PRTC moved for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Rehabilitation Act claim because PRTC's receipt of Federal Emergency Management Agency ("FEMA") disaster funds could not, as a matter of law, qualify it as a "program ... receiving federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794. The district court disagreed, rejected the jurisdictional challenge, and denied summary judgment. Rivera-Flores v. PRTC, 840 F.Supp. 3, 6 (D.P.R.1993) (Laffitte, J.).

On the first day of trial, after Judge Laffitte unexpectedly recused himself, the parties agreed to proceed with the jury trial before a magistrate judge. When Rivera rested her case, PRTC moved for judgment as a matter of law on the Rehabilitation Act claim, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1), on the ground that Rivera had failed to introduce evidence that PRTC had "receiv[ed] federal financial assistance" in the form of FEMA disaster funds. Rivera responded that she did not proffer such evidence, because Judge Laffitte's earlier order denying summary judgment to PRTC conclusively established that the court had subject matter jurisdiction over her Rehabilitation Act claim against PRTC. In the alternative, Rivera requested that she be permitted to reopen her case to present this evidence.

The magistrate judge summarily denied the request to reopen and dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim, after correctly noting that a denial of summary judgment normally does not settle material factual disputes upon which the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proof. The court then decided to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the three commonwealth claims, see 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367, but nevertheless discharged the jury after concluding that Rivera had no independent Seventh Amendment right to jury trial on these commonwealth claims in federal court, see U.S. Const. amend. VII, since plaintiffs enjoy Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment on Rivera's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, see P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 31, Secs. 5141-5142, awarding her $90,000 in damages. The three remaining claims were dismissed. First, the federal procedural due process claim was dismissed on the ground that Puerto Rico law presumes the natural expiration of an employee's "property right" in her employment after one year of continuous disability. Rivera-Flores v. PRTC, No. 89-1697, 1994 WL 422314, at * 10, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS, at * 30 (D.P.R. June 20, 1994) (citing Carron Lamoutte v. Compania de Turismos, 92 J.T.S. 27, at 9306 (1992)). Second, the claim asserted under the commonwealth constitution failed for lack of proof of "reputational damage." Id. at * 8, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS, at * 23. Third, the handicap discrimination claim foundered because the 1992 amendment to the Puerto Rico statute which provides a private cause of action for damages is not made applicable to pre-1992 causes of action. Id. at * 10, 1994 U.S.Dist. LEXIS, at * 30 (interpreting P.R.Laws Ann. tit. 1, Sec. 511).

no such parallel right under the Puerto Rico Constitution.

II DISCUSSION

A. Federal Rehabilitation Act Claim

Rivera focuses first on the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim because she did not introduce evidence that PRTC was a "program ... receiving federal financial assistance." She insists that this question had never been placed in genuine dispute by PRTC, that the pretrial order denying PRTC's summary judgment motion (Laffitte, J.) had established this "jurisdictional" fact, and that she was caught off guard by the magistrate judge's decision to treat Judge Laffitte's pretrial order as non-dispositive. In these circumstances, she suggests, at the very least the court should have allowed her briefly to reopen and introduce the "undisputed" evidence that PRTC received FEMA disaster funds.

Trial court rulings on motions to reopen civil cases to permit additional evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Hibiscus Assocs., Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 917-18 (11th Cir.1995); Joseph v. Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir.1994); Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.1986); Swartz v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 323 F.2d 713, 714 (7th Cir.1963). While the particular criteria that guide a trial court's decision to reopen are necessarily flexible and case-specific, it is generally understood that a trial court abuses its discretion if its refusal to reopen works an "injustice" in the particular circumstances. See Gas Ridge, Inc. v. Suburban Agric. Properties, Inc., 150 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir.1945). Among the material factors which should be assessed by the trial court are whether: (1) the evidence sought to be introduced is especially important and probative; (2) the moving party's explanation for failing to introduce the evidence earlier is bona fide; and (3) reopening will cause no undue prejudice to the nonmoving party. See,...