Velez Rivera v. Agosto Alicea, CIV. 01-2240(SEC).
| Decision Date | 24 August 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 01-2240(SEC).,CIV. 01-2240(SEC). |
| Parties | Iseut G. VELEZ RIVERA, et al. Plaintiffs v. Juan AGOSTO ALICEA, et als. Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Francisco González-Colón, Esq., San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Ada Nurie Pagán-Isona, Esq., Edwin J. Seda-Fernández, Michelle Taveira-Tirado, Nestor J. Navas-D'Acosta, Rafael Escalera-Rodríguez, Esqs., Reichard & Escalera, Esther Crespin-Credi, Carlos Del-Valle-Cruz, Esqs., Department of Justice, Commonwealth of P. R., Gloria Robinson-Guarch, Esq., Department of Justice, Federal Litigation Div., San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
This is an action for injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages brought by Iseut Vélez-Rivera ("Vélez") and Fernando Peña-Castro ("Peña") ("Plaintiffs") against Juan Agosto-Alicea ("Agosto")(President of the Government Development Bank ("GDB") and others ("Defendants") in their individual and official capacity as officials of the GDB).1 Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Constitution of the United States. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Agosto terminated their employment with the GDB because of their political affiliation to the New Progressive Party ("NPP").
Pending before the Court is Defendants' motions for summary judgment requesting the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Section 1983 claims, as well as their claims arising under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Dockets 47, 49, 59 & 114). In essence, Defendants contend that there are no genuine issues of material fact indicating that Vélez's termination and Peña's cancelled service contract were in fact politically motivated and, that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiffs have filed their oppositions to Defendants' motions (Dockets # 105 & 125).
On December 12, 2003, Defendants' motions were referred to Magistrate Judge Gustavo A. Gelpí for his report and recommendation (Docket # 98). Thereafter, on February 20, 2004, the Magistrate issued his report recommending that Defendants' motions be denied in their entirety (Docket # 106). Timely objections to the Magistrate's Report were filed by both Agosto and the GDB (Dockets #112 & 113).
Upon careful review of the parties' arguments, the Magistrate Judge's Report, Defendants' objections thereto, and the applicable law, we find that Defendants' motions for summary judgment should be GRANTED and the case DISMISSED as to all claims against Defendants. We proceed to explain.
On November 7, 2000, general elections were held in Puerto Rico. The incumbent NPP was defeated by the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"). As part of a newly elected PPD administration, Co-defendant Juan Agosto Alicea was appointed as president of the GDB on January 2, 2001. Plaintiffs allege that soon after Agosto's arrival, the GDB began taking adverse employment actions against employees who were affiliated with the NPP. The details of each Plaintiffs' claims are set forth below.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) provides that: "A party against whom a claim ... is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part [of the claims asserted against him/her]." The Court may grant the movant's motion for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986); NASCO, Inc. v. Public Storage, Inc., 29 F.3d 28 (1st Cir.1994). "The principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists." 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2725, p. 401.
In this regard, the First Circuit Court of Appeals has noted that for a dispute to be "genuine," there must be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable trier of fact to resolve the issue in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property, 960 F.2d 200, 204 (1st Cir.1992); see also Boston Athletic Assn. v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 24 (1st Cir.1989); Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990) () (citations omitted).
By like token, "material" means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Morris v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994). "A fact is material if it tends to resolve any of the issues that have been properly raised by the parties." Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2725 at p. 419. Martínez v. Colón, 54 F.3d 980, 983-984 (1st Cir.1995).
In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence. Casas Office Machines, Inc. v. Mita Copystar America, Inc., 42 F.3d 668 (1st Cir.1994). Summary judgment "admits of no room for credibility determinations, not room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails." Id. (citing Greenburg v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, 835 F.2d 932, 936 (1st Cir.1987)). Accordingly, if the facts permit more than one reasonable inference, the court on summary judgment may not adopt the inference least favorable to the non-moving party. Casas Office Machines, 42 F.3d at 684.
While the moving party has the burden of initially establishing that there is "an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case", Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); the nonmovant has a "corresponding obligation to offer the court more than steamy rhetoric and bare conclusions." Lawton v. State Mutual Life Assurance Company of America, 101 F.3d 218, 223 (1st Cir.1996). Furthermore, Id.; see also Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 358 (1st Cir.1991) (); Medina-Muñoz, 896 F.2d at 8, (quoting Mack v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir.1989)) ( that "[t]he evidence illustrating the factual controversy cannot be conjectural or problematic; it must have substance in the sense that it limns differing versions of the truth which a factfinder must resolve.")
Then applicable Local Rule 311(12) (now codified as Local Rule 56(b)), moreover, requires the moving party to "file annexed to the motion a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried...." Unless the non-moving party controverts this statement, all the material facts set forth therein "shall be deemed to be admitted." Id. Cosme-Rosado v. Serrano-Rodriguez, 360 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.2004). This is the so-called "anti-ferret rule." See, e.g., Orbi, S.A. v. Calvesbert & Brown, 20 F.Supp.2d 289, 291 (D.P.R.1998). While failure to comply with this rule does not automatically warrant the granting of summary judgment, "it launches the nonmovant's case down the road toward an early dismissal." Tavárez v. Champion Products, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 268, 270 (D.P.R.1995).
Section 1983 in itself does not confer substantive rights, but provides a venue for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred. See Graham v. M.S. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). In order to establish liability under Section 1983, a plaintiff must first show that "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1989); Saugus v. Voutour, 474 U.S. 1100, 106 S.Ct. 879, 88 L.Ed.2d 916 (1986); Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir.1985).
Second, a plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908; Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 559. This second prong has two aspects: 1) there must have been an actual deprivation of the plaintiff's federally protected rights; and 2) there must have been a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the deprivation of the plaintiff's federal rights. See Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 559; Voutour, 761 F.2d at 819. In turn, this second element of causal connection requires that the plaintiff establish: 1) for each defendant, that the defendant's own actions deprived the plaintiff of his/her protected rights, Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 n. 58, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 882 F.2d at 562; Figueroa v....
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