Rivera Sanchez v. Autoridad De Energia Electrica
| Decision Date | 01 March 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.03-2179 HL.,CIV.03-2179 HL. |
| Citation | 360 F.Supp.2d 302 |
| Parties | Orlando RIVERA SÁNCHEZ, Plaintiff, v. AUTORIDAD DE ENERGIA ELECTRICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Rosa M. Nogueras, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Patricia Guijarro-Alfonso, Maria Judith Surillo, Guaynabo, PR, Ana M. Margarida-Julia, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Orlando Rivera Sánchez ("Rivera") brings this action against the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA"), Héctor R. Rosario (PREPA's Executive Director), Isabel Nieves de Sánchez (PREPA's Interim Supervisor of the Claims and Judicial Investigation Department), and Ana Blanes (PREPA's Human Resources Division Director) alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990(ADA), the United States Constitution, and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Before the Court is the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 49), recommending that defendants' motions to dismiss the amended complaint (see Docket Nos. 22, 44) be granted in part and denied in part. Co-defendants Héctor Rosario ("Rosario"), Isabel Nieves de Sánchez ("Nieves"), and Ana Blanes ("Blanes"), in their personal capacities, submitted objections to the Report and Recommendation (Docket No. 50), and plaintiff Rivera filed an opposition to these objections (Docket No. 54).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court approves and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.
A district court, may on its own initiative, refer a pending matter to a United States Magistrate Judge for a report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); D.P.R. R. 72. Under Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court is obligated to make a "de novo determination ... of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule." The Court thereafter "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." Phinney v. Wentworth Douglas Hospital, 199 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1999) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)).
In the Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Camille Velez-Rive recommends the following: (1) Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 be denied. (2) Co-defendants Blanes, Rosario, and Nieves' motion to dismiss on the grounds that they enjoy qualified immunity be denied at this time. (3) Defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 be granted as to all defendants. (4) Defendants' motions to dismiss the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims against PREPA be denied. (5) Defendants' motions to dismiss the ADA claims against individual co-defendants Blanes, Rosario, and Nieves be granted for lack of individual liability. (6) Pendent jurisdiction should be exercised over plaintiff's state law claims. Co-defendants Blanes, Rosario, and Nieves object to the Report and Recommendation on the grounds that plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them are time-barred and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.
In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that on February 13, 2003, Sylvette López, from PREPA's "program to help the employee," advised plaintiff that PREPA should approve the retirement of plaintiff due to mental impairment and that plaintiff's emotional condition was not work-related. Plaintiff avers that this early retirement was involuntary and that it shows a pattern of discrimination against him due to his political affiliation and mental incapacity. Co-defendants contend that they cannot be liable for the actions of Sylvette López. Plaintiff avers that co-defendants are liable under a supervisory liability theory.
For a supervisor to be liable under § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the supervisor's own acts or omissions deprived plaintiff of a constitutionally protected right, (2) that his conduct or inaction amounted to reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others, and (3) that there was an affirmative link between the misconduct and action or inaction of supervisory officials. See Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir.1989); Figueroa v. Aponte-Roque, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir.1989). However, "[s]upervisors need not have personal knowledge of the alleged violation ... if they were indirectly responsible for or could have prevented the challenged act." Figueroa, 864 F.2d at 953.
Here, plaintiff asserts that co-defendants Blanes, Rosario, and Nieves were directly responsible for López's actions. When determining a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual claims, and indulge all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Doyle v. Hasbro, Inc., 103 F.3d 186, 190 (1st Cir.1996). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only when the facts alleged, taken as true, do not justify the recovery. Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996). Under this standard, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff does not have any claim under § 1983 against co-defendants Blanes, Rosario, and Nieves. Therefore, at this time, dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against co-defendants would not be appropriate.
Further, in cases brought pursuant to § 1983, the Court applies the forum state's statute of limitations period for personal injury actions, which in Puerto Rico is one year. Ruiz-Sulsona v. Univ. of Puerto Rico, 334 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir.2003). The event which serves as the basis for plaintiff's § 1983 claims occurred on February 13, 2003. The complaint was filed on November 3, 2003. Therefore, plaintiff's § 1983 claims against co-defendants are not time-barred.
Co-defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. In determining whether the co-defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, the threshold question the Court must ask is, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). If the facts alleged show that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right, the Court must ask whether "the contours of this right are `clearly established' under then-existing law so that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct was unlawful." Santana v. Calderon, 342 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir.2003) (citing Dwan v. City of Boston, 329 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir.2003)). If both inquires are answered in the affirmative, a defendant will not be afforded qualified immunity.
In the amended complaint, plaintiff claims that co-defendants violated his well-established constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Thus, it would be premature at this time for the Court to find that co-defendants Blanes, Rosario, and Nieves are entitled to the protection of qualified immunity
The Court approves and adopts the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in its entirety. Accordingly, defendants' motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 3, 2003, plaintiff Orlando Rivera Sánchez filed suit against the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA"), Héctor R. Rosario (PREPA's Executive Director), Isabel Nieves de Sánchez (Interim Supervisor of the Claims and Judicial Investigation Department), and Ana T. Blanes (PREPA's Director of the Human Resources Division) alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101; Section 20, Article 11 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5151 and 5152. (Docket No. 1).
On February 23, 2003, PREPA filed a Motion to Dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted alleging the Complaint lacked allegations of discriminatory acts or allegations of the nature of disability under the ADA. (Docket No. 3).
On April 8, 2004, PREPA filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and requested leave to file an Amended Complaint (Docket No. 9). On the same day, the Court granted leave to file the Amended Complaint and struck from the record the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss because it exceeded the page limit specified by Local Rule 7(e). (Docket No. 10). PREPA was granted until April 23, 2004 to re-file its Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss in accordance with Local Rule 7(e) and PREPA timely filed same in compliance with Local Rule 7(e). (Docket No. 15).
On April 8, 2004, the Amended Complaint was filed alleging discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985 and 1986; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101; and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (Docket No. 11). In addition, supplemental jurisdiction was invoked for this Court to exercise jurisdiction for claims under Law 44 of July 2, 1989, as amended by Law 105 of December 20, 1991 and Law 53 of August 30, 1993; Law of Puerto Rico Annotated 501 et seq. (Puerto Rico Disabilities Law); Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, 31 L.P.R.A. §§ 5151 and 5152; and the Employment Discrimination Statute, Act. No. 100 of June 30, 1959, 29 P.R. Laws Ann. Title 29 § 146 et seq.
PREPA's Motion to Dismiss was referred to this Magistrate Judge for...
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