Vega Marrero v. Consorcio Dorado-Manati

• Decision Date: 02 February 2007
• Docket Number: Civil No. 05-2354 (FAB).
• Citation: 552 F.Supp.2d 157
• Parties: Maria C. VEGA MARRERO, Plaintiff v. CONSORCIO DORADO MANATI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

552 F.Supp.2d 157

Maria C. VEGA MARRERO, Plaintiff v. CONSORCIO DORADO MANATI, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 05-2354 (FAB).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

February 2, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Maria S. Kortright-Soler, M.S. Kortright Soler Law Office, San Juan, PR, Pedro R. Vazquez, III, Pedro R. Vazquez Law Office, Guaynabo, PR, for Plaintiff.

Charles A. Rodriguez-Colon, Andres Guillemard-Noble, Monique Guillemard-Noble, Francis A. Marquez-San Martin, Nachman & Guillemard, Miguel A. Romero-Lugo, Romero, Rodriguez & Quijano, PSC, Maria Judith Surillo, Department of Justice, Robert Millan, Millan Law Office, Francisco R. Gonzalez-Colon, Francisco J. Gonzalez-Magaz, F.R. Gonzalez Law Office, Manuel D. Herrero-Garcia, Herrero & Herrero Law Office, San Juan, PR, Maria Judith Surillo, Department of Justice, Marcos A. Ramirez-Lavandero, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

On December 30, 2005, Maria C. Vega Marrero, former Local Office Manager of the Consorcio Dorado-Manati (the "Consortium"), filed a complaint against the Consortium, the Municipalities of Dorado, Manati, Florida, Vega Alta, Vega Baja, Barceloneta, Morovis, Ciales, their respective Mayors,¹ Jose Sanchez, the Consortium's Executive Director, and Benjamin Ramirez, the Consortium's Human Resources Director, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986. She alleges, in essence, political discrimination, deprivation of her First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and violation of state laws. Ms. Vega also alleges that defendants conspired to deprive her "of her civil rights, namely, the right to due process and the right to a full and fair hearing before an impartial forum." (Docket No. 1).

Defendants Jose Sanchez, Delilah Ruiz Manzano, and Benjamin Ramirez Cardona, in their individual capacities, moved for summary judgment, in their individual capacities to dismiss plaintiffs claims (Docket No. 3). On September 12, 2006, the Court granted the Consortium's, Mr. Sanchez's, Ms. Ruiz Manzano's (in their official capacities), the Municipality of Vega Alta's and the Municipality of Ciales' request to join the motion for summary judgment. (Docket No. 55).

For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

A. The facts

The Consortium is a non-profit partnership composed of several municipalities, namely: Manati, Vega Baja, Dorado, Morovis, Vega Alta, Florida, Ciales, and Barceloneta. (See, Docket No. 1, 4.1). The Consortium administrates federal funds for the implementation of the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 ("WIA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2945.

Ms. Vega Marrero began working as the Manager of the Vega Baja Local Office of the Consortium on February 18, 2003. (See, Docket No. 52, Exh. C). Her employment contract began on February 18, 2003 and expired on July 30, 2003. Id. On June 16, 2003, four months after she began work, Ms. Vega Marrero was advised that, pursuant to a Classification and Compensation Plan prepared for the personnel of the Consortium, her position was classified "on scale number eleven (11), intermediate level two (2), of the trust service, with a monthly salary of $2,949.00." (See, Docket No.25, Exh. A).

On June 23, 2003, four months after she began working for the Consortium, Ms. Vega Marrero signed an "Oath of Loyalty and Assumption of Office" in which she specifically indicated that she held a trust position. (Id., Exh. B.)

Following the Puerto Rico general elections held in November, 2004, New Progressive Party ("PNP") mayoral candidates were elected to six of the above mentioned municipalities. Popular Democratic Party ("PPD") mayoral candidates were elected in two municipalities—Dorado and Barceloneta. Control of the Consortium passed from the PPD to the PNP, which controlled a majority of the municipalities after the newly-elected Mayors took office in January, 2005. On January 21, 2005, Ms. Vega Marrero's employment contract with the Consortium was terminated. (See, Docket No. 1, 4.12).

Ms. Vega Marrero then filed a claim before the Equal Employment Opportunity Office (EEO), alleging that her termination was based on her political affiliation with the PPD and that her duties as a Local Manager were not akin to those of a trust position.² In addition, she claimed a right to be reinstated to a career position because she was "recruited into the position of Manager of the Local Office as a career position." (Docket No. 52, Exh. H). The EEO claim was closed on March 28, 2005 (Docket No. 52, Exh. N).

On December 30, 2005, Ms. Vega Marrero brought suit alleging political discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, deprivation of her First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and violation of state laws. Plaintiff also alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986, claiming that defendants conspired to deprive her "of her civil rights, namely, the right to due process and the right to a full and fair hearing before an impartial forum." (Docket No. 1, If 4.28).

On March 13, 2006, defendants Sanchez, Ruiz Manzano and Ramirez Cardona, in their individual capacities, moved for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 3) arguing, in essence, that plaintiffs position as a Local Manager for the Consortium is not protected from patronage because political affiliation was properly required for it. In the alternative, they argued that if Ms. Vega Marrero's position enjoys protection from patronage, they are entitled to qualified immunity. They also contended that Ms. Vega Marrero's claims under sections 1985 and 1986 should be dismissed because, among other reasons, the pleadings fail "to flesh out the alleged facts that make up such violations." Finally, they argued that the complaint fails to state a cognizable Law 100 state claim because Law 100 (P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 29 § 146) operates against employers, "a label that does not fit any of the appearing individual-capacity defendants." On September 12, 2006, the Court granted the Consortium's, Sanchez's, Ruiz Manzano's (in their official capacities), the Municipality of Vega Alta's and the Municipality of dales' request to join the request for summary judgment. (Docket No. 55).

Although the Municipalities of Dorado, Manati, Florida, Vega Baja, Barceloneta and Morovis did not join the motion for summary judgment or file a motion of their own, this Court's findings are equally applicable to Ms. Vega Marrero's claims against them. See Kennedy v. Children's Serv. Soc. Of Wisconsin, 17 F.3d 980, 983 n. 1 (7th Cir.1994) ("If one defendant is granted a motion for summary judgment, the district court may sua sponte enter summary judgment in favor of nonmoving additional defendants `if the motion raised by the first defendants is equally effective in barring the claim against the other defendants, and the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to argue in opposition to the motion'") (citations omitted). See also Hubbard v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 433 F.Supp.2d 1134, 1149-1150 (S.D.Cal.2006).

B. Summary Judgment Standard

The court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56 states, in pertinent part, that the court may grant summary judgment only if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); See also, Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000); Morales, et al. v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, et al, 328 F.Supp.2d 192, 195-196 (D.P.R.2004). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment has been presented to the court, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l Inc., 229 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.2000).

In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be "material" and the dispute must be "genuine". "Material" means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is "genuine" when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party based on the evidence. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). It is necessary that "a party opposing summary judgment must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion." Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994).

In making this assessment, the court "must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). The court may safely ignore, however, "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge". (See, Rivera Abella v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 470 F.Supp.2d 86 (D.P.R.2007), (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, ...