Rivera Sanfeliz v. Chase Manhattan Bank
| Citation | 349 F.Supp.2d 240 |
| Decision Date | 14 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV. 00-1485RLA.,CIV. 00-1485RLA. |
| Parties | Randolfo RIVERA SANFELIZ, Plaintiff, v. THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Carlos A. Bobonis-González, Esq., Bobonis, Bobonis & Rodriguez Poventud, San Juan, PR, Luis A. Meléndez-Albizu, Esq., Urb. San Francisco, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Ariadna Alvarez, Esq., Radamés A. Torruella-Del-Valle, Esq., McConnel Valdes, San Juan, PR, for Defendant/Respondent.
ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS UNDER LAW 80 AND FOR BENEFITS UNDER LONG-TERM INCENTIVE PLAN PURSUANT TO ERISA
Codefendant THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, successor to THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A. and codefendant THE CHASE MANHATTAN CORPORATION ("CHASE CORP."), collectively referred to as ("CHASE") have moved the Court to dismiss plaintiff's unjust dismissal cause of action as well as plaintiff's claim that Chase Corp.'s Long-Term Incentive Plan ("LTIP") is a plan covered by the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA").
The Court having reviewed the memoranda submitted by the parties as well as the applicable law finds that dismissal of the two aforementioned causes of action is proper.
Plaintiff, RANDOLFO RIVERA SANFELIS ("RIVERA") was a Chase employee in Puerto Rico.
In 1996, CHASE adopted The Chase Manhattan Corporation LTIP which provided stock option grants to certain employees, including RIVERA. LTIP was established pursuant to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. In compliance with Regulations issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, LTIP's plan document expressly stated that it was not subject to ERISA. In 1997 and 1998, RIVERA was awarded stock option grants pursuant to LTIP.
In his Third Amended Complaint ("Complaint") (docket No. 4) RIVERA alleges that on April 21, 1998 CHASE informed him of the sale of its assets and operations in Puerto Rico to Banco Bilbao Vizcaya ("BBV"). CHASE advised that the going concern would not cease operating and that BBV would offer employment to some of its employees.
In 1998, during the conclusion of the transaction whereby CHASE would sell its Puerto Rico operations to BBV — but prior to regulatory approval of the transaction — CHASE employees were apprised of the agreement to sell. RIVERA was further notified that should he decline continued employment at BBV, he would be regarded as having resigned and not be entitled to exercise the stock option grants under LTIP which, under the terms of the plan, were forfeited upon resignation.
RIVERA was offered employment by BBV but he declined the offer. Instead, plaintiff obtained employment with FirstBank Puerto Rico and on or about June 1, 1998, resigned his employment at CHASE. As a result thereof CHASE declined RIVERA's request to exercise the stock option grants issued to him pursuant to LTIP alleging forfeiture on account of his resignation.
RIVERA claims that he rejected BBV's employment offer because it purportedly entailed a reduction in benefits, and because he did not want to start a relationship with a new employer that was not of his own choosing.
Plaintiff has asserted a total of four causes of action as a result of the aforementioned facts.
In the first two RIVERA demands severance pay benefits under both Puerto Rico Act No. 80 of May 30, 1976, 29 Laws of P.R. Ann. § 185(f) ("Law 80")1 and CHASE's ERISA-covered severance pay plan.2 Specifically, RIVERA alleges that his imminent transfer to BBV constituted an involuntary termination and/or constructive discharge which entitles him to severance pay relief afforded under local law and ERISA.
Regarding his rights under LTIP RIVERA claims damages under Puerto Rico law. Further, he alleges that he is entitled to exercise his stock option grants under this plan pursuant to local contract law3 or as a "claim for benefits" under ERISA's § 502(a)(1)(B).4
CHASE filed a partial motion to dismiss the unjust dismissal claim asserted under Law 80 arguing that this state-provided remedy is pre-empted by ERISA under the particular circumstances of this case. CHASE further argues that even assuming Law 80 was applicable the Complaint does not contain any allegations to support a claim for constructive discharge.
Additionally, CHASE filed a partial summary judgment request seeking dismissal of the ERISA claim for stock option benefits on the grounds that the underlying plan under which those benefits were offered is not an ERISA plan.
Rule 12 (b)(6) of the Fed.R.Civ.P. allows the court to dismiss a complaint when it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must take the allegations of the complaint as "true, and determine whether, under any theory, the allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action in accordance with the law". Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, 68 F.3d 525, 530, (1st Cir.1995). The court should not accept interpretations and unsupported conclusions of law, since the facts must be susceptible to any "objective verification". Washington Legal Found., v. Massachusetts Bar Found., 993 F.2d 962 (1st Cir.1993). According to this provision, the Court will base its determination solely on the material submitted as part of the complaint or central to it. Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir.1988). Documents on which a complaint depends and to which it refers merge "into the pleadings and the trial court can review [them] in deciding a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6)." Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir.1998).
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Santiago Clemente v. Executive Airlines, Inc., 7 F.Supp.2d. 114 (D.P.R.1998); aff'd, 213 F.3d 25 (1st Cir.2000).
Not every factual controversy bars access to summary judgment. The mere presence of some alleged factual conflicts among the parties will not defeat a proper motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir.1998); Wadsworth, Inc. v. Schwarz-Nin, 951 F.Supp. 314 (D.P.R.1996); Preussag Int'l Steel Corp. v. Interacero, Inc., 951 F.Supp. 338 (D.P.R.1997).
The U.S. Supreme Court, in its leading case regarding the summary judgment standard, established that:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169, 1172 (1st Cir.1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)).
Celotex allows the movant to seek summary judgment based on the adverse party's failure to establish an element essential to its case and on which that party bears the burden of proof. The only requirement is that there be "adequate time for discovery."
"If the moving party demonstrates that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish the existence of a genuine material issue." J. Geils Band Employee Benefit Plan v. Smith Barney Shearson, Inc., 76 F.3d 1245, 1251 (1st Cir.1996), cert. den., 519 U.S. 823, 117 S.Ct. 81, 136 L.Ed.2d 39 (1996). An issue is genuine if it "must be decided at trial because the evidence, viewed in the light most flattering to the non-movant, would permit a rational fact finder to resolve the issue in favor of either party." Remington Inv., Inc. v. Quintero & Martínez Co., 961 F.Supp. 344, 350 (citing Mulero-Rodríguez v. Ponte, Inc., 98 F.3d 670, 673 (1st Cir.1996)).
On the other hand, if "the non-moving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation," Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 535 (1st Cir.1996), then the court must grant summary judgment in favor of the moving party. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Landrau Romero v. Caribbean Restaurants, Inc., 14 F.Supp.2d 185, 188 (D.P.R.1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that: "...the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan..." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (emphasis added). The term "State Law" includes all the laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state actions having the effect of law of any State. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1).
The U.S. Supreme Court has construed the above cited section as covering a law that "`relates to' an employee benefit plan..., if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) (emphasis added).
In this regard, it has been stated that:
Because ERISA applies to the benefit plans at issue here, plaintiffs' state law claim for benefits under the plans is preempted. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The Supreme Court has held that ERISA's "preemptive force `is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action...'" Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 44, 107 S.Ct. 1549,...
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