Rivera v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Civil No. 07-1096 (RLA).

• Decision Date: 16 June 2009
• Docket Number: Civil No. 07-1096 (RLA).
• Parties: Jose Manuel DIAZ RIVERA, et al., Plaintiffs v. BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

626 F.Supp.2d 244

Jose Manuel DIAZ RIVERA, et al., Plaintiffs v. BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO RICO, INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 07-1096 (RLA).

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 16, 2009.

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Edelmiro Antonio Salas-González, Esq., Juan Manuel Suárez-Cobo, Esq., San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff/Petitioner.

Pedro J. Manzano-Yates, Esq., Enrique R. Padró, Esq., Pedro A. Buso-García, Esq., Fiddler, González & Rodríguez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant/Respondent.

ORDER GRANTING BFI'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAYMOND L. ACOSTA, District Judge.

Defendant BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES OF PUERTO RICO, INC. ("BFI") has moved the Court to enter summary judgment on its behalf in these proceedings and to dismiss plaintiffs' claims. The Court having reviewed the arguments presented by the parties as well as the documents submitted therewith hereby finds that relief as requested by defendant is proper.

BACKGROUND

This action was instituted by plaintiffs JOSE MANUEL DIAZ RIVERA ("DIAZ"), his wife and their conjugal partnership against BFI and various unknown defendants alleging that DIAZ was terminated from his employment at BFI in violation of the American with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. In his opposition to the summary judgment request, DIAZ purports to have also pled a claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. Additionally, plaintiffs asserted various causes of action under our supplemental jurisdiction as provided for in 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Specifically, DIAZ sought relief under Puerto Rico Law No. 44 of July 2, 1985 ("Law 44"), our local disability discrimination statute. His wife and conjugal partnership, on the other hand, sued for damages based on tort under art. 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141 (1993).

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) Fed. R. Civ. P., which sets forth the standard for ruling on summary judgment motions, in pertinent part provides that they shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Sands v. Ridefilm Corp., 212 F.3d 657, 660-61 (1st Cir.2000); Barreto-Rivera v. Medina-Vargas, 168 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1999). The party seeking summary judgment must first demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact in the record. DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir.1997). A genuine issue exists if there is sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual disputes to require a trial. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico, 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir.1994); LeBlanc v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 841 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of a lawsuit under the governing law. Morrissey v. Boston Five Cents Sav. Bank, 54 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir.1995).

"In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view `the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.'" Poulis-Minott v. Smith, 388 F.3d 354, 361 (1st Cir.2004) (citing Barbour v. Dynamics Research Corp., 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir.1995)).

Credibility issues fall outside the scope of summary judgment. "`Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). See also, Dominguez-Cruz v. Suttle Caribe, Inc., 202 F.3d 424, 432 (1st Cir.2000) ("court should not engage in credibility assessments."); Simas v. First Citizens' Fed. Credit Union, 170 F.3d 37 49 (1st Cir.1999) ("credibility determinations are for the factfinder at trial, not for the court at summary judgment."); Perez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 54 (1st Cir.1998) (credibility issues not proper on summary judgment); Molina Quintero v. Caribe G.E. Power Breakers, Inc., 234 F.Supp.2d 108, 113 (D.P.R.2002). "There is no room for credibility determinations, no room for the measured weighing of conflicting evidence such as the trial process entails, and no room for the judge to superimpose his own ideas of probability and likelihood. In fact, only if the record, viewed in this manner and without regard to credibility determinations, reveals no genuine issue as to any material fact may the court enter summary judgment." Cruz-Baez v. Negron-Irizarry, 360 F.Supp.2d 326, 332 (D.P.R.2005) (internal citations, brackets and quotation marks omitted).

In cases where the non-movant party bears the ultimate burden of proof, he must present definite and competent evidence to rebut a motion for summary judgment, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256-257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202; Navarro v. Pfizer Corp., 261 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir.2001); Grant's Dairy v. Comm'r of Maine Dep't of Agric., 232 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2000), and cannot rely upon "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation". Lopez-Carrasquillo v. Rubianes, 230 F.3d 409, 412 (1st Cir.2000); Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodríguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581 (1st Cir.1994); Medina-Muñoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990).

THE FACTS

1. DIAZ commenced working for BFI in April 1998, as a Helper-Driver. During his tenure at BFI, DIAZ was a member of the Union de Tronquistas de Puerto Rico, Local 901 ("Union").

2. DIAZ was later designated to the position of Roll-Off Driver. His main responsibility in that position was to drive a roll-off truck to provide complete waste removal for the commercial roll-off customers of the company. Plaintiff performed his duties as a Roll-Off driver throughout Puerto Rico driving on public highways.

3. Pursuant to the Position Description for the Roll-Off Driver position, plaintiff was required to comply with the following prerequisites: (1) have a valid class A or B Commercial Driver's License ("CDL") with air brakes endorsement; (2) meet all qualifications as defined under the Department of Transportation ("DOT") Regulation 49 CFR § 391.41; and (3) meet Allied Waste Driver MVR Qualification Standards. DIAZ had to be physically qualified under the regulations contained in 49 CFR § 391.41 as these requirements were adopted by the Puerto Rico Public Service Commission ("PR-PSC") in its regulations.

4. The DOT regulations at 49 CFR § 391.41 provide the following physical qualifications for drivers:

(a) A person shall not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is physically qualified to do so and, except as provided in § 391.67, has on his/her person the original, or a photographic copy, of a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle.

(b) A person is physically qualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle if that person—

. . . .

(3) Has no established medical history or clinical diagnosis of diabetes mellitus currently requiring insulin control[.] . . . .

(emphasis ours)

5. Both the DOT and the PR-PSC require the driver of a commercial motor vehicle to be medically examined and certified every two years in accordance with the pertinent regulations as physically qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle. In this regard, 49 CFR § 391.45 reads:

Except as provided in § 391.67, the following persons must be medically examined and certified in accordance with § 391.43 as physically qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle:

(a) Any person who has not been medically examined and certified as physically qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle;

(b)(1) Any driver who has not been medically examined and certified as qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle during the preceding 24 months[.]

. . . .

(emphasis ours).

6. The Medical Examiner's Certificate requires that the medical examiner certify that he/she has examined the driver in accordance with the Federal Motor Carrier for Safety Regulations and that he/she finds the person as qualified thereunder. The date on which the examination was made must be included as well as the date on which the medical certificate expires, i.e., after two years. Both the medical examiner and the driver must sign the certificate. Further, the commercial motor vehicle driver must have on his/her person the original or a copy of the medical examiner's certificate. See 49 CFR 391.41.

7. On September 20, 1987, the PR-PSC adopted multiple DOT regulatory provisions, including 29 CFR § 391.41, via its "Reglamento de Seguridad en el Transporte" ("Regulation No. 3511").¹

8. On July 14, 1997, the PR-PSC updated its regulations to bring them up to par with the Federal Safety Regulations and to rename them "Reglamento para la Seguridad en el Transporte" ("Regulation No. 5648").² As clearly stated in its Introduction, the new regulations adopted the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations providing Puerto Rico with the proper mechanisms and procedures to promote and achieve utmost safety in commercial transportation while complying with the federal provisions. In pertinent part, § 1.03 explains the purpose of Regulation No. 5648 as follows:

These Regulations have the purpose of establishing the minimum requisites for the transportation of cargo and passengers within the jurisdictional limits of Puerto Rico and for the drivers and operators of the commercial motor vehicles covered by these Regulations and incorporate and harmonize the applicable provisions of the Federal Regulations for transportation for the purpose of promoting and achieving the...