Rivera v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 21 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 06-1318.,06-1318.
• Citation: 469 F.3d 631
• Parties: Emily RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

469 F.3d 631

Emily RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 06-1318.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued October 17, 2006.

Decided November 21, 2006.

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Michael D. Robbins (argued), Schlesinger & Robbins, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Emily K. Paster (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and BAUER and EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Chief Judge.

Former Chicago police officer Mario Morales entered Emily Rivera's home, handcuffed her, and ransacked her apartment. Rivera obtained a default judgment against Morales, who is currently in prison after being convicted of numerous felonies. In an attempt to collect the judgment, Rivera sued the City of Chicago ("the City"). The district court granted the City summary judgment, and the City submitted a bill of costs to the court pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). The court denied the City's costs based on its finding that Rivera is indigent. The City now appeals. For the following reasons, we vacate the district court's denial of costs and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On June 21, 2001, at 11:30 p.m., former Chicago police officer Mario Morales went to Emily Rivera's apartment, identified himself as a police officer and demanded that Rivera let him in. Rivera was home with her six year old daughter and one month old son. At the time of the incident, Morales was wearing a bulletproof vest and a badge pouch. Rivera opened the back door and Morales forcibly entered the apartment. Once inside, Morales informed her that he had a search warrant but never showed it to her. Morales led Rivera upstairs, handcuffed her hands behind her back and placed her on a bed. While Rivera was handcuffed upstairs, Morales ransacked the apartment and then left. Rivera did not report the incident to law enforcement. Following the incident, Morales pled guilty to numerous federal felony offenses for which he is currently incarcerated. In his plea agreement, Morales admitted entering Rivera's apartment.

Rivera brought a two-count complaint against Morales alleging a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and a state law battery claim. The district court stayed Rivera's claim pending the resolution of related criminal matters against Morales. Approximately a year later, Rivera filed a motion to vacate the stay, which the district court granted. Morales failed to respond to the complaint, and Rivera sought a default judgment against him, which the district court granted in the amount of $175,000.

Rivera then attempted to collect this judgment from the City through a supplemental collection proceeding under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69. Rivera argued that the City was liable for Morales's conduct because he was a city employee and acted under color of state law when he entered her apartment. The City moved for summary judgment arguing that it should not be liable for Morales's conduct because he was not acting within the scope of his employment. The district court granted the motion and entered judgment for the City.

Following the judgment in its favor, the City submitted a bill of costs to the district court. In response, Rivera argued that she should not pay costs associated with the litigation because she is indigent. To support her claim of indigence, Rivera submitted an affidavit of her assets, stating that she is a single mother of four children, earns a salary of $1800 per month, has only a nominal amount of money in her checking account, receives food stamps, and has no other assets. The affidavit did not list her expenses or include the $175,000 judgment against Morales among her assets. The district court found that Rivera made a showing sufficient to demonstrate her "indigency and inability to pay costs."

II. ANALYSIS

The City makes two arguments on appeal. First, the City requests this Court to reexamine whether district courts may consider a losing party's indigence when ruling on a bill of costs submitted by the prevailing party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). Second, the City argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying the City's motion for costs.

A.

The City argues that we should abolish the exception that allows indigent losing parties to avoid paying costs under Rule 54(d)(1). The proper interpretation of Rule 54(d)(1) is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. Gavoni v. Dobbs House, Inc., 164 F.3d 1071, 1075 (7th Cir. 1999).

Rule 54(d)(1) provides in pertinent part, "[e]xcept when express provision therefore is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs." Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(1). The rule provides a presumption that the losing party will pay costs but grants the court discretion to direct otherwise. Although Rule 54 does not specifically mention indigence, the rule speaks of the district court's discretion in general terms, and certainly does not prohibit a district court from considering indigence when assigning costs to a losing party.

Since 1983, this Court has held that it is "within the discretion of the district court to consider a plaintiff's indigency in denying costs under Rule 54(d)." Badillo v. Cent. Steel & Wire Co., 717 F.2d 1160, 1165 (7th Cir.1983); see also Mother & Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir.2003); Reed v. Int'l Union, 945 F.2d 198, 204 (7th Cir.1991); Congregation of Passion v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir.1988). Though the City asserts that we adopted the exception without analysis and without relying on any prior precedent, Badillo was a case of first impression for this Court, and that is why no precedent was cited in the opinion. In that case we relied on the unambiguous language of Rule 54(d), and held that the power to award costs is a matter within the sound discretion of the district court. Badillo, 717 F.2d at 1165.

In support of its argument that we should reconsider the Badillo line of cases the City states that the Supreme Court has never adopted the indigence exception to Rule 54(d). While it is true that the Supreme Court has never adopted such an exception, it has not foreclosed its availability either. Furthermore, seven other circuits permit district courts to consider the losing party's indigence when determining whether to award costs. See Rodriguez v. Whiting Farms, 360 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir.2004); Lampkins v. Thompson, 337 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir.2003); Whitfield v. Scully, 241 F.3d 264, 273 (2d Cir.2001); Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1039 (11th Cir.2000); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 221 F.3d 449, 462-68 (3d Cir.2000); Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999); Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 178 F.3d 1069, 1079 (9th Cir.1999). Only one circuit has expressly prohibited district courts from considering a losing party's indigence when awarding costs under Rule 54(d). See McDonald v. Petree, 409 F.3d 724, 732 (6th Cir.2005). Because the acceptance of the indigence exception is well established, we decline to abandon it.

The City expresses concern that the indigence exception eliminates the disincentive for indigent litigants to pursue meritless claims. However, indigence does not automatically excuse the losing party from paying the prevailing party's costs. See Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 733-34 (7th Cir.1999). The fact that indigence is not a blanket excuse for paying costs tempers the City's policy argument because allowing the district court discretion to impose costs on indigent litigants "serves the valuable purposes of discouraging unmeritorious claims...." McGill v. Faulkner, 18 F.3d 456, 460 (7th Cir.1994).¹

Finally, the City takes issue with the indigence exception because it gives district courts unbounded discretion and encourages litigants of modest means to portray themselves as indigent whether they truly are or not, leading to fraud on the district courts. These policy concerns are legitimate; however, the answer is not to eliminate the indigence exception. Rather, the better course is to provide the district courts with guidance in considering whether to hold an indigent party liable for costs.

First, the district court must make a threshold factual finding that the losing party is "incapable of paying the court-imposed costs at this time or in the future." McGill, 18 F.3d at 459. The burden is on the losing party to provide the district court with "sufficient documentation to support such a finding." Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039. This documentation should include evidence in the form of an affidavit or other documentary evidence of both income and assets, as well as a schedule of expenses. Requiring a non-prevailing party to provide information about both income/assets and expenses will ensure that district courts have clear proof of the non-prevailing party's dire financial circumstances. Moreover, it will limit any incentive for litigants of modest means to portray themselves as indigent.

Second, the district court should consider the amount of costs, the good faith of the losing party, and the closeness and difficulty of the issues raised by a case when using its discretion to deny costs. No one factor is determinative, but the district court should provide an explanation for its decision to award or deny costs. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1039 (holding that a district court must have and state a sound basis for doing so); Cantrell v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 69 F.3d 456, 459 (10th Cir.1995) (holding that when a district court exercises its discretion and denies costs to a prevailing party, it must provide a valid reason for the denial).

Though we decline to abolish the indigence exception, we note that the...