Stanley v. University of Southern California

• Decision Date: 02 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. 95-55466,95-56250,96-55004.,95-55466
• Citation: 178 F.3d 1069
• Parties: Marianne STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA and Michael L. Garrett, individually and in his official capacity as Athletic Director, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

178 F.3d 1069

Marianne STANLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA and Michael L. Garrett, individually and in his official capacity as Athletic Director, Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 95-55466, 95-56250, 96-55004.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted October 7, 1996.

Submission withdrawn November 28, 1997.

Resubmitted May 24, 1999.

Filed June 2, 1999.

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Robert L. Bell, Law Offices of Robert L. Bell, Washington, D.C. for the plaintiff-appellant.

J. Al Latham, Jr., Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker, Los Angeles, California for the defendants-appellees.

Before: HUG, Chief Judge, PREGERSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

HUG, Chief Judge:

Appellant Marianne Stanley appeals from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants University of Southern California and Michael Garrett on Stanley's claims of discrimination and breach of employment contract. Stanley also appeals the denial of her motion to recuse Judge Davies, and her motion to re-tax costs. Appellants move for an award of sanctions against Stanley for filing the latter two appeals.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Marianne Stanley was hired as head coach of the women's basketball team for the University of Southern California ("USC") in 1989. Her initial contract, signed in July of that year, was for a four-year term, expiring June 30, 1993. The contract provided that she would make a base salary of $60,000 per year. This base salary was increased to $62,000 per year in 1992. The women's basketball program at USC enjoyed much success during Stanley's tenure.

Defendant Michael Garrett is the Athletic Director at USC. On April 20, 1993, two months prior to the expiration of Stanley's contract, Stanley and Garrett had an initial meeting to negotiate a new contract. The parties disagree over what took place at this meeting. Stanley contends that on that date she entered into a contract for a salary equivalent to that of George Raveling, the USC men's basketball coach. It is undisputed that Garrett expressly stated that USC could not pay her that salary, but that he would make her a formal offer in writing shortly after that meeting.

On April 27, 1993, Garrett offered Stanley, in writing, a three-year contract providing $80,000 in year one, $90,000 in year two, and $100,000 in year three, with a $6,000 per year housing allowance for each of the three years. The parties met again on May 27, 1993, at which point Garrett claims that Stanley rejected the April 27 offer because she insisted that her compensation should be equivalent to Raveling's. Stanley argues that she never rejected this offer, but simply disagreed as to the amount of compensation, because the April 27 offer was inconsistent with the April 20 offer—for Raveling's salary level—that she already had accepted.

On June 7, 1993, Stanley proposed a three-year contract providing $96,000 per year for the first eighteen months, and a salary equivalent to that of Raveling for the remainder of the term. Garrett rejected this offer. Stanley then retained an attorney who, on June 18, 1993, proposed to Garrett a three-year contract with an automatic two-year renewal provision, and total compensation of $88,000 for year one, $97,000 for year two, and $112,000 for year three, plus additional incentives. Garrett rejected this offer and withdrew the April 27 offer.

On June 21, 1993, Garrett sent to Stanley's attorney a written offer for a one-year contract for $96,000. Stanley's existing contract expired on June 30, 1993, but Stanley continued to perform her duties. On July 13, while on a recruiting trip, Stanley asked Garrett if he would still offer her a multi-year contract. He indicated that his June 21 one-year contract offer was USC's final offer, and that Stanley would have to accept or reject it by the end of the day. Stanley did not respond, but sent a memo to Garrett on July 14 requesting additional time to consider the offer. On July 15 Garrett revoked the offer, informed Stanley that he was seeking a new coach for the team, and requested that Stanley perform no further services for USC.

On August 5, 1993, Stanley initiated this action in Los Angeles County Superior Court, making claims of sex discrimination and retaliatory discharge. On August 6, 1993, the Superior Court granted Stanley's request for a temporary restraining order reinstating Stanley as head coach of the women's team at $96,000 per year pending the hearing on Stanley's motion for preliminary injunction. On that same day, defendants removed the action to federal court on the ground that the complaint stated claims arising under federal law.

On August 30, 1993, the district court denied the motion for preliminary injunction, and Stanley appealed. This court affirmed the denial of the preliminary injunction in an opinion filed January 6, 1994. Stanley v. University of Southern California, 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir.1994) ("Stanley I"). Between September 1993 and February 1994, Stanley amended her complaint several times, and defendants' motions to dismiss were granted as to several claims. Stanley's Third Amended Complaint alleges the following causes of action: (1) violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) and California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA"); (2) violation of Article I, § 8 of the California Constitution; (3) violation of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; (4) retaliation; (5) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy; (6) breach of express contract; (7) breach of implied-in-fact contract; and (8) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Stanley sought reinstatement, declaratory relief, injunctive relief preventing USC from further discriminating against her, back pay, three million dollars in compensatory damages, and five million dollars in punitive damages.

On October 17, 1994, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. After Stanley was allowed additional time to conduct discovery, on March 10, 1995, the district court granted summary judgment for USC and Garrett. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

I. Discrimination Claims

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 852 (9th Cir.1998). We address each claim in turn.

A. Equal Pay Act Claim

The Equal Pay Act provides in relevant part:

No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate, within any establishment in which such employees are employed, between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees ... at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions....

29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1).

In an Equal Pay Act case, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that employees of the opposite sex were paid different wages for equal work. The prima facie case is limited to a comparison of the jobs in question, and does not involve a comparison of the individuals who hold the jobs. See, e.g., Brock v. Georgia Southwestern College, 765 F.2d 1026, 1032 (11th Cir.1985) (citing Hein v. Oregon College of Educ., 718 F.2d 910, 914 (9th Cir.1983)). To make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the jobs being compared are "substantially equal." See 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a); see also Spaulding v. University of Wash., 740 F.2d 686, 697 (9th Cir.1984), overruled on other grounds, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir.1987) (en banc). Significantly, under the Act, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that the jobs in question are identical; she must show only that the jobs are substantially equal.

Because we are reviewing an appeal from the grant of summary judgment, the question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stanley, and resolving all inferences in her favor, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the substantial equality of the jobs. See, e.g., Cordova v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 124 F.3d 1145, 1150 (9th Cir.1997). This analysis is quite different from that conducted by our court in Stanley I, 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir.1994), where we considered an appeal from the denial of a mandatory preliminary injunction.

Circuit courts employ a two-step "substantially equal" analysis in Equal Pay Act cases. In Brobst v. Columbus Srvs. Int'l, 761 F.2d 148, 156 (3d Cir.1985), the Third Circuit described this approach, writing that "the crucial finding on the equal work issue is whether the jobs to be compared have a `common core' of tasks, i.e. whether a significant portion of the two jobs is identical." When a plaintiff establishes such a "common core of tasks," the court must then determine whether any additional tasks, incumbent on one job but not the other, make the two jobs "substantially different." Id. Both the Seventh and Fourth Circuits have also adopted this approach to Equal Pay Act cases. See Fallon v. State of Illinois, 882 F.2d 1206, 1209 (7th Cir.1989); Brewster v. Barnes, 788 F.2d 985, 991 (4th Cir.1986).

Here, we may assume that the men's and women's coaching jobs share a common core of tasks. Garrett—U.S.C.'s athletic director and a defendant in this case—has acknowledged that the women's and men's coaches "have the same basic responsibilities" with regard to recruiting athletes and administering the basketball programs. In his declaration, Garrett also stated:

Both the women's and men's head basketball coaches have the following general duties and responsibilities: basketball program; coaching and discipline of team members; general supervision over the personal and academic lives of the student athletes; and

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