Rivera v. Redfern
| Decision Date | 21 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL 1:21-CV-01118 |
| Parties | MICHAEL RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. LIEUTENANT REDFERN, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
The plaintiff Michael Rivera contends that the defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by subjecting him to secondhand oleoresin capsicum spray (“OC spray”) knowing that he has asthma. Currently before the court is the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants, who contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Rivera's claims for damages against them in their individual capacities, that the Eleventh Amendment bars his claim for damages against them in their official capacities and that his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot. For the reasons set forth below, we will grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Rivera, who is representing himself, began this action by filing a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Pennsylvania. The complaint concerns an incident involving the use of OC spray that occurred at the State Correctional Institution Benner Township (SCI Benner Township) in June 2020, and it names four officers or employees of SCI Benner Township: (1) Lieutenant Redfern; (2) Corrections Officer Schreck;[1] (3) Corrections Officer Monsell; and (4) Nurse Phil Rogers.
In June 2021, the defendants removed the case to this court and filed an answer to the complaint. The parties then consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and the case was referred to the undersigned. We set case management deadlines, and we tried to settle the case. After the case did not settle, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. That motion is ripe, and for the reasons set forth below, we will grant that motion.
The defendants move for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact' and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services, 811 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)).
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that burden by “‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).
The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248-49.
When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” N.A.A.C.P. v. N. Hudson Reg'l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial-whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.
Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially ‘put up or shut up' time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).
Here, in accordance with Local Rule 56.1, the defendants filed a statement of material facts, and Rivera filed a response. Where the facts set forth by the defendants are undisputed, we cite to the defendants' statement of material facts (doc. 24) and Rivera's response thereto (doc. 29).
In addition to responding to the defendants' statement of material facts, Rivera submitted a document entitled “Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts.” See doc. 30. In this document, without pointing to record evidence, Rivera merely sets forth seven questions regarding the ultimate issues in this case. Id. Under our local rules, this is not a proper way to oppose the defendants' statement of material facts, and we will not consider this document further.
Rivera also submitted a declaration made under penalty of perjury in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See doc. 31 at 1-7. In accordance with our duty to “construe all facts and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party[,]” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 2015)), for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion, we accept as true the facts set forth in Rivera's declaration. But Rivera's declaration also contains legal conclusions, which we do not accept as true.
Rivera also submitted a declaration made under penalty of perjury from another inmate-Gene Brown. See doc. 31 at 8-11. Brown substantially corroborates Rivera's version of the events, and in setting forth the material facts, we rely on Brown's declaration as well as Rivera's.
The following facts are the material facts for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion. The incident at issue in this case occurred on June 20, 2020, in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) of SCI Benner Township. Doc. 24¶ 1; Doc. 29 ¶ 1. At approximately 5:30 p.m.,[2] defendants Schreck and Monsell escorted Rivera to the telephone cage. Doc. 24 ¶ 2; Doc. 29 ¶ 2. The telephone cage was an open-air cage. Doc. 31 ¶ 4. It was located on the lower level of the RHU pod, and it was approximately 25-30 feet away from Rivera's cell, which was also located on the lower level. Doc. 24 ¶ 3; Doc. 29 ¶ 3. On a normal evening, Rivera would have been permitted to remain in the telephone cage for 30 minutes. Doc. 24 ¶ 6; Doc. 29 ¶ 6.
Approximately halfway through his time in the telephone cage, Rivera heard defendant Redfern request that defendant Schreck stand by cell JA2023 for observation, and he noticed that Monsell had left the pod. Doc. 24 ¶ 7; Doc. 29 ¶ 7. Recognizing that the officers were preparing to use force against the inmate in cell JA2023, Rivera immediately informed defendants Redfern and Schreck that he is asthmatic and that exposure to secondhand OC spray while in the open-air cage would trigger him to have an asthma attack. Doc. 31 at 2, ¶ 6. He requested to be returned to his cell, explaining that he would not be adversely affected by the use of OC spray if he were inside his cell. Id. Defendants Redfern and Schreck ignored his request. Id.
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