Rivera v. Triple M. Roofing Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 January 1986
• Citation: Rivera v. Triple M. Roofing Corp., 497 N.Y.S.2d 416, 116 A.D.2d 561 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986)
• Parties: Daniel RIVERA, Appellant, v. TRIPLE M. ROOFING CORP., Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 416

497 N.Y.S.2d 416

116 A.D.2d 561

Daniel RIVERA, Appellant, v. TRIPLE M. ROOFING CORP., Respondent.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Second Department.

Jan. 13, 1986.

Borda, Wallace & Witty, Bay Shore, (Emanuel I. Witty, of counsel), for appellant.

Before MANGANO, J.P., and THOMPSON, BRACKEN and BROWN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Gowan, J.), dated May 24, 1984, which denied his motion to vacate the marking of this matter as settled and to restore the action to the trial calendar.

Order reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, motion granted, and matter remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for further proceedings consistent herewith.

We have previously held that an attorney who appears at a pretrial settlement conference without expressly qualifying his authority impliedly acknowledges his authority to bind his client (see, Collazo v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 103 A.D.2d 789, 477 N.Y.S.2d 662, 22 NYCRR 699.6). At bar, however, it is undisputed that the acceptance of the proffered settlement was expressly conditioned on counsel's obtaining his client's approval thereof (see, Graffeo v. Brenes, 85 A.D.2d 656, 445 N.Y.S.2d 223). Thus, the instant case is distinguishable from one in which an attorney with the implied authority to bind his client unconditional consents to a settlement and then later seeks to vacate the settlement on the ground that he was without authority to do so (see, Continental Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Constr. Co., 80 Misc.2d 552, 363 N.Y.S.2d 258).

Moreover, it does not appear from the record before us that the provisions of CPLR 2104 were complied with. The purported stipulation of settlement reached in chambers was not reduced to writing nor were its terms entered in the minutes of an open court proceeding. As we held in Collazo (su...