Rivera v. United States
| Decision Date | 12 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:21-cv-00973 (KAD) |
| Parties | EDGARDO RIVERA, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Following a plea of guilty, by judgment dated July 17, 2020, Petitioner Edgardo Rivera was convicted of (1) possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of forty (40) grams or more of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) (b)(1)(B)(vi); and (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a narcotics trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C § 924(c). Petitioner was sentenced to a period of incarceration of 78 months on Count One and 60 months on Count Two, to be served consecutively, for a total effective sentence of 138 months.[1] He filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on July 15, 2021. Petitioner challenges his conviction asserting that (1) his plea of guilty was “unlawfully induced and not made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature and the consequences of the plea;” (2) his conviction was “obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure” in violation of his Fourth Amendment; and (3) he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the plea and sentencing hearings. For the reasons set forth below, the petition is DENIED. (ECF No. 1)
At sentencing, absent objection, the Court adopted the factual content of the Presentence Investigation Report as the Court's findings of fact. Those facts and those to which the Petitioner allocuted at his change of plea are set forth in the Government's opposition to the Petition as follows.
Between June of 2017 and October of 2018, Petitioner was engaged in narcotics trafficking in the Hartford, Connecticut area typically distributing bundle quantities of heroin and fentanyl. During this time period, Petitioner possessed with intent to distribute and did distribute between 280 and 400 grams of fentanyl. On July 16, 2017 at approximately 6:30 p.m., Petitioner sold opiates containing fentanyl to two male customers, who both used the fentanyl. The following morning, emergency personnel responded to a report of an overdose victim at a Southington, Connecticut home. The victim was unresponsive and later pronounced dead. The state medical examiner concluded that the cause of death was acute fentanyl toxicity. At the scene, bags were found and subsequently determined to have contained fentanyl. In addition, law enforcement conducted controlled purchases from Petitioner on May 18, 2018, yielding four bundles that tested positive for fentanyl, heroin, and caffeine, and on June 25, 2018, yielding three bundles of heroin. On September 4, 2018, a sealed complaint was issued by Magistrate Judge Sarah A.L. Merriam. On October 5, 2018, members of the Drug Enforcement Agency and the United States Marshals Service arrested Petitioner at his home pursuant to a federal arrest warrant. Law enforcement seized approximately 200 grams of controlled substances containing a detectable amount of heroin and fentanyl, as well as a firearm that Petitioner possessed in furtherance of his narcotics dealing.
On four occasions after his arrest, Petitioner moved for and was granted a continuance of his probable cause hearing. On May 23, 2019, Petitioner waived indictment and pled guilty to Counts One and Two of an Information, charging him with (1) possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of forty (40) grams or more of fentanyl in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(vi); and (2) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a narcotics trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As part of his guilty plea, Petitioner executed in open court a stipulation of offense conduct. Relevant here, the Stipulation included the following: Plea Agreement, United States v. Rivera, No. 3:19-cr-00139-KAD-1 (D. Conn. May 23, 2019), ECF No. 38 at 12.
At Petitioner's request, sentencing was continued three times. (Id. ECF Nos. 43, 47, 55) On August 27, 2019, Petitioner's appointed counsel, A.F.P.D. Charles Willson, moved to withdraw on the grounds that communication with his client had broken down. (Id. ECF No. 51) On October 4, 2019-more than four months after pleading guilty and nearly a year after his arrest-Petitioner, then represented by C.J.A. Attorney Trent LaLima, filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Id. ECF No. 60) The Court denied this motion on January 14, 2020. (Id. ECF No. 72) On July 16, 2020, the Court imposed a sentence of 78 months of imprisonment on Count One and 60 months of consecutive imprisonment on Count Two for a total of 138 months of imprisonment, four years of supervised release, and a special assessment of $200 and Judgment entered thereafter on July 17, 2020. (Id. ECF No. 103) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction or sentence.
On July 15, 2021, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (ECF No. 1) In response to an Order to Show Cause as to why the relief requested should not be granted, the Government filed its response to the Petition on August 16, 2021. (ECF No. 8) Petitioner filed a reply to the Government's response on October 6, 2021. (ECF No. 11)
“Pursuant to § 2255, a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence [or conviction] on four grounds: (1) ‘that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or (2) that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or (3) that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'” United States v. Hoskins, 905 F.3d 97, 102 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)) (brackets omitted). These are “jurisdictional [or] constitutional” issues that create “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” See Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962). A federal prisoner may also use § 2255 to attack his conviction because “[f]or the purposes of § 2255, the term ‘sentence' refers to both the prisoner's sentence and underlying conviction.” Fermin v. United States, 859 F.Supp.2d 590, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 2010)) (emphasis in Fermin).
Petitioner bears the burden of proving that a miscarriage of justice occurred. United States v. Hoskin, 905 F.3d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 2018); see also Napoli v. United States, 45 F.3d 680, 683 (2d Cir. 1995) (). In evaluating a petitioner's claim, “a district court need not assume the credibility of factual assertions . . . where the assertions are contradicted by the record in the underlying proceeding.” Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 2009). “Indeed . . . when the judge that tried the underlying proceedings also presides over the § 2255 motion, a less-than full-fledged evidentiary hearing may permissibly dispose of claims where the credibility assessment would inevitably be adverse to the petitioner.” Id.
Second Circuit “precedent instructs that § 2255 review is ‘narrowly limited in order to preserve the finality of criminal sentences and to effect the efficient allocation of judicial resources.'” Hoskins, 905 F.3d at 102 (quoting Graziano v. United States, 83 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1996)). The Second Circuit has summarized the principles governing the resolution of § 2255 claims as follows:
[N]ot every asserted error of law can be raised on a § 2255 motion.... The grounds provided in [§] 2255 for collateral attack on a final judgment in a federal criminal case are narrowly limited, and it has long been settled law that an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment. As a general rule, relief is available under § 2255 only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.
Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31, 35 (2d. Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), amended on reh'g on other grounds, 45 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1995). Constitutional errors will not be corrected through a writ of habeas corpus unless they had a “substantial and injurious effect,” that is, unless they resulted in “actual prejudice.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637-38 (1993); see also Underwood v. United States, 166 F.3d 84, 87 (2d. Cir. 1999) ().
Petitioner advances three distinct claims in his § 2255 petition. First, Petitioner claims that his plea of guilty was “unlawfully induced and not made voluntarily with the understanding of the nature and the consequences of the plea.” (ECF No. 1 at 6) Second, Petitioner claims that his conviction was “obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure” in violation of his Fourth Amendment. (Id.) Third Petitioner claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at the plea...
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