Rivera v. Veterans Memorial Medical Center

• Decision Date: 25 March 2003
• Docket Number: (SC 16752).
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: DANIEL RIVERA ET AL. v. VETERANS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER

262 Conn. 730

818 A.2d 731

DANIEL RIVERA ET AL. v. VETERANS MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER

(SC 16752).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued December 13, 2002.

Officially released March 25, 2003.

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Zarella, Js.

Brian T. Mahon, for the appellants (plaintiffs).

Kathleen M. Nevins, for the appellee (defendant).

Doreen West Amata, for the appellees (third party defendant Brown, Welsh and Votre, P.C., et al.).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The principal issue in this appeal¹ is whether the trial court abused its discretion by changing the definition of a class previously certified for this class action suit and thereafter decertifying the class on the basis of that revised definition. The plaintiffs² appeal from the order of the trial court decertifying their class action against the defendant, Veterans Memorial Medical Center.³ The defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal because the trial court's decertification order is not a final judgment. We conclude that an order decertifying a class action constitutes a final judgment. We further conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in decertifying the class. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. In their second amended complaint dated April 17, 1998, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had treated them for various work-related injuries, and thereafter had subjected the plaintiffs to unlawful collection activity for charges resulting from that treatment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia: abuse of process; breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq.; defamation; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Also on April 17, 1998, the plaintiffs filed an amended motion for certification of a class action.

On June 2, 1998, the trial court, Levine, J., granted the plaintiffs' motion and certified the matter as a class action.⁴ On July 3, 2000, pursuant to an agreement by the parties, the case was transferred to the Complex Litigation Docket. During a status conference, the trial court, Aurigemma, J., sua sponte, raised the issue of the propriety of the class certification. On October 24, 2000, Judge Aurigemma ordered the defendant to prepare a report reviewing the claims of every twentieth person who was a purported class member. After submitting the report to the trial court, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of class certification. Following two days of hearings on the motion, Judge Aurigemma issued an order decertifying the class. This appeal followed.

I

As a threshold issue, the defendant contends that a decertification order is interlocutory in nature and, therefore, not a final judgment. Accordingly, the defendant contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal. We disagree.⁵

Our law surrounding interlocutory appeals and final judgments is well settled. "The right of appeal is purely statutory.⁶ It is accorded only if the conditions fixed by statute and the rules of court for taking and prosecuting the appeal are met.... The statutory right to appeal is limited to appeals by aggrieved parties from final judgments.... Because our jurisdiction over appeals... is prescribed by statute, we must always determine the threshold question of whether the appeal is taken from a final judgment before considering the merits of the claim....

"Adherence to the final judgment rule is not dictated by legislative fiat alone.... In both criminal and civil cases ... we have determined certain interlocutory orders and rulings of the Superior Court to be final judgments for purposes of appeal. An otherwise interlocutory order is appealable in two circumstances: (1) where the order or action terminates a separate and distinct proceeding, or (2) where the order or action so concludes the rights of the parties that further proceedings cannot affect them." (Citations omitted.) State v. Curcio, 191 Conn. 27, 30-31, 463 A.2d 566 (1983); accord State v. Malcolm, 257 Conn. 653, 667, 778 A.2d 134 (2001). "Unless the appeal is authorized under the Curcio criteria, absence of a final judgment is a jurisdictional defect that [necessarily] results in a dismissal of the appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Malcolm, supra, 667.

Applying these principles, we conclude that a decertification order satisfies the second prong of the Curcio test, and is, therefore, appealable.⁷ "The second prong of the Curcio test focuses on the nature of the right involved. It requires the parties seeking to appeal to establish that the trial court's order threatens the preservation of a right already secured to them and that that right will be irretrievably lost and the [party] irreparably harmed unless they may immediately appeal." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 165, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000). Accordingly, "the [appellant] must do more than show that the trial court's decision threatens him with irreparable harm. The [appellant] must show that that decision threatens to abrogate a right that he or she then holds." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Longo, 192 Conn. 85, 91, 469 A.2d 1220 (1984).

Our determination is predicated on the fact that class actions serve a unique function in vindicating plaintiffs' rights. "[C]lass action procedures ... increase efficiencies in civil litigation by encouraging multiple plaintiffs to join in one lawsuit. Many jurisdictions have recognized that in certain situations, class action suits are superior to individual lawsuits." Grimes v. Housing Authority, 242 Conn. 236, 244, 698 A.2d 302 (1997). "Connecticut's class action procedures ... are designed to prevent the proliferation of lawsuits, and duplicative efforts and expenses." Id., 247. Accordingly, we have noted that class actions serve four essential and distinct functions, specifically, to: "(1) promote judicial economy and efficiency; (2) protect defendants from inconsistent obligations; (3) protect the interests of absentee parties; and (4) provide access to judicial relief for small claimants." (Emphasis added.) Id., 244.

In the present case, when the plaintiffs were certified as a class by the trial court, Levine, J., they secured the right to proceed in a class action against the defendant. That right provided to the plaintiffs an economically efficient means to proceed in an action that they otherwise might be unable to pursue. See Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 538 F.2d 991, 997 (3d Cir.1976) (concluding that "those members of the class whose claim is small will not be able to secure the necessary assistance of counsel unless the decertification is lifted"); Miles v. America Online, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 297, 304 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that "[e]ach individual's amount [of damages] is fairly minimal and the cost large for each member to proceed individually against [the defendant]"). When the trial court, Aurigemma, J., decertified the class two years after the initial certification, the right to proceed as a class was "irretrievably lost and the [plaintiffs were] irreparably harmed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Shay v. Rossi, supra, 253 Conn. 165. Therefore, because the trial court's decertification order prevented the plaintiffs from presenting their claims as a class, we conclude that the order constitutes a final judgment under the second prong of Curcio.⁸

II

We next turn to the plaintiffs' claim that the trial court, Aurigemma, J., abused its discretion when it decertified the class. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court abused its discretion because it changed the definition of the class from the one previously certified and then decertified the class based on the plaintiffs' inability to satisfy the requirements of a class action applying that new definition.⁹ Additionally, the plaintiffs contend that this decision improperly was predicated largely on the court's determination that the plaintiffs would be unable to succeed on the merits. The defendant contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and that any change to the definition of the class was harmless. The defendant further asserts that any consideration of the merits by the trial court was not improper. We agree with the plaintiffs. We note at the outset that our class action jurisprudence is sparse, as most class actions are brought in federal court. Our class action requirements, however, are similar to those applied in the federal courts. Compare Practice Book §§ 9-7¹⁰ and 9-8¹¹ with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) and (b).¹² Both sets of rules require that at least four elements be satisfied to certify a class: (1) numerosity—that the class is too numerous to make joinder of all members feasible; (2) commonality—that the members have similar claims of law and fact; (3) typicality—that the named plaintiffs' claims are typical of the claims of the class; and (4) adequacy of representation— that the interests of the class are protected adequately. See Practice Book § 9-7; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a). Thus, we look to federal case law for guidance in construing our class certification requirements. Marr v. WMX Technologies, Inc., 244 Conn. 676, 680-81, 711 A.2d 700 (1998).

We do so, however, mindful that the federal rules impose additional constraints on trial courts overseeing class actions beyond those imposed under our rules. Specifically, rule 23 (c) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs the trial court that "[a]s soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits."

The federal courts have determined that,...