Riverbank Improvement Co. v. Chapman

• Decision Date: 21 June 1916
• Parties: RIVERBANK IMPROVEMENT CO. v. CHAPMAN et al. SAME v. CHADWICK et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

224 Mass. 424

113 N.E. 215

RIVERBANK IMPROVEMENT CO.

v.CHAPMAN et al.

SAME

v.CHADWICK et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

June 21, 1916.

Report from Land Court, Suffolk County.

Actions by the Riverbank Improvement Company against Edwin Chapman and others and against Sarah A. Chadwick and others. On report from the land court on questions of law. Report dismissed.

Tyler, Corneau & Eames, Robt. A. Pritchard, and Franklin King, all of Boston, for petitioner.

L. M. Friedman and Swift, Friedman & Atherton, all of Boston, for respondent Congregation Adath Israel.

Gaston, Snow & Saltonstall, of Boston (F. W. Bacon, of Boston, of counsel), for respondent Mary E. Holden and others.

John D. Graham, of Boston, for respondent Eugene B. Hagar and others.

Hurlburt, Jones & Hall and Philip N. Jones, all of Boston, for respondent Fannie E. Hurlburt.

Adams & Blinn and Amos L. Taylor, all of Boston, for respondents Landensack trustees and Chadwick trustees.

RUGG, C. J.

One of these cases is a petition for the registration of the title to certain land in Boston, free from restrictions imposed in an agreement and deeds which appear of record to encumber the title, on the ground that such restrictions are not now valid and enforceable by reason of changes in the neighborhood. The other case, for the registration of other land subject of record to the same or similar restrictions, is a petition founded on the jurisdiction sought to be conferred upon the land court by St. 1915, c. 112. Numerous questions of law involving the right of several persons to be heard as parties, the extent of territory subject to the restrictions, the construction of divers agreements and deeds, the right to amend the first petition into one under St. 1915, c. 112, and the constitutionality of the latter statute, have been heard and decided by the land court. But there has been no hearing on the merits. So far as any of these questions go to the merits of the cases, they have been determined in favor of the petitioners, so that according to the rulings of the land court there must be further hearings on evidence involving perhaps further important rulings upon questions of law, before that court will be ready to render a final decision or to enter a final decree. The judge of the land court has attempted to report for the determination of this court these numerous questions of law before proceeding to a hearing on the merits.

A preliminary inquiry is whether the land court has power to make report under these circumstances. The land court is a statutory court, not of general but of strictly limited jurisdiction. R. L. c. 128, § 1, as amended by St. 1904, c. 448, § 1, and St. 1910, c. 560, § 3. While the power to report to the full court questions of law arising at any stage of a case has long been exercised by justices of this court (which has been recognized by statute), that power exists in other courts only to the extent conferred by the express terms of the statute. Terry v. Brightman, 129 Mass. 535, 537;Hetherington & Sons v. William Firth Co., 212 Mass. 257, 98 N. E. 797;Newburyport Inst. for Savs. v. Coffin, 189 Mass. 74, 75 N. E. 81. Authority is conferred upon the land court by St. 1904, c. 448, § 8 (R. L. c. 128, § 13), as amended by St. 1910, c. 560, § 1, in these words:

‘Questions of law arising * * * on any decision or decree may be taken by any party * * * directly to the Supreme Judicial Court for revision in the same manner in which questions * * * are taken to that court from the superior court. The land court, after any decision or decree dependent upon questions of law, may report such decision or decree, with so much of the case as is necessary for understanding such questions of law, for the determination of the Supreme Judicial Court.’

These statutory words are the same as those in St. 1898, c. 562, § 14, and St. 1899, c. 131, § 2. It was said, respecting the extent of the power of the land court to report under those acts, by Chief Justice Holmes, in Welsh, Petr., 175 Mass. 68, 70, 55 N. E. 1043:

‘It seems to us enough if the case is ripe for judgment or decree and the report shows that a decree would be entered were it not for the question of law, and provides for a decree when the doubt upon that question is resolved. Under such circumstances the actual entry of the decree before sending the case up is a pure...