Rivers v. City of New Britain, No. 17863.

• Decision Date: 22 July 2008
• Docket Number: No. 17863.
• Citation: 950 A.2d 1247,288 Conn. 1
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Jeanne RIVERS v. CITY OF NEW BRITAIN et al.

950 A.2d 1247

288 Conn. 1

Jeanne RIVERS v. CITY OF NEW BRITAIN et al.

No. 17863.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 25, 2007.

Decided July 22, 2008.

Linda Clough, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Irena J. Urbaniak, city attorney, for the appellee (named defendant).

KATZ, PALMER, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and SCHALLER, Js.

PALMER, J.

Municipalities ordinarily have a duty of care with respect to the maintenance of public sidewalks, and, under General Statutes § 13a-149,¹ they are liable for damages caused by a breach of that duty. Pursuant to General Statutes § 7-163a,² however, a municipality may adopt an ordinance that shifts to the owner of the land abutting a public sidewalk both the duty of care and liability with respect to the presence of snow and ice on the sidewalk.³ This certified appeal requires us to determine whether an ordinance that a municipality adopts in accordance with § 7-163a relieves the municipality of liability when the landowner abutting the sidewalk is the state, which is shielded from liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity unless that immunity has been waived. In the present case, the trial court rendered summary judgment for the named defendant,⁴ the city of New Britain (city), concluding that, because the city had adopted an ordinance pursuant to § 7-163a, it is not liable to the plaintiff, Jeanne Rivers, for injuries that she allegedly suffered after falling on an icy public sidewalk, even though the abutting landowner, the state, is shielded from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court; Rivers v. New Britain, 99 Conn.App. 492, 499, 913 A.2d 1146 (2007); and we granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Did the Appellate Court properly affirm the trial court's ... judgment based [on] its application of ... § 7-163a?" Rivers v. New Britain, 281 Conn. 929, 918 A.2d 278 (2007). We conclude that when, as in the present case, the state owns the land abutting a public sidewalk, an ordinance adopted by a municipality under § 7-163a does not relieve the municipality of liability for damages caused by the presence of ice or snow on the sidewalk. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The plaintiff claimed that she suffered serious injuries on January 7, 2003, when she slipped and fell on ice and snow that had accumulated on a public sidewalk in front of 185 Main Street in New Britain. The property abutting the sidewalk is state owned property, which is used as part of Central Connecticut State University (university). Portions of that state owned property are leased to private businesses. The university had a contract with Lawn Ranger, LLC, to provide snow removal, sanding and application of ice melting services at the subject property. The company provided services pursuant to that contract the day before the plaintiff fell.

"The plaintiff commenced this action against the [city], pursuant to . . . § 13a-149, and Stephen E. Korta [II, in his official capacity as] the commissioner of transportation, pursuant to General Statutes § 13a-144.⁵ Korta filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the plaintiff's action against him was barred by sovereign immunity because the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell was not part of the state highway system [and, therefore, the state had no duty to maintain it]. The plaintiff did not file an objection, and the court granted [Korta's] motion.

"The [city] filed an answer and a special defense. The special defense alleged that the [city] was not liable for the plaintiff's fall because it had adopted ordinance § 21-8.1c in January, 1996, in accordance with the provisions of § 7-163a. The language of the ordinance essentially mirrors the language of the statute. On January 30, 2006, the [city] filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis of the facts alleged in its special defense. The plaintiff filed an objection, claiming that the statute did not apply under the circumstances of this case. The court heard argument and . . . grant[ed] the [city's] motion." Rivers v. New Britain, supra, 99 Conn.App. at 494-95, 913 A.2d 1146.

The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court, claiming that the trial court improperly had concluded that, because the city had adopted an ordinance in accordance with § 7-163a, it was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries even though the sidewalk at issue abuts state property. Id., at 495, 913 A.2d 1146. The plaintiff contended that the city is liable for failing to maintain the sidewalk when the abutting landowner is the state because § 7-163a does not waive the state's sovereign immunity with respect to the sidewalk, and because a municipality cannot impose liability on the state through the adoption of an ordinance. Id.

The Appellate Court agreed with the plaintiff that § 7-163a does not constitute a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity and that the ordinance that the city had adopted did not effect such a waiver. The court reasoned, however, that "those conclusions [did] not warrant the ultimate conclusion that the provisions of § 7-163a do not apply in this case." Id., at 497-98, 913 A.2d 1146. The court stated further that "[i]n order to conclude that the provisions of § 7-163a do not apply, this court would have to read into those provisions an exception. We would have to determine that the shifting of liability does not occur if the owner of the land abutting the public sidewalk is the state of Connecticut. It is undisputed that no such language [can be] found in § 7-163a, and, therefore, we would have to add it by implication." Id., at 498, 913 A.2d 1146. Although the plaintiff urged the Appellate Court "to do so, claiming that the legislative history [of] the statute supports such a result"; id.; the court rejected the plaintiff's invitation, concluding that, because the language of § 7-163a is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, under General Statutes § 1-2z,⁶ consideration of extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute, including its legislative history,⁷ was foreclosed.

In his dissent from the majority opinion of the Appellate Court, Judge Bishop first expressed his agreement with the majority that § 7-163a is "facially clear and unambiguous" and does not contain an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Id., at 500, 913 A.2d 1146 (Bishop, J., dissenting). He also agreed with the majority that the language of § 7-163a clearly relieves a municipality of liability and shifts it to the abutting landowner. Id., at 501, 913 A.2d 1146 (Bishop, J., dissenting). Judge Bishop also observed, however, that § 7-163a "has two principal facets: the shifting of liability and the responsibility for public safety."⁸ Id. He concluded that § 7-163a is unworkable when the abutting landowner is the state because the public safety component of the statute cannot be effectuated. Id. Judge Bishop explained: "[B]ecause § 7-163a does not constitute a waiver of the state's immunity from liability, it is difficult to conceive how it can be implied from the statute that it imposes any duty on the state for public safety regarding a sidewalk not located on state property. Thus, it is the inevitable consequence of the majority's holding that § 7-163a relieves the municipality of its public safety responsibility without shifting it to the abutting landowner because the abutter happens to be the state."⁹ Id., at 504, 913 A.2d 1146 (Bishop, J., dissenting).

Judge Bishop therefore concluded that, because the statute is unworkable when the state is the abutting landowner, § 1-2z does not bar the court from consulting the pertinent legislative history to determine whether the legislature intended to relieve the city of its duty of care and liability even when the abutting landowner is the state. Id., at 500-501, 504, 913 A.2d 1146 (Bishop, J., dissenting). Judge Bishop stated that, on the basis of the legislative history, it is "plain that the intent of the General Assembly in enacting § 7-163a was to permit a municipality to pass an ordinance to shift the burden of liability regarding snow and ice on municipal sidewalks from the municipalities' taxpayers to abutting private property owners." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 504, 913 A.2d 1146 (Bishop, J., dissenting). Accordingly, Judge Bishop concluded that, contrary to the determination of the trial court and the Appellate Court majority, the ordinance that the city had adopted in accordance with § 7-163a did not relieve it of liability for its alleged negligence in failing to remove the ice and snow from the sidewalk on which the plaintiff was injured. See id., at 505, 913 A.2d 1146 (Bishop, J., dissenting).

On appeal to this court following our granting of certification, the plaintiff urges us to reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court for the reasons set forth by Judge Bishop in his dissenting opinion. The city contends that we should affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court, albeit on a ground different from that relied on by the Appellate Court majority. Specifically, the city maintains that, although the Appellate Court majority correctly concluded that § 7-163a relieves the city of liability for the plaintiff's injuries, the court incorrectly determined that § 7-163a does not waive the state's sovereign immunity with respect to injuries caused by snow and ice on sidewalks abutting state property. In support of its contention, the city asserts that § 7-163a plainly and unambiguously imposes a duty of care and liability on all abutting landowners, including the state, and that, if the legislature had intended to exempt the state from the provisions of § 7-163a, it easily could have done so.

We conclude that § 7-163a does not waive the state's...