Rivers v. H.S. Beauty Queen Inc.
| Decision Date | 18 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A10A1210.,A10A1210. |
| Citation | 703 S.E.2d 416,73 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 136,306 Ga.App. 866 |
| Parties | RIVERSv.H.S. BEAUTY QUEEN, INC. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Reynolds, Horne & Survant, Timothy J. Boyd, Macon, Mary–Dallas J. Roper, for appellant.Hawkins, Parnell, Thackston & Young, Wayne W. Dempsey, Jr., Michael J. Goldman, Brian W. Sprinkle, Atlanta, for appellee.DOYLE, Judge.
After suffering burns to her face and chest from a ceramic, scented-oil burner, Stacy Rivers filed the instant action, alleging claims for strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose against H.S. Beauty Queen, Inc. (“Beauty Queen”), where she purchased the item. Beauty Queen filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted as to all of Rivers's claims. Rivers appeals, arguing that there were genuine issues of material fact as to her claims and that the trial court therefore erred by granting the motion for summary judgment. We disagree and affirm, for the reasons that follow.
To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9–11–56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9–11–56(c). A defendant may do this by showing the court that the documents, affidavits, depositions[,] and other evidence in the record reveal that there is no evidence sufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of plaintiff's case. If there is no evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to any essential element of plaintiff's claim, that claim tumbles like a house of cards. All of the other disputes of fact are rendered immaterial. A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party's case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue.1
Viewed in this light, the record establishes that Rivers shopped at Beauty Queen for scented candles for her home. She was assisted at the store by one of the employees, whom she alleges dissuaded her from buying the candles, directing her instead to ceramic, scented-oil burners. Rivers deposed that she selected a burner in the shape of an elephant, and because she was unaware of how to use the device, the employee explained to her that she would need to select an oil, purchase tealight candles, and place the candle below an oil reservoir so that the flame would heat the oil when lit. Rivers further deposed that the burner was not sold with instructions; however, she relied on the instructions on the scented oil in order to determine the amount of oil to use in the burner.
A few days later, Rivers used the device for the first time, placing it at face height on her mantel, but instead of a pleasing aroma, Rivers deposed that an unpleasant smell emanated from the burner, causing her to extinguish the flame by blowing out the candle. Rivers deposed that as she blew out the flame, it became very large, and “[i]t exploded in [her] face.” Rivers was transported to the emergency room and was treated for second-degree burns on her face, neck, and chest, as well as injuries to her eyes, one of which was swollen shut after the incident.
Rivers filed the instant action against Beauty Queen, but did not join the manufacturers of any of the three products (the scented oil, the candle, or the ceramic burner) involved in the incident. Upon its motion, the trial court granted summary judgment to Beauty Queen on all counts alleged in the complaint. Rivers now appeals the grant as to each count except the allegation of strict products liability.
A product is defective and breaches the implied warranty of merchantability when it is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; such purpose is determined by the manufacturer and not the user. In addition, as a separate element, a claim of breach of implied warranty requires proof that the goods are defective at the time they were sold. To succeed on its motion, [Beauty Queen] was required to show the absence of evidence as to at least one element of the breach of implied warranty claim.2
The trial court determined that Rivers's claim for breach of implied warranty of merchantability failed because Rivers's complaint specifically admitted that the ceramic burner was not defective, which resulted in a failure of proof of one of the essential elements of the claim.
“As warranty liability under the Code is predicated upon a sale, it follows that the defect or condition of the goods relied upon to establish that there has been a breach of warranty must have existed at the time of the sale.” 3
The trial court's conclusion that the ceramic burner was not defective for its ordinary purpose at the time of sale is supported by the evidence of record. While it appears that the trial court misconstrued the admission contained in Rivers's complaint (while inartfully worded, Rivers contended that the product was not defective as manufactured, but the display and packaging prepared by Beauty Queen rendered it defective), the grant of summary judgment to Beauty Queen was still correct because Rivers has not presented any evidence of record that some defect existed in the item such that it was inappropriate to use for its ordinary purpose as a ceramic oil burner other than the mere existence of her injury.4
On appeal, Rivers contends that the item was not defective for its ordinary purpose as a ceramic decorative item, but became defective as sold because Beauty Queen inappropriately advertised the product as a scented-oil burner. Beauty Queen's owners and employees, however, deposed that this item and others like it were...
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