Riverside Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't v. Stiglitz

• Decision Date: 01 December 2014
• Docket Number: No. S206350.,S206350.
• Citation: 181 Cal.Rptr.3d 1,339 P.3d 295,60 Cal.4th 624
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jan STIGLITZ, as Hearing Officer, etc., Defendant and Respondent; Kristy Drinkwater, Real Party in Interest and Respondent; Riverside Sheriffs' Association, Intervener and Appellant. Riverside County Sheriff's Department, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jan Stiglitz, as Hearing Officer, etc., Defendant and Respondent; Kristy Drinkwater, Real Party in Interest.

60 Cal.4th 624

339 P.3d 295

181 Cal.Rptr.3d 1

RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Jan STIGLITZ, as Hearing Officer, etc., Defendant and Respondent;

Kristy Drinkwater, Real Party in Interest and Respondent;

Riverside Sheriffs' Association, Intervener and Appellant.

Riverside County Sheriff's Department, Plaintiff and Respondent

v.Jan Stiglitz, as Hearing Officer, etc., Defendant and Respondent;

Kristy Drinkwater, Real Party in Interest.

No. S206350.

Supreme Court of California

Dec. 1, 2014.

Hayes & Cunningham, San Diego, Dennis J. Hayes, Adam E. Chaikin and Amanda K. Hansen for Intervener and Appellant.

Stone Busailah, Pasadena, Michael P. Stone, Muna Busailah, Melanie C. Smith, Robert Rabe and Travis M. Poteat for Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Lackie, Dammeier & McGill, Upland, and Michael A. Morguess for Peace Officers' Research Association of California Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine, Santa Monica, Richard A. Levine, Brian P. Ross and Michael Simidjian for Los Angeles Police Protective League as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Green & Shinee, Encino, Richard A. Shinee and Helen L. Schwab for Association for Los Angles Deputy Sheriffs as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Law Office of James E. Trott and James E. Trott for Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs, Long Beach Police Officers Association and Southern California Alliance of Law Enforcement as Amici Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, Santa Ana, Jon F. Hamilton, Kimberly A. Wah and Bruce D. Praet for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Kathleen Bales–Lange, County Counsel (Tulare) and Crystal E. Sullivan, Deputy County Counsel, for California State Association of Counties and California League of Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jones & Mayer, Fullerton, Martin J. Mayer, Gregory P. Palmer and Krista MacNevin Jee for California State Sheriffs' Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for Defendant and Respondent.

Opinion

CORRIGAN, J.

Here we hold that when hearing an administrative appeal from discipline imposed on a correctional officer, an arbitrator may rule upon a discovery motion for officer personnel records, commonly referred to as a Pitchess motion. (Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305 (Pitchess ); Evid.Code, §§ 1043, 1045.) Evidence Code section 1043 expressly provides that Pitchess motions may be filed with an appropriate “administrative body.” The language reflects a legislative intent that administrative hearing officers be allowed to rule on these motions. This holding harmonizes the statutory scheme with other Evidence Code provisions and furthers the goals of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov.Code, § 3300 et seq. ).

I. BACKGROUND

The Riverside County Sheriff's Department (the department) fired Deputy Kristy Drinkwater for falsifying her payroll forms. A memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Riverside Sheriffs' Association (Sheriffs' Association) and the county provided for an administrative appeal. The parties chose arbitrator Jan Stiglitz as the hearing officer.

Drinkwater intended to urge a disparate treatment defense, claiming that others had committed similar misconduct but were not fired. Accordingly, she sought discovery of redacted records “from personnel investigations of any Department employees who have been disciplined for similar acts of misconduct.” (See Pegues v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 95, 105–106, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 705 ; Talmo v. Civil Service Com. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 229–231, 282 Cal.Rptr. 240.) Limiting her request to events during the previous five years, she sought incident summaries, the rank of the officer, and the discipline imposed. The department objected, arguing in part that Drinkwater could not satisfy the requirements for a Pitchess motion under Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, and could not establish the good cause required for discovery. Stiglitz denied the motion without prejudice, ruling the department need not search its records for similar disciplinary cases. Instead, Drinkwater was obligated to identify particular officers whose records she believed were relevant to her claim.

Drinkwater renewed her motion, supported by counsel's declaration that 11 named officers had allegedly committed similar misconduct but received little or no discipline. Stiglitz ordered production of the 11 officers' records for in camera review.

The department sought a writ of administrative mandate in superior court. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) It argued initially that Drinkwater failed to establish good cause for discovery because counsel's declaration was speculative and Pitchess discovery was only available for officers involved in the underlying incident at issue. The department then filed a supplemental brief citing the recent case of Brown v. Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 429 (Brown ). Brown held that a driver facing a license suspension for driving under the influence could not seek Pitchess discovery in a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) administrative proceeding. (See discussion, post. ) Relying upon Brown, the department argued only judicial officers could grant Pitchess motions, depriving Stiglitz of authority to rule. The superior court agreed and granted mandate, ordering Stiglitz to reverse his prior order.

The Sheriffs' Association sought to intervene, moving to set aside the mandate order and to secure a new hearing. Intervention was granted. After additional briefing and a new hearing, the superior court again granted the department's mandate petition, relying upon Brown.

Drinkwater and intervener Sheriffs' Association sought review. In consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal reversed, distinguishing Brown and criticizing its reasoning. We affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

The department again urges that only judicial officers are authorized to rule on Pitchess motions. That argument fails in light of the governing statutes.

A. The Pitchess Statutes

In Pitchess, this court held a criminal defendant could obtain discovery of certain law enforcement personnel records upon a sufficient showing of good cause. (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 537–540, 113 Cal.Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305.) “In 1978, the California Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to be known as ‘Pitchess motions' ... through the enactment of Penal Code sections 832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.” (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222, fn. omitted (City of Santa Cruz ).) Those sections create a statutory scheme making these records confidential and subject to discovery only through the procedure set out in the Evidence Code. (City of Santa Cruz, at pp. 81–82, 260 Cal.Rptr. 520, 776 P.2d 222.) The sole issue here is whether, by statute, these motions may only be ruled on in the superior court, or whether they can be resolved by an administrative hearing officer. In answering this question of statutory interpretation, our goal is to effectuate the Legislature's intent. (People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 260, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 70, 303 P.3d 379 ; People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 837, 274 P.3d 456.) “ ‘When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]henever possible, significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some words surplusage.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e may reject a literal construction that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd results....' [Citation.]” (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1131, 150 Cal.Rptr.3d 533, 290 P.3d 1143 ; accord, Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 518–519, 128 Cal.Rptr.3d 658, 257 P.3d 81.) We consider the applicable statutes in turn.

Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a) provides in part: “Peace officer or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local agency pursuant to [Penal Code] Section 832.5 [regarding the investigation and retention of citizen complaints], or information obtained from these records, are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code.” (Italics added.) Penal Code section 832.8 defines “personnel records,” a definition not disputed here.¹

Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) reads in part: “In any case in which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel records ..., the party seeking the discovery or disclosure shall file a written motion with the appropriate court or administrative body ....” (Italics added.) The expansive language of Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) does two things. First, it makes clear that Pitchess motions may be brought in both civil and criminal cases. (See Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 293, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 661, 165 P.3d 462 (Peace Officer Standards ); Pen.Code, § 832.7, subd. (f).) Second, Evidence...