Riverside Dan River Cotton Mills v. Williamson Menefee

• Decision Date: 12 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 169,169
• Citation: 237 U.S. 189,59 L.Ed. 910,35 S.Ct. 579
• Parties: RIVERSIDE & DAN RIVER COTTON MILLS, Incorporated, Plff. in Err., v. WILLIAMSON MENEFEE, by His Next Friend, Mrs. Emma W. Menefee
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

237 U.S. 189

35 S.Ct. 579

59 L.Ed. 910

RIVERSIDE & DAN RIVER COTTON MILLS, Incorporated, Plff. in Err.,

v WILLIAMSON MENEFEE, by His Next Friend, Mrs. Emma W. Menefee.

No. 169.

Argued March 4, 1915.

Decided April 12, 1915.

Mr. F. P. Hobgood, Jr., for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

Mr. Chief Justice White delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff in error, a corporation called hereafter the Riverside Mills, was sued, in North Carolina by the defendant in error, a resident of that state, to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by him while working in Virginia as an employee in a cotton mill operated by the Riverside Mills. The summons directed to the corporation was returned by the sheriff served as follows: 'By reading and leaving a copy of the within summons with Thos. B. Fitzgerald, a director of the defendant corporation.' The Riverside Mills filed a special appearance and motion to dismiss in which it prayed for the striking out of the return of service for the reason that 'the defendant is a foreign corporation, not doing business in North Carolina, and has not been domesticated, and has no agent upon whom service can be made, and that the service of the summons is invalid and does not amount to due process of law as against this defendant.' This motion was supported by an affidavit of a person styling himself secretary and treasurer of the company, stating the facts to be that the corporation was a Virginia one, had its place of business in Virginia, carried on its factory there, had never transacted business in North Carolina, had no property there, and that the person upon whom service was made, although he was a director of the corporation and was a resident of North Carolina, had never transacted any business in that state for the corporation. The motion to strike out was refused, although the court found the facts to be in accordance with the statement made in the motion and in the affidavit. The defendant answered. There was a trial to a jury, and despite the insistence upon the invalidity of the summons, there was a verdict against the Riverside Mills to which it prosecuted error to the supreme court of North Carolina. For the purpose of that review an agreed case was made in which the facts were found to be as stated in the affidavit supporting the motion to strike out, and in considering the case the court below, stating the same facts, reviewed the ruling of the trial court upon that premise.

Coming first to consider the statutes of North Carolina and various decisions of that state construing and applying them, the court held that as the plaintiff was a resident of the state, and the director upon whom the summons was served also resided in the state, the summons was authorized, wholly irrespective of whether the foreign corporation had transacted any business in the state, had any property in the state, or whether the resident director was carrying on business for the corporation in North Carolina or had done so. The court came then to consider decisions of this court, which it deemed related to the question under consideration, for the purpose of testing how far the due process clause relied upon operated from a Federal point of view, that is, the Constitution of the United States, to dominate and modify, if at all, the state rule. In doing so reference was made to the ruling in Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 39 L. ed, 517, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559, and Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406, 47 L. ed. 1113, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728, in the first of which it was held that there was no basis for asserting jurisdiction as the result of service of process on the president of a foreign corporation in a state where he was temporarily present, and where the corporation did no business, had no property, and where the president was transacting no business for the corporation in the state where he was served; and in the second of which, under like conditions, the same conclusion was reached where the service was made on a director of a foreign corporation residing in the state where the suit was brought. After briefly reviewing these cases, which were both decided in courts of the United States on removal from state courts, and directing attention to the fact that in the Goldey Case it was observed, 'Whatever effect a constructive service may be allowed in the courts of the same government, it cannot be recognized as valid by the courts of any other government,' and that the same observation was reiterated in the opinion in the Conley Case, it was in effect decided that from the point of view of the Constitution of the United States the due process clause relied upon did not control the state law so as to prevent the taking of jurisdiction under the summons for the purpose of entering a judgment, whatever effect the due process clause might have upon the power to enforce the judgment when rendered. The court said: 'Under our decisions above quoted, and upon which the plaintiff relied in bringing his action, the service is sufficient for a valid judgment, at least, within our jurisdiction.' Concerning the judgment of affirmance which it awarded, the court further said: 'What opportunity or method the plaintiff may have to enforce his judgment is not before us now for consideration.' Two members of the court dissented upon the ground that the decisions of this court, which were referred to in the opinion of the court, clearly established that there was no power to render the judgment, and that the same conclusion was required as the result of the following additional cases in this court: Old Wayne Mut. Life Asso. v. McDonough, 204 U. S. 8, 51 L. ed. 345, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 236; Kendall v. American Automatic Loom Co. 198 U. S. 477, 49 L. ed. 1133, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 768; Connecticut Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 43 L. ed. 569, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 308; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U. S. 350, 27 L. ed. 222, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 354; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 100, 42 L. ed. 964, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; Fitzgerald & M. Constr. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 137 U. S. 98, 34 L. ed. 608, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 36. To the judgment thus rendered (161 N. C. 164, 76 S. E. 741) this writ of error was prosecuted.

Was error committed in deciding that, consistently with the due process clause of the 14th Amendment, there was jurisdiction to enter against ...