Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Development Corp.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1939
• Parties: RIVIERA CLUB v. BELLE MEAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

194 So. 783

141 Fla. 538

RIVIERA CLUB v. BELLE MEAD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION et al.

Florida Supreme Court, Division B.

December 15, 1939

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1940.

Suit by the Belle Mead Development Corporation against the Rio Vista Hotel & Improvement Company and others to foreclose certain tax sale certificates, wherein the Riviera Club filed petition for intervention. From an order denying the petition for intervention, intervener appeals.

Affirmed. Appeal from Circuit Court, Volusia County George Wm. jackson, judge.

COUNSEL

Walter C. Hardesty, Jr., of Daytona Beach, for appellant.

Hull Landis & Whitehair and Francis P. Whitehair, all of DeLand and B. F. Brass, of Daytona Beach, for appellees.

OPINION

BROWN Justice.

This is the second appearance of this case here. See Rio Vista Hotel & Imp. Co. v. Belle Mead Development Corporation et al., 132 Fla. 88, 182 So. 417. The facts therein stated that are pertinent to a proper disposition of this case are as follows:

In April, 1934, The Belle Mead Development Corporation instituted suit to foreclose certain tax sale certificates issued by the town of Ormond for the non-payment of taxes assessed and levied by the town, against the property involved in this suit, for the years 1925, 1926 and 1927. Complainant had purchased the tax certificates from the town of Ormond in October, 1931. The bill of complaint filed in this suit also set out certain tax sale certificates held by one H. L. Post and a water assessment lien held by the city of Ormond. All other present appellees were named defendants in the original action. Decrees pro confesso were entered against H. L. Post and Mortgage Securities Co. The City of Ormond answered, admitting ownership of the water assessment lien as alleged but denied the priority of complainant's lien over their own. The defendants Rio Vista Hotel & Imp. Co., The Standard Abstract Co. and Walter C. Hardesty filed an amended answer admitting the ownership of the property as alleged but attacking the validity of the tax sale certificates on various grounds. These special defenses were stricken by an order of the court and an appeal was taken. The ruling of the lower court was affirmed by this court on the grounds of laches, waiver and estoppel. See Rio Vista Hotel & Imp. Co. v. Belle Mead Dev. Corp. et al., supra.

In conformity with our mandate of July 25, 1938, motion was made for a reference to a special examiner, which, by order of court, was done on August 4, 1938. On August 11, 1938, The Riviera Club, appellant herein, filed its petition for intervention.

The petition, among other things, set forth that appellant was in actual occupancy of the premises under a recorded lease; that by the terms of the lease it was the duty of the petitioners to pay taxes against the property; that this court had held the tax sale certificates to be enforceable; that the taxes for the years 1931 to 1937, inclusive, had not been paid and that the intervenor desired to litigate and have settled its liability on all the unpaid tax liens on the property. The petition ended with a prayer that appellant be allowed to intervene and file its attached answer, the said answer containing a lengthy attack on the validity of the taxes assessed and levied for the years 1925 to 1937, inclusive.

By order of court, dated August 12, 1938, the chancellor denied the petition for intervention, without prejudice. The present appeal is taken from the last cited order.

In disposing of this case, it is necessary to consider only one principle of law, which is well founded and has been previously settled in this jurisdiction; namely, that an intervenor must accept the pleadings of a case as he finds them--he will not be heard to raise new matters or issues not embodied in the original suit, unless otherwise ordered by the court in its discretion.

Upon examination of the bill of complaint, it is readily noted that the only matters presented therein are the foreclosure of the tax sale certificates for the years 1925, 1926 and 1927, held by complainant; the tax sale certificates for the years 1928 and 1929, held by H. L. Post; and the water assessment lien held by the city of Ormond. The answer of the appellant, attached to its petition of intervention, sought to bring into the cause not only the matters just above mentioned but also the tax certificates for the years 1931 to 1937, inclusive.

While it is the better practice to adjudicate all unsatisfied tax liens at the same time and clear the title of all tax liens, such procedure is not mandatory. In the case of City of Bradenton v. Lee, 120 Fla. 100, 102, 162 So. 139, 140, this court said:

'In order to avoid multiple litigation, the holder of a tax sale certificate may bring a foreclosure suit to have all unsatisfied tax liens adjudicated and the title cleared of all matured tax liens, but such procedure is not mandatory. They may be cleared piecemeal if desired.'

The appellant, The Riviera Club, was bound by the record, as it was at the time of its petition for intervention, by the pleadings as they were framed at that time, and by the issues and matters involved therein and sought to be adjudicated thereby. It was required to take the suit as it found it, and could not, by its petition to intervene, inject or raise new or independent matters or issues in its own behalf against the city of Ormond, one of the defendants. In 21 C.J. 343, it is stated:

'The courts have always striven to maintain the integrity of the issues raised by the original pleadings, and to keep newly admitted parties within the scope of the original suit. A stranger cannot intervene for the purpose of litigating with plaintiff his right or title to any relief, nor for the purpose of defeating the entire suit. The injection of an independent controversy by intervention is improper. If a person desires to set up a new and independent claim to the subject matter of the suit it must be done by an original bill; it cannot be done by an intervening petition.'

Likewise:

'An intervenor must abide by the pleadings as he finds them at the time of his entry; he...