Rizzo v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Local 237

• Decision Date: 12 March 1985
• Citation: 109 A.D.2d 639,486 N.Y.S.2d 220
• Parties: , 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3304 Sara RIZZO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 237, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 220

486 N.Y.S.2d 220

109 A.D.2d 639, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3304

Sara RIZZO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, LOCAL 237, et al Defendants-Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division First Department.

March 12, 1985.

J.T. Murray, New York City, for plaintiff-respondent.

K.K. Fisher, New York City, for defendants-appellants.

Before SANDLER, J.P., and CARRO, MILONAS and KASSAL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM DECISION.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered May 23, 1984, reversed to the extent appealed from, on the law, without costs, defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's fourth cause of action alleging breach of an implied covenant of good-faith performance in an at-will employment contract is granted, and the complaint is dismissed. The appeal by defendant International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 237, from the order insofar as it denied that party's motion to dismiss on the ground that it is not a proper party to the action, is dismissed without costs as academic.

On March 23, 1981 plaintiff was hired, without a written contract and for an indefinite period, as secretary to defendant Maggie Drezin, the director of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 237 Retirees' Benefit Fund. In February 1982 Ms. Drezin advised plaintiff that her employment was to be terminated for purposes of office reorganization, and on March 12, 1982 plaintiff was discharged with one week's salary and one week's vacation pay.

In July 1983 plaintiff commenced an action against Local 237 and Ms. Drezin, alleging that plaintiff had actually been discharged for spreading rumors about a romantic involvement between Ms. Drezin and an officer of Local 237, a charge that plaintiff claims was false. The complaint stated five causes of action: the first alleging a denial of due process in that she was denied a hearing, the second for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the third for prima facie tort, the fourth for breach of an implied covenant of good-faith performance under contract, and the fifth for wrongful discharge.

Special Term granted defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing each of the aforesaid causes of action except the fourth. The motion was denied as to the fourth cause of action without prejudice to bringing a new motion for summary judgment dismissing that cause of action upon completion of discovery proceedings. Special Term reasoned that plaintiff should have an opportunity to examine any codified personnel policies of her employer so that she might demonstrate that her employment was governed by principles set forth in Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 57 N.Y.2d 458, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441. For reasons that follow we conclude that defendants' motion to dismiss the fourth cause of action should have been granted, and the complaint dismissed.

In Weiner the Court of Appeals undertook to decide whether, in the circumstances of that case "the plaintiff, though not engaged for a fixed term of employment, pleaded a good cause of action for breach of contract against his employer because, allegedly, he was discharged without the 'just and sufficient cause' or the rehabilitative efforts specified in the employer's personnel handbook and allegedly promised at the time he accepted the employment." (57 N.Y.2d at p. 460, 457 N.Y.S.2d 193, 443 N.E.2d 441, emphasis added). The operative facts in that case, which the court stated "deserve emphasis" (id.), are as follows: (1) the employee was induced to...