Roach v. Lacho
| Decision Date | 09 May 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. 2,No. 51492,51492,2 |
| Citation | 402 S.W.2d 344 |
| Parties | Dona Lee ROACH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Verna F. LACHO, Defendant-Respondent |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
W. Hugh McLaughlin, Rollie R. Baldwin, Kansas City, for appellant.
Richard P. Sprinkle, Kansas City, for respondent; Sprinkle, Carter, Sprinkle & Larson, Kansas City, or counsel.
Plaintiff brought suit for $20,000 for personal injuries. At the close of plaintiff's case the trial court sustained defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered judgment for defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff's petition alleged primary and humanitarian negligence. Defendant's answer contained a general denial and pleaded contributory negligence, including an assertion that plaintiff was driving to the left side of the road when approaching within one hundred feet of an intersection. The trial court held that plaintiff's own evidence disclosed that she was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, which barred recovery for primary negligence, and that the evidence did not make a submissible case under the humanitarian doctrine. These are the two issues raised on appeal, and we shall consider them in that order.
The evidence discloses that on the morning of September 25, 1961, plaintiff was driving her automobile south on Raytown Road where it enters Raytown. The speed limit at that point was 35 miles per hour. The street is constructed of concrete and is 18 feet wide. Raytown Road is intersected at this point by 53rd Street, which runs east from a 'T' intersection with Raytown Road. It is constructed of blacktop and is 17 feet wide. At the intersection with Raytown Road, 53rd Street bells or widens out to a width of 62 feet, but practically all of the additional width is on the south side of the street. Both the testimony and the photographs indicate that 53rd Street does not widen appreciably on its north edge but at that point forms an almost square intersection with Raytown Road.
Plaintiff testified that as she proceeded south on Raytown Road she followed a slow-moving Comet automobile traveling at approximately 15 miles per hour. She testified variously that when she was between 100 to 150 feet from the intersection with 53rd Street, she turned from the right lane to the left lane and started to pass the Comet. For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that this occurred before she reached a point 100 feet from the intersection with 53rd Street. At the time plaintiff turned from the right-hand to the left-hand lane she could see four blocks to the south on Raytown Road. She accelerated to 30 miles an hour to pass the Comet, which was traveling at 15 miles per hour. When she was about three car lengths from the north edge of the 53rd Street intersection (48 to 51 feet), plaintiff observed defendant's car moving west on 53rd Street at about 10 miles per hour. She estimated it was about one car length from Raytown Road. At that time plaintiff's right rear door was about even with the front of the Comet automobile. Plaintiff applied her brakes and honked her horn, but her car and defendant's car collided on the east half of Raytown Road at the intersection with 53rd Street. Other facts, as necessary, with be recited in connection with discussion of whether the evidence was sufficient to justify a submission to the jury under the humanitarian doctrine.
The question of whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law involves a consideration of the provisions of § 304.016 and particularly paragraph 4 thereof (all references are to RS Mo 1959, V.A.M.S., unless otherwise indicated). Said paragraph 4 is as follows:
'4. No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
'(1) When approaching the crest of a grade or upon a curve of the highway where the driver's view is obstructed within such distance as to create a hazard in the event another vehicle might approach from the opposite direction.
'(2) When the view is obstructed upon approaching within one hundred feet of any bridge, viaduct, tunnel or when approaching within one hundred feet of or at any intersection or railroad grade crossing.' 1
Plaintiff asserts that when the statute uses the language 'No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway,' the use of the preposition 'to' implies a change of the vehicle's location from the right to the left side of the roadway. Consequently, says plaintiff, the statutory prohibition relating to the area within one hundred feet of an intersection applies only if, within that distance, the vehicle actually crosses from right to left, and it has no application if the vehicle was already in the left lane when it reached a point one hundred feet from the intersection.
We note that the statute does not say specifically that no vehicle shall be driven from the right-hand lane to the left-hand lane of the highway. Neither does it say explicitly that no vehicle shall be driven in or on the left-hand side of a roadway. What, then, does the language 'to the left side of the roadway,' as used in paragraph 4 of the statute, mean?
In the first place, it should be noted that paragraph 4 is not limited by its terms to vehicles overtaking and passing other vehicles. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of § 304.016 do apply specifically to overtaking and passing, but this is not true of paragraph 4. It makes no reference anywhere to overtaking and passing other vehicles, but starts out by saying that 'No vehicle shall at any time be driven * * *' (emphasis supplied). It then goes on to spell out several specific situations in which no vehicle is to be driven 'to the left side of the roadway.' The first such situation specified in the statute is as follows: 'No vehicle shall at any time be driven to the left side of the roadway * * * when approaching the crest of a grade.' Is this language intended to prohibit all vehicles from driving in the left-hand lane when approaching the crest of a grade, or does it mean, as plaintiff contends, that the prohibition applies only if the vehicle corsses over from right to left as it approaches the crest of the grade? We think it means the former, not the latter. A car which has been on the left side of the road for some time and remains there as it approaches the crest of the hill is just as much a hazard to traffic approaching from the opposite direction as a vehicle which crosses over into the left-hand lane when approaching the crest of the hill. We find nothing in the language of the statute, or in the evident purpose of the statute, which would cause us to construe it to be applicable only to those vehicles crossing over from right to left as they approach the crest of the grade. The intention of the legislature, we think, was to prevent all cars from being in the left lane when approaching the crest of a grade, not just those which cross over when approaching the crest. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the preposition 'to' as used in paragraph 4 is synonymous with 'on' or 'upon.' Obviously, if the preposition 'to' is synonymous with 'on' or 'upon' with respect to this situation (approaching the crest of a grade), it has the same meaning when applied to the other specific situations set out in paragraph 4, including travel in the left lane within one hundred feet of an intersection.
We think that this interpretation of the meaning of the preposition 'to' as used in paragraph 4 is in harmony with its use in other paragraphs in § 304.016. For example, it also is used in paragraph 2 thereof. That paragraph provides that the driver 'may overtake and pass to the right of another vehicle * * * upon a city street with unobstructed pavement of sufficient width for two or more lines of vehicles in each direction.' Plaintiff's interpretation of the preposition 'to' as implying a crossing over and a change of lanes would mean that this permission to pass on the right of another vehicle applied only if he first crossed over from the left to the right lane of vehicles moving in the same direction in the process of passing 'to the right of another vehicle.' The same would be true under paragraph 2(3) which is applicable to a one-way street. Obviously, we think, this is not what the statute means. Rather, it means that it is permissible on such a city street to pass on the right 'when such movement may be made in safety' and there is no requirement that there has been any crossing over from one lane to another as a condition to that permission. Thus, the preposition 'to' as used in paragraph 2 is synonymous with 'on' or 'upon,' just as we find it to be in paragraph 4 of the section. We shall not lengthen this opinion with a discussion of the other paragraphs of the section and the use of the preposition 'to' therein, but we believe them to be consistent with this interpretation.
Counsel have cited no Missouri cases interpreting this section of the statute in its present form, and we have found no case in our research on the subject. Cases are cited by counsel from other jurisdictions which interpret statutes containing identical or substantially identical language. The cases of Harbert v. Mathis, Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W.2d 380, and Young v. Blue Line Storage Co., 242 Iowa 125, 44 N.W.2d 391, reach conclusions which are in harmony with the views herein expressed. The cases of Lemkie v. Boice, 329 Mich. 278, 45 N.W.2d 288; Clark v. Summer, Fla., 72 So.2d 375, and Hendrick v. Strazzulla, Fla.App., 168 So.2d 156, reach opposite results. We have considered these cases, but see no useful purpose in discussing and analyzing them in this opinion. Those who are interested may read the cases for themselves. Obviously, from what we have said, we believe that the interpretation made in the Texas and Iowa cases is the proper one.
Plaintiff makes the further assertion with respect to § 304.016 that it was intended only to...
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...using the roadway at or near the intersection regardless of the direction they were traveling." (Emphasis added). Roach v. Lacho (1966), Mo., 402 S.W.2d 344, 349; see also Harbert v. Mathis (1950), Tex.Civ.App., 230 S.W.2d 380, 383. What else if not a motorist entering the highway at an int......
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