Roalsvik v. Comack, Docket: Yor-18-443
Decision Date | 14 May 2019 |
Docket Number | Docket: Yor-18-443 |
Citation | 208 A.3d 367 |
Parties | Lisa ROALSVIK v. Brett COMACK |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Anthony P. Shusta II, Esq., Law Offices of Anthony P. Shusta II, Madison, for appellant Lisa Roalsvik
Keri J. Marshall, Esq., Marshall Law, PLLC, East Kingston, New Hampshire, for appellee Brett Comack
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶1] Lisa Roalsvik appeals from orders entered in the District Court (York, Sutton, J. ) denying her motion to modify the parties' divorce judgment and her motion for the court to reconsider that order. The orders, among other things, denied Roalsvik's request that the parties' child reside primarily with her; allocated final parental decision-making authority regarding the child's education to Brett Comack; and increased Roalsvik's child support obligation.
[¶2] In determining whether to modify parental rights and responsibilities established in an existing judgment, "the trial court engages in a two-step inquiry: [f]irst, whether since the prior order there has occurred a change in circumstances sufficiently substantial in its effect upon the child's best interest to justify a modification; and second, if so, how should the custody arrangement be modified in furtherance of the child's best interest."1
Bulkley v. Bulkley , 2013 ME 101, ¶ 11, 82 A.3d 116 (alterations and quotation marks omitted); 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1657(1)(A), (2) (2018). Because at trial Roalsvik bore the burden of proof on her motion, see Little v. Wallace , 2016 ME 93, ¶ 13, 142 A.3d 585, she must demonstrate here that the evidence compelled the court to make the findings necessary to grant her motion. See Handrahan v. Malenko , 2011 ME 15, ¶ 13, 12 A.3d 79. Contrary to Roalsvik's assertion, the record evidence did not compel the court to conclude that it would be in the child's best interest to reside primarily with her. See 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3) (2018).
[¶3] Additionally, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Roalsvik's motion for reconsideration because the motion comprised a reiteration of arguments that she had already presented to the court and allegations of events that occurred only after the hearing was held and the record was closed. See M.R. Civ. P. 7(b)(5) ; M.R. Civ. P. 59(e) ; Shaw v. Shaw , 2003 ME 153, ¶¶ 7-8, 12, 839 A.2d 714.
[¶4] We write only to address two issues that Roalsvik raises on this appeal.
Largely from this, Roalsvik asserts that "the court summarily dismissed the [GAL's] report, testimony and recommendations regarding primary residency."
[¶6] For two reasons, Roalsvik's claim reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the court's remarks. First, utterly contrary to Roalsvik's view of the way the court treated the GAL's recommendation, the court's statement constitutes an explicit expression of its intention to take the recommendation seriously and a recognition of the value that a GAL's investigation and recommendation can provide to the court in these often difficult cases. Indeed, the court explained that it wanted to know "every aspect" of the GAL's reasoning—an approach illustrated by the court's rulings that overruled Roalsvik's own objections to a number of Comack's questions that explored the GAL's opinion. The court's order did not specifically refer to the GAL's recommendation, and its ultimate conclusion differed from the GAL's. Nonetheless, particularly given that Comack's cross-examination of the GAL generated testimony that could reasonably be seen to bring several aspects of the GAL's recommendation into question, it cannot be fairly maintained that the court improperly ignored or "summarily dismissed" the GAL's testimony. Indeed, the record establishes just the opposite.
[¶7] This ties into the second element of the court's comment quoted above, namely, that the court intended to adjudicate the question of where the parties' child should primarily reside "based solely on the best interest of the child, using the statutory factors that the Court needs to consider" and not based "just" on a "rubber stamp" acceptance of the GAL's recommendation. This is an indelibly correct statement of the court's responsibility to exercise its independent judgment based on the record as a whole and within the analytical framework established by the Legislature. Here, the court was presented with the testimony of multiple witnesses—including the GAL—and voluminous exhibits. Consistent with what the court told the parties it would do, the court stated plainly in its order that its decision was based on that full record and that it had considered "each" of the statutory factors that pertain a proper analysis of the child's best interest. See Vibert v. Dimoulas , 2017 ME 62, ¶ 15, 159 A.3d 325 ; see also In re Caleb M. , 2017 ME 66, ¶ 27, 159 A.3d 345 . Roalsvik's contention that the court's analysis was...
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