Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., SNAP-ON

Decision Date23 October 1996
Docket NumberNo. 95-179,SNAP-ON,95-179
Citation555 N.W.2d 229
PartiesDan J. ROBBENNOLT, Appellant, v.TOOLS CORPORATION, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Mark S. Soldat, Algona, for appellant.

Joseph M. Barron of Peddicord, Wharton, Thune & Spencer, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

PER CURIAM.

This case comes to us on further review of the decision of the Iowa Court of Appeals. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand the district court decision for further proceedings.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On August 17, 1990, Dan Robbennolt received a severe cut to his right third finger while working for Snap-On Tools Corporation (Snap-On). He was treated for the injury and was off work for two days. Robbennolt continued to experience problems with the finger, causing additional absences from work and leading to additional corrective surgeries which failed to resolve the problems. On October 3, an extensor tendon reefing and pinning was performed. Robbennolt returned to work on November 19. On January 11, 1991, surgery was performed on the finger. Robbennolt was released to work and did return to work on February 25. On March 11, a fusion of the PIP joint of the injured finger was performed. Robbennolt was released to return to work and did return to work on April 25. On July 3, a refusion of the PIP joint with a bone graft was performed. This was unsuccessful and, on August 14, the right third finger was amputated. Robbennolt was released to return to work without restriction on September 9. On September 23, his physician opined that Robbennolt had a ninety-four percent permanent partial disability (PPD) of the right finger. In January 1992, he filed a claim for benefits, interest, and penalty benefits with the Iowa Industrial Commissioner (commissioner).

Robbennolt continued to experience pain in his hand. A ray resection surgery was performed on November 18, 1992 to alleviate the pain. Although Robbennolt complained that he has lost grip strength in his right hand and suffers from fatigue due to the loss of his finger, the treating physician reported that he made a good recovery from the ray resection surgery. After April 1993, no work restrictions were placed on Robbennolt and he was permitted to work overtime. On June 30, the physician handling the ray resection surgery gave Robbennolt a 100% permanent partial impairment rating regarding the right third finger, which translated into a twenty percent permanent partial impairment of his right hand as a result of the loss of the finger. Robbennolt claims that this rating does not take into account the pain he was suffering. Robbennolt also claims that he was not able to perform all the tasks he was able to do with his hand prior to the injury, and that the injury affected his right arm.

Initially, Snap-On paid workers' compensation benefits using a rate that did not include the overtime Robbennolt had been working. Snap-On, however, admitted the rate was incorrect, and ultimately applied the correct rate. In his claim with the commissioner, Robbennolt claims he is entitled to additional PPD benefits from his finger injury that caused a permanent disability to his right arm, that he should receive additional interest for Snap-On's failure to make timely payments of compensation, and that he should receive penalty awards under Iowa Code section 86.13 (1993) for alleged unreasonable delay in payment of benefits.

On January 18, 1994, the deputy industrial commissioner (deputy) entered a decision determining Robbennolt had a twenty percent permanent impairment to his right hand due to the loss of his finger and that he was entitled to interest on PPD payments due and not timely made on or after June 9, 1993. This is the date the deputy determined that Robbennolt reached maximum medical improvement and that his healing period terminated. The deputy also determined Snap-On must pay additional healing period benefits and temporary partial disability benefits to Robbennolt. However, no interest was allowed on these unpaid benefits. The deputy refused to assess interest under Iowa Code section 85.30 as requested by Robbennolt and also refused to impose a penalty under Iowa Code section 86.13 for unreasonable delay or denial of benefits. On June 29, 1994, the commissioner affirmed the decision of the deputy. The commissioner assessed the cost of the appeal to Robbennolt and required Snap-On to pay all other costs.

Robbennolt filed a petition for judicial review on July 5, 1994, challenging the commissioner's decision. The district court entered a ruling on January 3, 1995, essentially affirming the commissioner's decision. The court rejected Robbennolt's claim that the commissioner neglected to determine whether there was a permanent disability to Robbennolt's right arm, concluding that the commissioner considered Robbennolt's argument and rejected it. The court determined that there was substantial evidence to support the commissioner's determination regarding the extent of Robbennolt's impairment. The court also concluded that there was a sufficient basis for the commissioner's decision limiting Robbennolt's hand impairment to twenty percent based on the medical rating. The court further concluded that the compensation payments were paid within the time required by Iowa Code section 85.30. The court found Robbennolt's PPD payments accrued on September 23, 1991 rather than on June 9, 1993, the date set by the commissioner. However, the court noted that Snap-On paid Robbennolt for the original impairment rating at the time the rating was given in September 1991, and that any payment at an incorrect rate was corrected after the June 1993 impairment rating. The court determined that Robbennolt was not entitled to additional interest. The court also determined that Robbennolt was not entitled to penalties under Iowa Code section 86.13. The court further determined that the commissioner did not abuse his discretion in taxing costs of the unsuccessful appeal to Robbennolt. The court taxed the costs of the judicial review action to Robbennolt.

Robbennolt filed a timely notice of appeal. We transferred the appeal to the court of appeals. See Iowa R.App.P. 402. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's ruling. We granted Robbennolt's application for further review. Iowa R.App.P. 402.

II. Scope of Review

Judicial review of the actions of an administrative agency is governed by the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(8). Mercy Health Ctr. v. State Health Facilities Council, 360 N.W.2d 808, 811 (Iowa 1985). The court acts in an appellate capacity by reviewing the agency's decision solely to correct any errors of law. Dubuque Community Sch. Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 424 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Iowa 1988). The agency's decision is final if it is supported by substantial evidence and is correct in its conclusions of law. Heatherly v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 397 N.W.2d 670, 670 (Iowa 1986). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the same evidence does not prevent the agency's decision from being supported by substantial evidence. Henry v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 391 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Iowa App.1986).

III. Review Determination
A. Disability Determination

Robbennolt claims error in the commissioner's decision in not assigning more than a disability of twenty percent scheduled member impairment of his right hand. He asserts he has at least an uncontroverted forty percent hand loss and forty percent arm loss. He argues that the decision is not sufficiently detailed to show the path taken through conflicting evidence. He believes the commissioner "secretly adopted the AMA Guides to evaluation of permanent impairment rating without considering other evidence." The other evidence is Robbennolt's testimony of pain and numbness in the thumb, web, palm, graft site, and forearm. He states that the guides also offer no measurement of loss of hand grip and pinch strength or of arm-lifting strength. In the absence of countering evidence to negate, he believes a higher disability rating than twenty percent is mandated. He says this is because otherwise uncontroverted lay and subjective evidence of functional impairment is disregarded.

Snap-On argues that there is a great deal of evidence that Robbennolt has sustained very little impairment of his activities either at work or elsewhere. Snap-On points to the recitation by the commissioner of Robbennolt's problems both as recited by the examining doctor, by Robbennolt himself, and by a counselor who helped him on unresolved grief as a result of the loss of his finger.

We note that the deputy detailed the loss of pinch strength, pain, functional use of his hand, and other decreased use experienced by Robbennolt. The deputy then stated:

It is expressly found that claimant has a decreased ability to lift with the right upper extremity as well as decreased grip and pinch strength in the right hand. These factors are sufficient to demonstrate that claimant's overall impairment is an impairment to the hand and not an impairment to the right third finger only.

Regarding the emotional trauma the deputy said:

It is expressly found that claimant's emotional concerns and reactions as presented in this record were part of the normal sequela of recovery from the significant injury. It is further expressly found that these conditions did not rise to the level of an independent debilitating psychological condition such that claimant's impairment is to the body as a whole and not to the hand.

Robbennolt complains that there is virtually no rationale for how the commissioner deduced that he had sustained only a twenty percent loss of permanent function in the right hand. He says the commissioner noted, but did not analyze, the findings of functional capacity evaluations. He says the commissioner also...

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