Robbins' Estate, In re

• Decision Date: 21 May 1962
• Citation: 21 Cal.Rptr. 797,57 Cal.2d 718,371 P.2d 573
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 371 P.2d 573 In re ESTATE of Jack ROBBINS, Deceased. Irvine ROBBINS, as Administrator with the Will Annexed, Petitioner andAppellant, v. Lee MISHKIN, Claimant and Respondent. L. A. 26196.

Page 797

21 Cal.Rptr. 797

57 Cal.2d 718, 371 P.2d 573

In re ESTATE of Jack ROBBINS, Deceased.

Irvine ROBBINS, as Administrator with the Will Annexed, Petitioner andAppellant, v. Lee MISHKIN, Claimant and Respondent.

L. A. 26196.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

May 21, 1962.

Brock, Fleishman & Rykoff and Hugh R. Manes, Los Angeles, for petitioner and appellant.

John T. McTernan, David B. Finkel, A. L. Wirin and Fred B. Okrand, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of petitioner and appellant.

Pacht, Ross, Warne & Bernhard, Clore Warne, Harvey M. Grossman and Ira E. Bilson, Los Angeles, for claimant and respondent.

TRAYNOR, Justice.

In his will the testator divided his estate into Fund A consisting of 'cash, securities and money in the bank' and Fund B consisting of 'a parcel of real estate situated in Los Angeles, California, and improved with two (2) single family residences, together with furniture, fixtures, personal belongings and library contained therein.' He directed that the assets comprising Fund B be sold and the cash distributed to three named trustees in trust. 'The income of said trust, or so much of the rincipal as in the sole discretion of the Trustees may be deemed desirable or advisable, is to be used for the care, comfort, supportMedical attention, education, sustenance, maintenance or custody of such minor Negro child or children, whose father or mother, or both, have been incarcerated, imprisoned, detained or committed in any federal, state, county or local prison or penitentiary, as a result of the conviction of a crime or misdemeanor of a political nature.' He then set forth illustrative examples of crimes of a political nature for the guidance of the trustees in the exercise of their discretion and stated his reasons for creating the trust. ¹

In this proceeding to determine heirship (Prob.Code, § 1080) the disposition of Fund A is not in dispute, but Lee Mishkin, a grandnephew of the testator, challenges the validity of the Fund B trust. The trial court determined that the trust. The trial Since the will contained no residuary clause, the court entered an order determining that the property bequeathed to the trustees should pass by the law of intestate succession. The administrator-with-the-will annexed appeals.

We agree with the contention of of the administrator that the testator established a valid charitable trust. The trustees, the beneficiaries, and the trust purpose are all stated. 'A bequest is charitable if: (1) It is made for a charitable purpose; its aims and accomplishments are of religious, educational, political or general social interest to mankind. (Citations.) (2) The ultimate recipients constitute either the community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite portion thereof. (Citations.)' (Estate of Henderson, 17 Cal.2d 853, 857, 112 P.2d 605, 607.) Provision for the 'care, comfort, support, medical attention, education, sustenance, maintenance or custody' of minor children who have been deprived of normal home life by the incarceration of one or both of their parents is unquestionably of social value. Any risk that a parent might be induced to commit a crime he otherwise would not commit because of the possibility that his child might become a beneficiary of this trust is far outweighed by the interests of the innocent children involved and society's interest in them. To hold otherwise would, as stated in another context, 'incorporate into the law of the land as legal precepts the sayings that the sins of fathers are visited upon their children (Westbrook v. (Mobile & O.) R. R. (Co.), 66 Miss. (560,) loc. cit. 569, 6 South. 321,) and that the child's teeth must be set on edge because the father has eaten sour grapes. (B(ellefontaine) & I. R. R. Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. (399), loc. cit. 409).' (Neff v. City of Cameron, 213 Mo. 350, 360, 111 S.W. 1139, 1141, 18 L.R.A.,N.S., 320; see also Zarzana v. Neve Drug Co., 180 Cal. 32, 34-37, 179 P. 203, 15 A.L.R. 401; Reynolds v. Willson, 51 Cal.2d 94, 102, 331 P.2d 48.)

The testator selected a class of beneficiaries constituting an indefinite part of the community and provided adequate standards to guide his trustees in administering the trust. (Estate of Bunn, 33 Cal.2d 897, 901-904, 206 P.2d 635, and authorities cited.) Like the aged beneficiaries in Estate of Henderson, supra, 17 Cal.2d 853, 112 P.2d 605, Fredericka Home For The Aged v. County of San Diego, 35 Cal.2d 789, 221 P.2d 68, and Estate of Tarrant, 38 Cal.2d 42, 237 P.2d 505, these children require special care and attention, and it is immeterial that the beneficiaries are not limited to children in financial need. 'Relief of poverty is not a condition of charitable assistance. If the benefit conferred has a sufficiently widespread social value, a charitable purpose exists.' (Estate of Henderson, supra, 17 Cal.2d 853, 857, 112 P.2d 605, 607; see also Estate of Tarrant, supra, 38 Cal.2d 42, 50, 237 P.2d 505.) 'In shortAs the word 'charity' is commonly understood in modern usage, it does not refer only to aid to the poor and destitute and exclude all humanitarian activities * * * which are maintained to care for the physical and mental well-being of the recipients, and which make it less likely that such recipients will become burdens on society.' (Fredericka Home For The Aged v. County of San Diego, supra, 35 Cal.2d 789, 793, 221 P.2d 68, 71.)

Lee Mishkin contends, however, that the testator's purpose was to encourage the commission of political crimes and that therefore the trust is illegal. The administrator and amicus curiae contend, on the contrary, that the testator's purpose was to encourage constitutionally protected freedom of speech and expression and to protect the right of lawful dissent and that these are valid charitable purposes. They contend that the illustrations the testator set forth in his will, convictions of violating the Smith Act, convictions of contempt of congressional committees, convictions for violating laws dealing with test oaths, convictions for engaging in labor union activities, all involve areas where the lines between constitutionally protected activity and illegal activity are vaguely defined. (Cf., e. g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 95 L.Ed. 1137, with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356; Scales v. UnitedStates, 367 U.S. 203, 81 S.Ct. 1469, 6 L.Ed.2d 782, with Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 81 S.Ct. 1517, 6 L.Ed.2d 836; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 79 S.Ct. 1081, 3 L.Ed.2d 1115, with N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488.) They assert that the will can reasonably be interpreted as referring only to parents who have been unlawfully convicted for engaging in constitutionally protected activity and that thereby any question of illegality can be avoided.

We need not search for any such limitation in the language of the will to sustain the trust. We may assume that the testator intended to benefit the children of those convicted of even valid laws of which he disapproved and that his motive in part at least was to encourage challeges to such laws by violations of them. It is the purpose for which the property is to be used, however, not the motives of the testator that determines whether a trust is a valid charitable trust. (Estate of Butin, 81 Cal.App.2d 76, 83, 183 P.2d 304; Matter of Frasch, 245 N.Y. 174, 182, 156 N.E. 656; Archambault's Estate, 308 Pa. 549, 555, 162 A. 801; Woodstown Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Snelbaker, 136 N.J.Eq. 62, 40 A.2d 222, 224, affd. 133 N.J.L. 256, 44 A.2d 210; Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. 539, 568-569; see Estate of Loring, 29 Cal.2d 423, 434-435, 175 P.2d 524; In re Little's Estate, 403 Pa. 534, 170 A.2d 106, 107-108; Chamberlain v. Van Horn, 246 Mass. 462, 464, 141 N.E. 111; Baker v. Hickman, 127 Kan. 340, 273 P. 480, 481, 68 A.L.R. 743; Restatement, Trusts 2d, § 368, comment d; 4 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.), §§ 348, 368, pp. 2551, 2628; 2A Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 364, pp. 30-34.)

Assistance to the minor beneficiaries of the trust in this case is a valid charitable purpose. The risk that such assistance may serve to encourage crime is far more remote than that which the Legislature itself may have created by provision for the care of children that extends to those of convicted prisoners. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1500.) The benefit to society offered by the testator transcends whatever criticism there may be of his motives, which have died with him.

The order is reversed. The appeal from the order denying the motion for new trial is dismissed. (Prob.Code, § 1240; Estate of Duke, 41 Cal.2d 509, 515-516, 261 P.2d 235.)

GIBSON, C. J., and PETERS and DOOLING, JJ., concur.

WHITE, Justice.

I dissent.

Undoubtedly a valid trust may be created where its purposes are to effect changes in existing laws. (See (4 Scott on Trusts (2d ed.) § 374.4, p. 2677; 2A Bogert on Trusts, § 378, pp. 168-170.)

As was said by this court in Collier v. Lindley, 203 Cal. 641, 650-651, 266 P. 526, 529: 'The trend of modern authority has been toward the upholding of trusts which have for their object the creation of a more enlightened public opinion, with a consequent change in laws having to do with human relations and rights in a republic such as ours * * *. To hold that a change in a law is in effect an attempt to violate that law would discourage improvement in legislation and tnd to compel us to continue indefinitely to live under laws designed for an entirely different state of society. Such view is opposed to every principle of our government based on the theory that it is a government 'of the people, by the people and for the people,' and fails to recognize the right of those who make the laws to change them at their pleasure when circumstances seem to require. With the wisdom of the proposed change the courts are not concerned.'

However, recognition cannot be...