Robbins v. Atkins
| Decision Date | 26 February 1897 |
| Citation | 46 N.E. 425,168 Mass. 45 |
| Parties | ROBBINS v. ATKINS. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
William A. Morse, for plaintiff.
Henry E. Fales and Stephen H. Tyng, for defendant.
This is an action by one of the occupants of an upper story in a house against the landlord for injuries received in consequence of the cellar stairs giving way as she was passing over them. The cellar staircase was a common passageway, for which the defendant had the usual responsibility of a landlord. The probable cause of the collapse was that a contractor employed to dig down the cellar had removed the earth which supported the staircase. The presiding judge was asked to take the case from the jury and also to rule that if the condition of the stairs was due to the work of an independent contractor, or of a person acting without the defendant's authority, the defendant was not liable, all of which he refused, and the defendant excepted. At the close of the charge the defendant suggested that, while the contract did not provide specifically for work upon the stairs, yet, if the deepening of the cellar required interference with the stairs, then the contract required it.
The court accepted the suggestion, and thereupon instructed the jury, in substance, that, if the defendant had reasonable cause to believe that his carrying out of the contract would leave the staircase in an unsafe condition, he would be responsible if he failed to use reasonable care.
This last instruction sufficiently points out why it was impossible to give the rulings asked for the defendant, so far as his conduct was concerned. His responsibility was not limited to cases where he had made the stairs unsafe by his own act, although the intervention of a contractor might not prevent the danger being attributed directly to him (Woodman v. Railroad Co., 149 Mass. 335, 340, 21 N.E. 482), but he was bound to use reasonable care to keep or to restore safety. The testimony was that he came to the house quite often, and so probably knew, in a general way, at least, the state of the work. And, whether he did or not, the most natural inference from the contract was that it contemplated just what happened. If so, it was the defendant's duty to see that care was taken to shore up the staircase, or to warn the tenants. Looney v. McLean, 129 Mass. 33; Lindsey v. Leighton, 150 Mass. 285, 22 N.E. 901.
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