Robbins v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 11 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 01-1072-JAR.,01-1072-JAR.
• Citation: 205 F.Supp.2d 1189
• Parties: Leeter D. ROBBINS, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

205 F.Supp.2d 1189

Leeter D. ROBBINS, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security,¹ Defendant.

No. 01-1072-JAR.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

April 11, 2002.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David H. M. Gray, Gragert, Hiebert & Gray, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff.

Emily B. Metzger, Office of United States Attorney, Wichita, KS, for Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT

ROBINSON, District Judge.

Ten days having passed, and no written objections being filed to the proposed findings and recommendations filed on March 20, 2002, by Magistrate Judge John Thomas Reid, and after a de novo determination upon the record pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b), the Court accepts the recommended decision and adopts it as its own.

RECOMMENDATION AND REPORT

REID, United States Magistrate Judge.

This is an action seeking review of a final decision in which the Commissioner of Social Security decided that plaintiff's disability ceased on January 24, 1991 and awarded a "closed period" of disability. Neither party contests the award of benefits through March 1991, but plaintiff claims there has been no medical improvement in her condition. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties and referred to this court for a recommendation and report. As explained hereinafter, the court recommends the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and this case be remanded for an immediate award of benefits through June 1998 and for further proceedings regarding whether medical improvement occurred thereafter.

I. Background

Plaintiff was awarded disability benefits from 1977 through 1982. (R. 17). In December, 1982, the Commissioner determined that plaintiff's disability ceased and terminated payment of benefits. (Id.). Plaintiff subsequently made application for disability insurance benefits in 1983, twice in 1984, in 1990, and twice in 1995. (R. 79, 83, 376, 380, 381, 386, 396). Plaintiff alleges disability due to Crohn's disease and complications therefrom.

Plaintiff's most recent filing was dismissed by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on January 24, 1997, finding that plaintiff could not be found disabled prior to her date last insured of December 31, 1985. (R. 348). Consequently the ALJ determined there was no issue before the Commissioner which would allow for the payment of benefits. (R. 349). Plaintiff appealed, and the Appeals Council remanded to the ALJ for further proceedings to determine whether plaintiff was under a disability on or before the correct date last insured, December 31, 1986. (R. 352-53). The ALJ held a pre-hearing conference on February 4, 1998 at which it was established that the notice on the December 27, 1983 claim was defective, the intervening decisions were not entitled to res judicata effect, and it was proper to consider whether plaintiff's earlier period of disability continued after 1982. (R. 17).

The ALJ held a hearing on May 27, 1998 and issued a partially favorable decision on June 29, 1998, in which he determined that plaintiff's disability continued from January 1977 to January 24, 1991 and ceased thereafter. (R. 25). The ALJ found that plaintiff's date last insured extended to March 31, 1994 (R. 18), but that she was not disabled at any time after January 1991.(Id.). On the basis of those findings, the ALJ determined that plaintiff is eligible for disability insurance benefits from January 1977 through the end of March 1991, but not thereafter. (Id.). The ALJ's findings include the following:

3. The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has Crohn's disease, impairments [sic] which are severe within the meaning of the regulations but which do not meet or equal the criteria of any impairment listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.

5. The claimant has a residual functional capacity for sedentary work with occasional limitations regarding bending, stooping and with the provision to be near a bathroom. For periods prior to January 1991, the claimant had pain and fatigue which further reduced the residual functional capacity to less than full time work. As of January 24, 1991, the evidence indicates medical improvement allowing for full time sedentary work.

10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the claimant cannot make a successful vocational adjustment to any jobs which exist in significant numbers in the national economy for periods prior to January 24, 1991. A finding of "disabled" was appropriate under 20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Section 201.00(h).

11. As of January 24, 1991, the claimant had the capacity for a range of sedentary work. A finding of "not disabled" is appropriate within the framework of 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, Table No. 1, Rule 201.15. Representative examples of work in the Wichita area include a civil service clerk, referral clerk, hand grinder and small [p]arts painter.

12. The claimant has continued under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act from January 1977 to January 1991, but not thereafter.

(R. 24-25). Based upon his findings, the ALJ determined plaintiff was disabled from January 1977 through January 24, 1991 and awarded a period of disability with entitlement ending at the end of March 1991. (R. 25). Plaintiff requested a review of the hearing decision and submitted: a brief, additional medical records, and a statement from her treating physician for consideration by the Appeals Council. (R. 11-12, 410-69). The Appeals Council received the additional evidence and made it a part of the record. (R. 8). Nonetheless, the council concluded there was no basis either in the regulations or the additional evidence to change the ALJ's decision and, therefore, denied plaintiff's request for review. (R. 6). Because the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review, the ALJ decision stands as the final decision of the Commissioner. Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1008 (10th Cir.1996). Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner's decision and alleging: that the ALJ improperly shifted the burden of proof to plaintiff; that considering the new evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, the ALJ's step three analysis, analysis of plaintiff's credibility, and rejection of plaintiff's treating physician opinion are not supported by substantial evidence; and that the ALJ did not apply the correct legal standard to the issue of whether plaintiff has transferable skills.

II. Standard of Review

The Social Security Act (the Act) provides that final decisions of the Commissioner shall be subject to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g). "[T]he findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court shall review the Commissioner's decision to determine only whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Glenn v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 983, 984 (10th Cir.1994); Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir. 1996). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, and is satisfied by such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support the conclusion. Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 804 (10th Cir.1988). The determination of whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision is not simply a quantitative exercise, for evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence or if it constitutes mere conclusion. Id. at 804-05; Ray v. Bowen, 865 F.2d 222, 224 (10th Cir. 1989).

Although the court is not to reweigh the evidence, the findings of the Commissioner will not be mechanically accepted. Nor will the findings be affirmed by isolating facts and labeling them substantial evidence, as the court must scrutinize the entire record in determining whether the Commissioner's conclusions are rational. Graham v. Sullivan, 794 F.Supp. 1045, 1047 (D.Kan.1992). The court shall examine the record as a whole, including whatever in the record fairly detracts from the weight of the Commissioner's decision and, on that basis, determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Glenn, 21 F.3d at 984.

An individual shall be determined to be under a disability in the first instance only if that individual can establish that she has a physical or mental impairment which prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of twelve months. The claimant's physical or mental impairment or impairments must be of such severity that she is not only unable to perform her previous work, but cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d).

A. Disability Sequential Evaluation Process

The claimant has the burden of proving a disability that prevents her from engaging in her prior work activity. The Commissioner has established a five-step process to evaluate whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920 (2001); Ray, 865 F.2d at 224; Gossett, 862 F.2d at 805. "If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary." Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988). In step one, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity at the time of the determination. Id. Step two considers whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments which prevents the claimant from performing work she has performed in the past. Id. at 750-51.

In step three, the Commissioner "determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges are so severe as to preclude...