Robbins v. Bossong Hosiery Mills Inc

• Decision Date: 29 October 1941
• Docket Number: No. 377.,377.
• Citation: 17 S.E.2d 20,220 N.C. 246
• Parties: ROBBINS. v. BOSSONG HOSIERY MILLS, Inc., et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

220 N.C. 246

17 S.E.2d 20

ROBBINS.

v.BOSSONG HOSIERY MILLS, Inc., et al.

No. 377.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Oct. 29, 1941.

Appeal from Superior Court, Randolph County; John H. Clement, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Mildred E. Robbins, employee, opposed by Bossong Hosiery Mills, Incorporated, employer and the American Mutual Liability Insurance Company, insurance carrier. From a judgment reversing an order of the commission and dismissing the action the employee appeals.

Reversed.

Claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, Ch. 120, P.L, 1929, as amended.

The individual commissioner allowed compensation. The full Commission affirmed. On appeal the court below, being of the opinion "that there is no sufficient or competent evidence upon which the finding of fact that the plaintiff sustained an injury by accident arising out of her employment can be sustained", entered judgment reversing the order of the Commission and dismissing the action. Claimant excepted and appealed.

Ferree & Beal, of Asheboro, for appellant.

Sapp, Sapp & Atkinson, of Greensboro, for appellees.

BARNHILL, Justice.

Claimant was employed by defendant Bossong Hosiery Mills, Inc., as a topper. On October 18, 1934, she returned to her place of employment just prior to the time her shift was required to relieve the night shift, went to her bench and began to perform necessary duties preliminary to the starting of her machine. She was "loose coursing" or making lines on hose. There is a stand or rack upon which she was required to keep her work material and to hang the hose. This rack was elevated and apparently over the machine. The hose are hung on the rack and in order for claimant to do her work it was necessary for her to take them down, "loose course" them and then put them back. Inso doing she fell and received serious injuries.

Her fall is thus described by an eye witness: "I saw her walk up there to this rack where they hang this work and she just walked up there and she put her hands up like that, I don't know whether she had work in them or what, or whether she was getting work, and then I saw her go backwards like that * * * looked to me like she walked up to the rack, about as high as that lamp, and it •looked like she reached up to get work or put it on the machine, and the next thing I knew she was falling * * * at the time she had her bone (an instrument used in her work) in her hand".

That claimant was acting in the course of her employment is conceded. That the fall constituted an accident cannot be controverted. While defendant insists that there is no evidence of any unusual or untoward condition or occurrence that caused the fall, this is not essential. The fall was the unusual, unforeseen occurrence which is the "accident" within the meaning of the act. The injury was the result.

Did the accident arise out of the employment? On this record this is the decisive question. It was upon a negative answer thereto that the court based its judgment.

The meaning of the term "out of" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act has been frequently discussed and defined by this Court. Mere repetition would serve no good purpose. Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co, 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266; Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co, 199 N.C. 733, 155 S.E. 728; Plemmons v. White's Service, Inc., 213 N.C. 148, 195 S.E. 370; Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co, 213 N.C. 356, 196 S.E. 342.

When claimant was injured she was engaged in performing one of the duties of her employment. When she reached up to the rack, for some undisclosed reason she lost her balance and fell. There is no evidence tending to show that the fall was caused by a hazard to which the workman would have been exposed apart from...