Robbins v. Esso Shipping Company
Citation | 190 F. Supp. 880 |
Parties | Jack ROBBINS, administrator of the Estate of Leo Schwarz a/k/a Leo Schwanz, and Jack Robbins, administrator ad prosequendum of the estate of Leo Schwarz a/k/a Leo Schwanz, Plaintiff, v. ESSO SHIPPING COMPANY and Esso Standard Oil Company, Defendants. |
Decision Date | 27 January 1960 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Baker, Garber & Chazen, Hoboken, N. J., for plaintiff; Milton Garber, Hoboken, N. J., of counsel.
Kirlin, Campbell & Keating, New York City, for defendant Esso Standard Oil Co.; George T. Delaney, New York City, of counsel.
The defendant Esso Standard Oil Company by notice of motion dated August 26, 1959, moves for summary judgment under Rules 12 and 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint as against said defendant basing the said motion upon the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff's decedent was allegedly injured on board the S.S. Esso Havana on April 5, 1956 and died on April 13, 1956, allegedly from injuries received from this accident.
The proceedings in this action were as follows:
The original summons and complaint, directed only to the defendant Esso Shipping Company, were served on or about March 27, 1958. Esso Shipping Company served its answer on April 17, 1958.
Paragraph Sixth of this complaint was as follows:
"Sixth: At all times hereinafter mentioned, the defendant was the owner of and was in possession of, operated, managed and controlled a certain vessel known as the S.S. Esso Havana, which was used by it in the transportation of freight for hire by water in interstate and foreign commerce."
In the answer, defendant Esso Shipping Company stated:
Paragraph Seventh of the complaint was as follows:
"Seventh: On or about April 5, 1956, the deceased, Leo Schwarz, was in the employ of the defendant as a machinist on said vessel, S.S. Esso Havana, under seaman's articles of customary form and deceased was a seaman and member of the crew of said vessel, S.S. Esso Havana."
In the answer thereto defendant Esso Shipping Company stated:
On or about May 1, 1958, Milton Garber of Baker, Garber & Chazen, attorneys for the plaintiff, wrote to the attorneys for the defendant, stating among other things: Mr. Garber then asked if this information was correct and requested advice as to the correct name and address of the deceased's employer and the name and address of the company which operated the vessel on the date of the accident, as well as asking for a consent for an amended complaint to correct the name of the defendant. On May 2, 1958, the attorneys for the defendant acknowledged receipt of the aforesaid letter and agreed to take up with their clients the concessions requested. (See letters attached to the supplemental affidavit of Walter X. O'Connor, sworn to January 8, 1960).
Walter X. O'Connor, one of the attorneys for the defendant, states in his affidavit of January 8, 1960 that on June 20, 1958 he called Mr. Garber and told him who owned and operated the S.S. Esso Havana and that he would oppose the proposed motion to substitute a new administrator as plaintiff and add a new defendant. This is substantiated by an office memorandum submitted by Mr. O'Connor.
On or about July 30, 1958, the plaintiff, by notice of motion, asked for an order permitting him to serve and file an amended complaint, a copy of which was annexed to the motion papers. This proposed amended complaint made Esso Standard Oil Company an additional defendant and in effect alleged that the defendants—that is, Esso Shipping Company and Esso Standard Oil Company— were the owners of and were in possession of, operated, managed and controlled a certain vessel known as the S.S. Esso Havana, etc. In the affidavit of counsel for plaintiff, dated July 30, 1958, and interposed in support of this motion, counsel stated:
After a number of adjournments to October 14, 1958, for some reason the motion was withdrawn. Apparently, on December 2, 1958, the motion was restored. However, on January 6, 1959, an endorsement by Judge McGohey of this court states:
Subsequently, another motion was made upon identic papers for similar relief by notice of motion dated February 25, 1959. This motion was adjourned to March 17, 1959, to March 24, 1959, to April 7, 1959, to April 28, 1959, to May 28, 1959, and finally was heard on June 16, 1959. On these motion papers is endorsed on June 17, 1959:
On June 23, 1959, an amended summons was issued through the clerk of this court directed to the two defendants and for service on Esso Standard Oil Company. This amended summons was served by the deputy marshal on June 23, 1959. The time of Esso Standard Oil Company to appear, move or answer to this amended complaint was extended by stipulation to August 12, 1959. Meanwhile, on August 3, 1959, Judge Bryan of this court signed an order requiring the plaintiff to serve a further amended complaint on defendant in accordance with his decisions on the motion to amend and a cross-motion made to dismiss. This new amended complaint was served by mail on August 14, 1959 and is the complaint concerned in this motion. The amended complaint was filed on June 25, 1959.
The present motion was instituted on or about August 26, 1959 and was heard on November 17, 1959. Further argument on the motion was heard on January 19, 1960.
The defendant Esso Standard Oil Company contends that the action against it was not instituted until over three years after the occurrence of the alleged injury to plaintiff's decedent and, therefore, is time-barred by the three-year limitation in the Jones Act, Title 46, U.S.C.A. § 688, which incorporated Title 45, U.S.C.A. § 56. This defendant contends that the service of an amended complaint upon Esso Standard Oil Company, which had not theretofore been made a party to the action, does not relate back to the commencement of the original action against the Esso Shipping Company; that this is a new and separate action against Esso Standard Oil Company which is not within the terms of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure since this is not a situation in which an amendment is sought to correct the name of a party defendant already in court, but a situation where the amendment substitutes or adds a new party defendant.
The plaintiff apparently contends (1) that the action is not time-barred by any strict statute of limitations but that the equitable doctrine of laches applies; (2) that the decision of Judge Bryan dated June 22, 1959 on the defendant's cross-motion to dismiss certain causes of action and the order made thereon dated August 3, 1959 have already determined this issue; (3) that an application for leave to amend stands in the place of an actual amendment (in effect, that the service of the notice of motion to amend on or about February 25, 1959 was equivalent to service of an amended pleading); and (4), that, in any event, the actions of the defendant estop it from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations.
The amended complaint listed four causes of action, the first two for negligence under the Jones Act, Title 46, U.S.C.A. § 688, and for unseaworthiness under the general maritime law, the third based on the New Jersey Wrongful Death Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to 2A:31-6, and the fourth for unseaworthiness under New Jersey law.
The decision of Judge Bryan on the notice of cross-motion to dismiss (see notice of motion filed March 17, 1959, decision filed June 23, 1959, order dated August 3, 1959) dismissed those portions of the first two causes of action based on unseaworthiness and the third and fourth causes of action.
The only causes of action remaining, therefore, result from the wrongful death of the decedent. See Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 1937, 300 U.S. 342, 347, 57 S.Ct. 452, 81 L.Ed. 685. As no remedy for wrongful death was provided under general maritime law, a suitor must look to a wrongful death statute. The Harrisburg, 1886, 119 U.S. 199, 7 S.Ct. 140, 30 L.Ed. 358; Norris, Maritime Personal Injuries (1959) § 125. The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688, grants a right of action in the case of the death of any seaman. That Act supersedes the application of the death statutes of the several states. Lindgren v. United States, 1930, 281 U.S. 38, 50 S.Ct. 207, 74 L.Ed. 686; Bath v. Sargent Line Corp., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1958, 166 F.Supp. 311.
The Jones Act incorporates by...
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