Robbins v. State
| Decision Date | 02 July 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 513-84,513-84 |
| Citation | 717 S.W.2d 348 |
| Parties | Robert Roy ROBBINS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jim Vollers, Austin, for appellant.
William S. Mason, Dist. Atty., Ozona, Douglas M. Becker, Austin, Robert Huttash, State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
Before the court en banc.
OPINION ON APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITION FOR
DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
A jury convicted appellant of involuntary manslaughter and assessed punishment at confinement for five years. The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. Robbins v. State, 667 S.W.2d 318 (Tex.App.--El Paso, 1984). Initially, we refused appellant's petition for discretionary review. However, upon appellant's motion for rehearing, we granted his petition to determine whether the trial court properly charged the jury, over appellant's objection, on the issue of causation.
The evidence shows that appellant drove his pickup truck at a high rate of speed and collided with an automobile, killing both occupants of the automobile. The State offered sufficient evidence to prove that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the accident and that such intoxication caused the collision and death of the victims. Appellant's defense was that the accident was due to his exhaustion and not due to his consumption of several beers, although he admitted drinking several beers. The court charged the jury, in pertinent part, that:
1.
Our statutes provide that a person commits the offense of involuntary manslaughter if he, by accident or mistake when operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and, by reason of such intoxication, causes the death of an individual.
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3.
You are instructed that before you would be warranted in convicting the Defendant of involuntary manslaughter you must find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that:
(a) the Defendant drove a motor vehicle, to-wit, a motor vehicle in Pecos County, Texas, on or about the 22nd day of October, 1981;
(b) the Defendant, while so driving, was intoxicated, as that term is defined herein;
(c) while so driving and while intoxicated, Defendant collided with the vehicle occupied by Emelinda Ramos;
(d) the Defendant thereby and therewith, at the time and place alleged in the indictment, did, by accident and mistake, kill the said Emelinda Ramos by so colliding with the vehicle which she occupied while Defendant was intoxicated;
(e) that the intoxication, if any, of Defendant then and there caused or contributed to cause the death of the said Emelinda Ramos; or, put another way, the Defendant, by the means aforesaid and by accident or mistake, by reason of said intoxication, caused or contributed to the death of Emelinda Ramos.
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4.
Now, if you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the 22nd day of October, 1981, in Pecos County, Texas, the Defendant, Robert Roy Robbins, while intoxicated, did drive and operate a motor vehicle, to-wit, a pickup truck, in said county and state, and did then and there and while so driving and operating such motor vehicle, through mistake and accident, and by reason of such intoxication, if any, kill Emelinda Ramos by then and there driving said motor vehicle into and causing it to collide with the vehicle occupied by the said Emelinda Ramos, thereby and therewith causing the said Emelinda Ramos's death, you will find the Defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will acquit the Defendant of involuntary manslaughter.
5.
You are instructed that even though you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time and place mentioned in the indictment, the Defendant did then and there drive and operate his motor vehicle while he was then and there intoxicated, and while so driving and operating said motor vehicle, at such time and place, he did, through accident and mistake cause the death of Emelinda Ramos, you cannot convict the Defendant unless you further find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that such intoxication, if any, caused the collision and death of Emelinda Ramos, or contributed to cause the same.
6.
You are further instructed that if you believe from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that on the occasion in question the Defendant was driving his vehicle while in a state of exhaustion caused by long hours of work and a lack of sleep, and that because of such exhaustion drove his vehicle into the vehicle occupied by Emelinda Ramos and caused her death, you must find the Defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Therefore if you find from the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that on the occasion in question Robert Roy Robbins drove his vehicle in a state of exhaustion caused by lack of sleep and long working hours, and that by reason of said exhaustion he drove his vehicle into the vehicle occupied by Emelinda Ramos and caused her death, you must find the Defendant not guilty of involuntary manslaughter.
Appellant objected to paragraphs 3(e) and 5 of the court's charge because the phrase that the intoxication caused "or contributed to cause the same," referring to the cause of the collision and death of the victim, lessened the State's burden of proof and conflicted with the specific provisions of the Penal Code. Appellant also objected that the phrase was misleading because it conflicted with other specific instructions given by the court.
Appellant argues that this charge lessens the burden of proof for the State as to causation. Under V.T.C.A. Penal Code, § 6.04(a) and § 19.05(a)(2) 1 an accused cannot be convicted unless the death of the victim would not have occurred but for the accused's intoxication. Sec. 6.04(a) states:
Sec. 6.04 Causation: Conduct and Results
(a) A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient.
Under § 6.04(a) a "but for" causal connection must be established between the defendant's conduct and the resulting harm. If concurrent causes are present, two possible combinations exist to satisfy the "but for" requirement: (1) the defendant's conduct may be sufficient by itself to have caused the harm, regardless of the existence of a concurrent cause; or (2) the defendant's conduct and the other cause together may be sufficient to have caused the harm. However, § 6.04(a) further defines and limits the "but for" causality for concurrent causes by the last phrase, "unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient." If the additional cause, other than the defendant's conduct, is clearly sufficient, by itself, to produce the result and the defendant's conduct, by itself, is clearly insufficient, then the defendant cannot be convicted.
As the Court of Appeals noted and both the State and appellant agreed, no charge on the issue of concurrent causation should have been given in the instant case because the issue was not presented. 2 However, because the trial court included concurrent causation in the charge by virtue of the "contributed to cause" language, the issue was before the jury and we must address the correctness of that charge as if a charge on the issue of concurrent causes was necessary.
As appellant contends, the issue of concurrent causes was presented to the jury in the court's charge, namely, as to whether appellant's intoxication "contributed to cause" the death of Emelinda Ramos. Appellant's exhaustion was the only other possible "concurrent cause" or contributing factor presented that the jury could have determined contributed with intoxication to cause the collision and death. The court clearly instructed the jury on the issue of whether the death was caused by intoxication alone, in which case appellant was guilty of involuntary manslaughter; or whether the death was caused by exhaustion alone, in which case appellant was not guilty of involuntary manslaughter. See paragraphs 4 & 6 of the court's charge, supra. However, the court's charge on the concurrent causes--intoxication and exhaustion--was incomplete under § 6.04(a) because it stated only that appellant was guilty if his intoxication "contributed to cause" the death. See paragraphs 3(e) & 5 of the court's charge, supra. Under this language the jury could have found appellant guilty even though they concluded that the concurrent cause, exhaustion, was clearly sufficient to have produced the death and that the other cause, intoxication, while it contributed, was clearly insufficient by itself to have produced death. The use of "contributed" without any restriction on the degree of contribution is error because it authorizes the jury to convict a defendant under a lesser standard than is required by 6.04(a). The degree of contribution of both causes makes a difference in culpability under § 6.04(a) because if the concurrent cause is "clearly sufficient" and the conduct of the actor "clearly insufficient" to produce the result, the jury must not convict. As appellant argues, the use of "contributed to cause" without the limiting language of § 6.04(a) does not provide the required standard within which the jury must consider the causes.
The whole charge alternates between stating that the jury must find that "by reason of such intoxication" appellant caused the death, and then allowing conviction if intoxication "contributed to cause the same" without explaining the limits of the...
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