Robbinsdale Ed. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers Local 872

• Decision Date: 23 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 46216,46216
• Citation: 239 N.W.2d 437,307 Minn. 96
• Parties: , 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2417, 78 Lab.Cas. P 53,796 ROBBINSDALE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondents, v. ROBBINSDALE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL 872, Appellant, Independent School District 281, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 437

239 N.W.2d 437

307 Minn. 96, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2417,

78 Lab.Cas. P 53,796

ROBBINSDALE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, et al., Respondents, v. ROBBINSDALE FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL 872, Appellant Independent School District 281, Respondent.

No. 46216.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Jan. 23, 1976.

Syllabus by the Court

Minn.St. 179.65, subd. 2, the so-called fair share statute, does not violate constitutional standards of procedural due process since we interpret the Public Employment Labor Relations Act, of which § 179.65, subd. 2, is a part, to implicitly provide that a public employee has (a) the right to notice of the amount of an impending fair share fee which is to be deducted from his earnings; (b) the right to bring an action in district court to enjoin the use of the withheld fee; (c) the right, under certain exigent circumstances, to have the collection of the fair share fee enjoined, and (d) the right, in all circumstances and upon proper application, to a court hearing on the validity and proper amount of the fair share fee.

The fact that in the absence of unusual circumstances the hearing and final judicial determination of the fee's validity and amount will probably not occup prior to the actual withholding of the fair share fee from the employee's paycheck does not by itself render the statute unconstitutional.

Peterson, Engberg & Peterson, Roger A. Peterson and William F. Garber, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Larson, Mannikko & Swenson and Darel F. Swenson, Wayzata, for Robbinsdale Ed. Assoc., and others.

LeVander, Zimpfer & Tierney and Bernard G. Zimpfer, Minneapolis, for Ind. Sch. Dist. 281.

Lee L. LaBore, Hopkins, amicus curiae, seeking affirmance.

Peterson, Popovich, Knutson & Flynn, Peter S. Popovich and Richard J. Sands, St. Paul, amicus curiae, seeking affirmance.

Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly and Eric R. Miller, St. Paul, amicus curiae, seeking reversal.

Peterson, Bell & Converse and Roger A. Jensen, St. Paul, amicus curiae, seeking reversal.

Mullin, Swirnoff & Weinberg, William E. Mullin and Edwin Vieira, Jr., Minneapolis, amicus curiae, seeking affirmance.

Robins, Davis & Lyons, St. Paul, Gregg M. Corwin, Minneapolis, Zwerdling, Maurer, Diggs & Papp, A. L. Zwerdling, Washington, D.C., and Fred Burstein, Minneapolis, amicus curiae, seeking reversal.

Heard and considered by the court en banc.

MacLAUGHLIN, Justice.

The sole issue on this appeal is whether Minn.St. 179.65, subd. 2, the 'fair share' statute, deprives an individual of property without providing procedural dur process. The trial court concluded that the statute violated the due process clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions in that 'it makes no provision for notice and hearing prior to the determination of the fair share fee for services.' We reverse.

The 'fair share' statute is a part of the Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA), Minn.St. 179.61 to 179.77. The purpose behind PELRA is to 'promote orderly and constructive relationships between all public employers and their employees, subject however, to the paramount right of the citizens of this state to keep inviolate the guarantees for their health, education, safety and welfare.' § 179.61. The legislature recognized that 'unique approaches to negotiations and resolutions of disputes between public employees and employers are necessary' to fulfill this purpose. Id. As a result, PELRA provides that any bargaining unit of employees may elect by majority vote an employee organization representative who shall then be certified as the 'exclusive representative of all employees in the unit.' § 179.67, subd. 12. The act contemplates that all employees in a given bargaining unit are entitled to share equally in the benefits obtained by the exclusive representative through negotiations or grievance proceedings. Consequently, the act provides in § 179.65, subd. 2:

'* * * (A)ll public employees who are not members of the exclusive representative may be required by said representative to contribute a fair share fee for services rendered by the exclusive representative, and the employer upon notification by the exclusive representative of such employees shall be obligated to check off said fee from the earnings of the employee and transmit the same to the exclusive representative. In no instance shall the required contribution exceed a pro rata share of the specific expenses incurred for services rendered by the representative in relationship to negotiations and administration of grievance procedures.'

Appellant, Robbinsdale Federation of Teachers Local 872, is an employee organization whose members are some, but not all, of the employees of Independent School District No. 281. Appellant has been elected the exclusive representative of all employees in the school district belonging to certain bargaining units, whether the employees are members of appellant or not. ¹ Respondents Marilyn Threlkeld, a nonprofessional employee of the school district, and Daniel Hanka, a professional employee of the school district, are not members of appellant but are, of course, represented by appellant in bargaining and grievance procedures. Respondent Robbinsdale Education Association is an employee organization which has as its members some of the professional employees of the school district.

In May 1974, appellant voted to require a fair share contribution from all the employees of the school district represented by appellant but who are not members of appellant, such as respondents Threlkeld and Hanka, and many of the members of the Robbinsdale Education Association. Appellant notified the school district of the amount of the fair share fee; and the school district, pursuant to § 179.65, subd. 2, began withholding or checking off from the paychecks of respondents Threlkeld and Hanka, among others, the designated amount of the fair share fee. Appellant informed respondents Robbinsdale Education Association and Hanka prior to the time of the first checkoffs, but did not so inform respondent Threlkeld. At no time were any of the respondents given an opportunity for a hearing by an independent and impartial body regarding their objections to the checkoff from their earnings of fair share contributions or the amount of such checkoffs.

On November 6, 1974, respondents brought this action challenging the validity of § 179.65, subd. 2. An agreement was reached by the parties on December 18, 1974, which provided that all fair share funds withheld from the employees' paychecks would be placed in an escrow account pending final determination of this action. On the basis of an agreed statement of facts, the trial court held that § 179.65, subd. 2, violated the due process clauses of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions because there is no provision for notice and hearing prior to the determination of the fair share fee.

The issue before the trial court, and before this court, is whether the fair share statute passes constitutional muster when neither it nor any of the other provisions of PELRA specifically provides for a hearing prior to the imposition of the fair share fee upon nonmembers of appellant. This act, like every legislative enactment, comes to us with a presumption in favor of its constitutionality. Klicker v. State, 293 Minn. 149, 197 N.W.2d 434 (1972); Head v. Special School Dist. No. 1, 288 Minn. 496, 182 N.W.2d 887 (1970), certiorari denied sub nom. Minneapolis Federation of Teachers, Local No. 59, v. Spannaus, 404 U.S. 886, 92 S.Ct. 196, 30 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971). The burden of proof is on the challenging parties to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the act is unconstitutional. Minneapolis Federation of Teachers v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966). Further, it is well established that when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the language of the entire act must be taken into consideration, and '(i)f the act is reasonably susceptible of two different constructions, one of which will render it constitutional and the other unconstitutional, the former construction must be adopted.' State v. Suess, 236 Minn. 174, 181, 52 N.W.2d 409, 414 (1952); In re Taxes on Property of Cold Spring Granite Co. 271 Minn. 460, 136 N.W.2d 782 (1965).

Since PELRA is challenged on the ground that it denies procedural due process, ² it is particularly important that we consider those provisions in the act which provide procedural remedies. Section 179.76 of the act states in part:

'It shall be the public policy of the state of Minnesota that every public employee should be provided with the right of independent review, by a disinterested person or agency, of any grievance arising out of the interpretation of or adherence to terms and conditions of employment.'

More importantly, § 179.68, subd. 1, of the act provides:

'Any employee * * * aggrieved by an unfair labor practice * * * may bring an action in district court of the county wherein the practice is alleged to have occurred for injunctive relief and for damages caused by such unfair labor practice.'

Section 179.68, subds. 2 and 3, detail certain acts, or failures to act, which constitute unfair labor practices. Specifically, § 179.68, subd. 3(1), prohibits employee organizations from 'restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their rights as provided in sections 179.61 to 179.77.' Considering these provisions together, we have concluded that the imposition upon a nonmember employee of a fair share fee which is not consistent with the provisions of the statute constitutes an unfair labor practice. Therefore, pursuant to § 179.68, subd. 1, a public employee aggrieved by such a practice may bring an action in district court for injunctive relief. Further, as we construe the statute, the district court, at the request of either party, may determine the validity and proper amount of the fair share fee.

In such an action, the district court shall,...