Robebins v. Bureau of Land Management

• Decision Date: 21 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 98-CV-201-B.,98-CV-201-B.
• Citation: 252 F.Supp.2d 1286
• Parties: Harvey Frank ROBBINS, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT ("BLM"), Department of the Interior, the United States of America; Charles Wilkie, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Darrell Barnes, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Teryl Shryack, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Patrick Merrill, individually and as an employee of the BLM; David Stimson, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Michael Miller, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Gene Leone, individually and as an employee of the BLM; and John Does 1 Through 20, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Wyoming

252 F.Supp.2d 1286

Harvey Frank ROBBINS, Plaintiff, v. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT ("BLM"), Department of the Interior, the United States of America; Charles Wilkie, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Darrell Barnes, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Teryl Shryack, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Patrick Merrill, individually and as an employee of the BLM; David Stimson, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Michael Miller, individually and as an employee of the BLM; Gene Leone, individually and as an employee of the BLM; and John Does 1 Through 20, Defendants.

No. 98-CV-201-B.

United States District Court, D. Wyoming.

March 21, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Karen J. Budd-Falen, Richard Michael AuBuchon, Marc Ryan Stimpert, Budd-Falen Law offices, Cheyenne, for Plaintiffs.

Thomas D. Roberts, U.S. Attorney's Office, Cheyenne, for Defend

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

BRIMMER, District Judge.

This ease arises out of a dispute between a Wyoming rancher and the federal government over a property interest in a small strip of land known locally as Rock Creek Road. The matter is currently before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. Upon reading the briefs, hearing oral argument, and being fully advised of the premises, the Court FINDS and ODERS as follows:

Statement of the Parties and Jurisdiction

Plaintiff, Harvey Frank Williams, is a resident of Wyoming. Plaintiff is the owner of the High Island Ranch in Hamilton Dome, Wyoming, which is located in Hot Springs County.

Defendant Department of the Interior is an agency of the United States headed by the Secretary of the Interior. Defendant Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") is a subordinate agency of the Department of Interior. Among other things, the BLM is charged with the administration of public lands in the United States. Defendant Joe Vessels is a BLM assistant manager and line officer. Defendant Charles Wilkie is a BLM area manager and line officer. Defendant Darrell Barnes is a BLM district manager. Defendants Michael Miller and David Stimson are BLM investigative and law enforcement officers whose duties include investigating criminal offenses and making recommendations regarding prosecution. Defendants Gene Leone, Patrick Merrill, and Teryl Shryack are employees of the BLM. Defendants John Does 1 through 20 are unknown federal officers who participated in the wrongful conduct alleged in Plaintiffs Complaint.

The Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this matter. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Venue is proper in the District of Wyoming. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), (2).

Background

In 1994, George Nelson owned the High Island Ranch in Hamilton Dome, Wyoming. (Second Am. Compl, at ¶ 16). On April 5, 1994, Mr. Nelson granted a nonexclusive access easement to the BLM across his ranch. (Id. at ¶ 21). The easement ran along a private ranch road known as the Rock Creek Road. (Id.). The BLM, however, failed to record this easement as required by Wyoming's recording statute. (Id. at ¶ 21; See also Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120 (providing that an unrecorded conveyance is void against a subsequent purchaser for value who, without notice, first records)).

On May 31, 1994, Plaintiff purchased the High Island Ranch from Mr. Nelson. (Id. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff took the High Island Ranch without notice of the BLM's easement and recorded his interest in Hot Springs County. (Id. at ¶ 23). Under Wyoming law, when Plaintiff recorded his deed, the BLM's easement across Rock Creek Road was extinguished. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120.

At the High Island Ranch, Plaintiff runs a commercial guest ranch and engages in cattle ranching. (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiffs ranch includes a number of BLM livestock grazing permits and preference rights. (Id. at ¶ 18). Pursuant to the grazing permits, livestock from Plaintiffs ranch may graze on federal land. (Id.). Additionally, Plaintiff had a Special Recreational Use Permit, which allowed him to operate his commercial guest ranch activities on federal land. (Id. at ¶ 19).

Defendant Vessels contacted Plaintiff to discuss the possibility of obtaining a new easement after he learned that the BLM's easement was extinguished. (Id. at 1126). Defendant Vessels made a non-negotiable demand that Plaintiff grant the BLM an easement across Rock Creek Road. (Id.). Plaintiff refused to grant the BLM an easement. (Id. at U 30).

Thereafter, Defendants engaged in a pattern of behavior and conduct in an attempt to persuade Plaintiff to re-grant the BLM an easement across Rock Creek Road. (Id. at K 31). In June 1994, Defendant Vessels wrote to Plaintiff requesting permission to enter his land to perform a survey for the proposed easement. (Id. at ¶ 32). Plaintiff denied the BLM access to his property to conduct the survey. (Id. at ¶ 33). Nevertheless, the BLM entered Plaintiffs property without his permission and conducted the survey. (Id. at ¶ 34).

On February 23, 1995, Defendant Vessels informed Plaintiff that his right-ofway across federal lands to reach some of his landlocked property would be terminated if he did not grant the BLM an easement across Rock Creek Road. (Id. at ¶ 39). Again, Plaintiff declined the BLM's request to grant it an easement. (Id. at ¶¶ 30, 36). After this last denial, the BLM allegedly developed an internal policy aimed at coercing Plaintiff into granting the BLM an easement. (Id. at 1139). Pursuant to this policy, Defendant Vessels and his subordinate employees began harassing Plaintiff. (Id.).

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to this internal policy: (1) the BLM refused to follow the terms and conditions of the High Island Ranch Allotment Management Plan in good faith, which resulted in Plaintiff not being able to obtain any flexibility in grazing operations, (id. at If 39); (2) Defendant Vessels cancelled Plaintiffs right-of-way across federal land, (id. at If 40); (3) BLM officers urged Plaintiffs neighbors to file a criminal complaint against him and provoked disputes between Plaintiff and his neighbors, (id at 111141, 43); (4) the BLM frivolously prosecuted Plaintiff for livestock trespass, (id. at f 45); (5) BLM employee Ed Parodi informed Plaintiff that if he kept butting heads with the BLM, the dispute would "get ugly," "come to war," and that the BLM would give Plaintiff a "hardball education," (id. at 1146); (6) the BLM trespassed on Plaintiffs property by representing that a fence easement was a general right of way easement, (id., at ¶¶ 48-56);¹ (7) Defendants Barnes and Vessels enticed Plaintiff to come to the BLM office by telling him they wanted to discuss his grazing allotment and instead subjected him to a surprise interrogation by BLM law enforcement officers David Stimson and Michael Miller, (id at ¶¶ 70-73); and (8) after the interrogation, the BLM convinced the United States Attorney's Office to prosecute Plaintiff for interfering with federal employees engaged in the performance of their official duties, (id at n 90(s)-(t)).

On August 12, 1998, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint: (1) alleges that Defendants, in their individual capacities, violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968; and (2) asserts a Bivens claim based on allegations that Defendants violated Plaintiffs federal constitutional rights. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (holding that an individual has a cause of action against a federal official in his individual capacity for damages arising out of the official's violation of the Constitution under the color of federal authority).

Legal Standards

A. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1).

A motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is treated as a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Meyers v. Colo. Dep't of Human Services, No. 02-1054, 2003 WL 1826166, 2003 U.S.App. LEXIS 199, *2-3 (10th Cir. Jan. 6, 2003). The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists. United States ex. rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Group, 279 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir.2002). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) may take two forms. When a defendant makes a facial attack on the complaint's allegations, which challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, the district court will accept the plaintiffs allegations as true. Cal. Cas. & Fire Ins. Co. v. Brinkman, 50 F.Supp.2d 1157, 1161 (D.Wyo.1999). If, however, the defendant goes beyond the allegations contained in the complaint and challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends, the district court will not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations and has wide discretion to consider other documents to resolve the jurisdictional question. Id.

B. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

A federal district court may dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45^6, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir.2001). The district court must assume the plaintiffs allegations are true and construe them liberally in the light most favorable to him. Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99; Grossman v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1118 (10th Cir.1997). However, the district need only accept the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and is not required to accept "conclusory allegations, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions in a complaint." Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks...