Roberds v. Sweitzer
| Decision Date | 14 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 69027,69027 |
| Parties | Charles John ROBERDS and Geraldine Louise Roberds, Respondents, v. George SWEITZER and Estate of Edward J. Murphy, deceased, Jean B. Murphy, Personal Representative, Appellants. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
W. Raleigh Gough, Independence, George T. Sweitzer, Jr., Harrisonville, Edward J. Murphy, Butler, for appellants.
Jeri Leigh Caskey, Alton, Harold L. Caskey, Butler, for respondents.
Attorney George Sweitzer and the Estate of Edward Murphy sought attorney fees for legal services rendered in attacking a property settlement arising out of the dissolution of the marriage of Geraldine and Charles Roberds. The trial court invalidated Sweitzer's and Murphy's attorney's lien, ruling their contingency fee contract was void as against public policy; further, any claim in quantum meruit was tainted by the illegal contract. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for determination of the reasonable value of the attorneys services. The case was certified to this Court by a dissenting judge. Reversed and remanded.
On December 21, 1982, the circuit court entered a decree which dissolved the marriage of Geraldine and Charles Roberds and approved a property agreement upon a finding that it was not unconscionable.
On January 20, 1983, Geraldine contacted attorney Sweitzer and told him she believed the property settlement was unfair. Sweitzer informed her that the time limitation for an appeal or a motion to set aside the judgment was expiring that day. He offered to investigate the matter if she would return with whatever papers she had regarding the dissolution. A few days later she returned with a copy of the settlement agreement. By January 28th, Sweitzer had met with Ralph Pratt, Charles' lawyer, from whom Sweitzer obtained the dissolution petition and decree.
Through March 4th, Sweitzer informed himself of the property settlement's conditions. He had several conversations with Geraldine and another with Pratt. On April 1st, Pratt sent Sweitzer papers which Pratt wanted Geraldine to sign, pursuant to the property settlement agreement. Sweitzer had asked Geraldine to get additional information on several items in the property settlement which had no listed valuation. Because that information remained unavailable and because Geraldine had indicated that she would sign nothing in the present circumstances, Sweitzer took no immediate action on these papers. On June 21, 1983, Sweitzer traveled to Independence and recorded the associate circuit court's tape of the dissolution proceedings.
On July 13, 1983, Geraldine was served with contempt papers and was ordered to show cause why she had not signed the papers necessary to effectuate the property settlement. Approximately August 1st, Sweitzer decided that Geraldine had a meritorious position. He traveled to Butler, Missouri, where he associated Attorney Edward Murphy to assist him in representing Geraldine. In early August, after a meeting of Murphy, Sweitzer and Geraldine, they agreed that the fee would be a contingent one for 50% of what Geraldine received over and above the property she was entitled to in the original property agreement.
Sweitzer filed a motion to set aside the circuit court's decree on August 17, 1983. Following a hearing the court on October 12, 1983, set aside the original property settlement as unconscionable. On October 24th, the court amended its order to note that the motion was sustained because of Charles Roberds' failure to provide the court with all requested information regarding marital property assets and liabilities. While the order provided for a future hearing to properly divide the property, the dissolution of the marriage as irretrievably broken was not affected. Charles filed a notice of appeal.
On December 23, 1983, Geraldine wrote to Sweitzer and Murphy, discharging them as her attorneys. She said she was discontinuing her legal action against Charles and requested a bill for their expenses above a previous cash advance to Sweitzer of $1,000. She retained other counsel and reached a compromise settlement.
On April 12, 1984, Sweitzer and Murphy caused notice to be issued to Charles and his counsel, Pratt, of an attorneys' lien against any funds held by Charles which belonged to or would be distributed to Geraldine. The lien set out a claim for the reasonable value of professional services inclusive of out-of-pocket expenses up to the termination of their employment in the matter in the amount of $10,000.
On December 3, 1984, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court for approval of the compromise settlement and for a determination of the validity and extent of the claim for attorneys' lien. The trial court approved the compromise settlement on May 2, 1985. The trial court excluded evidence of the compromise settlement in the lien proceeding. A comparison of the original and second agreements shows that Geraldine received substantially more property in the second agreement and obtained exclusive use of the marital home.
The trial court ruled the attorneys' lien was without merit, and without force and effect; that the attorneys had failed to establish a separate claim sounding in quantum meruit because such a claim was tainted by the void contingency fee contract. The court of appeals held the lien was supported by the attorneys' claim in quantum meruit for the reasonable value of their services up to their discharge.
The respondents and the certifying judge rely on Shanks v. Kilgore, 589 S.W.2d 318 (Mo.App.1979). Shanks stands for the proposition that contingency fee contracts in dissolution proceedings are void as against public policy. Id. at 321. Accord Guenard v. Burke, 387 Mass. 802, 443 N.E.2d 892, 895 (1982). Morfeld v. Andrews, 579 P.2d 426, 429 (Wyo.1978). Public policy favors reconciliations and the effect of such contracts is to give an attorney an interest in avoiding reconciliation. Similarly, the financial interest of attorneys in contingency arrangements may occasionally thwart another public policy purpose. Settlement of property rights is integral to the dissolution proceedings. Shanks, 589 S.W.2d at 321. The statutory scheme intends that the approving court be fully informed of the marital property to be distributed. See Guenard, 443 N.E.2d at 895. The existence of contingency agreements could provide an incentive to conceal...
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