Robert G. Haley, as Administrator of the Estate of John Otis Haley, Plaintiff and Respondent v. Frederick Friedman, as Executor of the Estate of Anna A. Friedman, Deceased, Frederick Friedman, Individually, Janice Stine and Jareen Whitta
| Decision Date | 12 August 1964 |
| Citation | 40 Cal.Rptr. 1 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Robert G. HALEY, as administrator of the Estate of John Otis Haley, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frederick FRIEDMAN, as executor of the Estate of Anna A. Friedman, Deceased, Frederick Friedman, individually, Janice Stine and Jareen Whittaker, Defendants and Appellants. Civ. 27494. |
Myron Blumberg, Long Beach, for appellants Frederick Friedman, individually, and as Executor of the Estate of Anna A. Friedman, decd., and Janice Stine.
Howlett & Weiler, Los Angeles, for appellant Jareen Whittaker.
August J. O'Connor, Redondo Beach, Overholt & Overholt, by E. Llewellyn Overholt Sr., and E. Llewellyn Overholt, Jr., Los Angeles, for respondent Robert G. Haley.
Appellants (defendants below), three grandchildren of Anna A. Friedman (decedent) appeal from a judgment quieting title in plaintiff (respondent) to several parcels of real estate in the counties of San Bernardino and Los Angeles and awarding to respondent judgment for net rents which had been accumulated from said parcels of real eatate in the approximate sum of $11,000.
Respondent's cause of action was bottomed on a deed (Exhibit I) which reserved a life estate to decedent, signed August 2, 1957 and handed to him on August 4, 1957. He was 72 years old at the time. Decedent died 16 days later on August 20, 1957. She was 78.
The real property described in Exhibit I claimed by respondent and included in the judgment, had belonged to decedent since 1921, constitutes the bulk of decedent's estate, and was appraised as of August 20, 1957, at $188,000.
This appraised value appears to be conceded.
The original respondent, John Otis Haley (Haley) was a real estate broker and a stranger to the blood of decedent. Haley has died since entry of the judgment and is succeeded in this litigation by his son, the administrator of his estate.
Appellants unsuccessfully resisted the action in the trial court, contending primarily that the deed was spurious, that if not, it was only conditionally and not actually delivered, that there was no valid gift, that there was no valuable consideration and that there were prejudicial errors committed by the trial court in the exclusion and admission of evidence.
The record, which will be detailed in part hereinafter, reveals much confusion as to whether Haley tried his case on the theory of a gift or on the theory of valuable and adequate consideration.
Any contention on Haley's part that there was a gift, appears to have been abandoned before judgment. The trial judge made findings that the transfer was made for a valuable consideration, that decedent had independent advice, and that there was no fiduciary relationship between Haley and decedent.
The action was 17 days in trial. The Reporter's Transcript, inclusive of arguments, comprises 1612 pages. A substantial portion of the Reporter's Transcript and of the time spent in trial was devoted to an effort by appellants to prove that Exhibit I was not a genuine document.
Haley contended and proved to the satisfaction of the trial judge, that the deed was copied by one David H. Campbell on Campbell's typewriter, from a handwritten copy which took decedent two days to prepare. This handwritten copy was incinerated by Ceda L. Anderson, a part-time employed companion of decedent, at the direction of decedent. Anderson was present at the time Exhibit I was handed to Haley.
Appellants' contention that Exhibit I, allegedly typed by Campbell, is a spurious Document, is predicated wholly on the testimony of David A. Black, a document expert. Black testified that Exhibit I was actually typewritten by Haley on Haley's typewriter, and that the body of Exhibit I was typewritten by Haley on a blank sheet of paper and superimposed above the genuine signature of decedent.
Anderson testified that she saw decedent working on her handwritten copy of Exhibit I (the copy incinerated by Anderson) for two days and that decedent, when she had completed her handwritten copy, asked Anderson to call David H. Campbell, who during two previous years, had prepared decedent's income tax returns. When Campbell arrived, decedent said to him: '* * * I wish you would type it for me * * *.' Campbell then took the handwritten copy and returned the following day with the typewritten draft thereof, delivered it to decedent, whereupon decedent said to Campbell in the presence of Anderson: "* * * I am going to sign this Deed and I want you and Miss Anderson to be witnesses to my signature." 'She saw Anna A. Friedman sign.' 'He passed it to me and I signed.' 'She was present when Anna A. Friedman delivered the Deed to John Otis Haley.' 'This was on August 4, 1957, when Mrs. Friedman, Mr. Haley and she were there.'
To discredit the evidence of Anderson, Campbell, Haley and other witnesses as to the genuineness of Exhibit I, Black, in great detail and at considerable length, pointed out many items which to him were demonstrated from the physical appearance of Exhibit I as the basis for his opinion that Exhibit I was a spurious document, even though the signature of decedent was genuine. All items pointed out were characteristic of a document which was filled out and completed over a signature which had been signed to a blank sheet of paper. Specimens of documents admittedly typed by Haley on Haley's typewriter were introduced and Black asserted, itemizing what to him were demonstrative bits of evidence, that Exhibit I was typed by Haley on Haley's typewriter.
This court has before it the direct evidence of Anderson, Campbell and Haley, as to the preparation, signing, witnessing and tradition of Exhibit I, as against the opinion evidence of Black, the expert, and like the court in Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal.2d 409, 71 P.2d 220, it has before it documentary evidence, particularly photographic copies of the questioned Exhibit I in form and size of the original and also in enlarged sizes, together with exemplars of Haley's typing and typing from Haley's typewriter introduced for the purpose of impairing the bona fides of Exhibit I. The record before us, however, shows a substantial conflict and extraordinary as the circumstances are in the case at bench, the direct evidence of witnesses Anderson, Campbell and Haley cannot be termed unsubstantial.
We are mindful of the statement of the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Lankershim, supra, page 475 of 9 Cal.2d, page 253 of 71 P.2d: '* * * that expert evidence, * * * cannot be arbitrarily disregarded * * *' and of the principle that the trial court's judgment even when based on conflicting evidence '* * * does not relieve an appellate court of its duty of analyzing the evidence in the light of reason and human experience and giving consideration to the motives and propensities which tend to influence or prompt human action, in an effort to solve the question as to whether the judgment is reasonably and substantially sustained by the evidence.' (Lankershim, page 471 of 9 Cal.2d, page 251 of 71 P.2d.) (Horsman v. Maden, 69 Cal.App.2d 11, 15, 157 P.2d 882; cf. Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Gifford, 137 Cal.App.2d 259, 267, 290 P.2d 281.) However, a conflict is raised by the direct evidence of the witnesses named and although the expert's testimony is convincing, we cannot say that it is inconceivable that a reasonable mind would inevitably resolve such a conflict in favor of appellants.
This court has said continuously and with rythmic reiteration pointed out that the trial judge is the final arbiter of conflicting evidence. This court is therefore bound by the finding of the trial judge that Exhibit I is not a spurious document. (Overton v. Vita-Food Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, 370, 210 P.2d 757; Crawford v. Southern Pacific Co., 3 Cal.2d 427, 429, 45 P.2d 183; Estate of Bristol, 23 Cal.2d 221, 223, 143 P.2d 689.)
Appellants charged that a fiduciary relationship existed between decedent and Haley. Haley denied this. This trial court by its Finding V held:
Although the trial court in the above finds Haley was decedent's agent for the limited period set out, Haley denied that he was decedent's agent in 1955, or that he was her agent at any time, or that he had at any time been paid for any service he rendered to decedent. He testified in part:
And in respect of payment he testified:
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