ROBERT M. ELLIOTT, PC v. Stuart
Decision Date | 18 May 1999 |
Docket Number | (AC 17937) |
Citation | 53 Conn. App. 333,730 A.2d 1176 |
Parties | ROBERT M. ELLIOTT, P.C. v. MARK STUART |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Landau, Spear and Hennessy, Js. David M. Fisher, with whom, on the brief, was Robert H. Weinstein, for the appellant (defendant).
Robert M. Levin, for the appellee (plaintiff).
In this collection action, the defendant, Mark Stuart, a dentist, appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff law firm, Robert M. Elliott, P.C. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) sustained the plaintiffs objections to certain questions posed by the defendant during cross-examination, (2) permitted evidence of the defendant's income to be admitted into evidence, (3) awarded excessive attorney's fees for the prosecution of the collection action and (4) accepted the affidavit of the plaintiffs counsel as to attorney's fees, which did not include contemporaneous time records. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Following a trial to the court, the court found the following facts. On November 13, 1995, the Connecticut state dental commission (commission) summarily suspended the defendant's license to practice dentistry because a young female patient complained that the defendant had stalked and harassed her. The patient alleged that the defendant, under the guise of needing to talk with her about her dental care, obtained the address of the patient's employer in Washington, D.C., from the patient's mother. The patient also alleged that the defendant went to her place of employment in an attempt to meet her socially. At the time the patient made her complaint, the defendant's license was in a probationary status. Four or five other patients had also complained to the commission about the defendant and his license had been suspended once previously.
On November 17, 1995, the defendant met with Robert M. Elliott, an attorney and principal of the firm, to obtain legal representation. The defendant represented to Elliott that he was losing $30,000 a month due to the suspension and that he wanted Elliott to take all steps necessary to restore his license. In the years immediately prior to the 1995 suspension, the defendant earned approximately $200,000 to $400,000 per year from his dental practice.
During their first meeting, the defendant signed a retainer agreement, which provided, in part, that the plaintiffs fee would be based on the amount of time spent and listed the hourly rates of the plaintiffs employees. The agreement also provided:
The defendant knew and agreed that Elliott, the other attorneys and the paralegals in the firm would work on his case. Because the loss of his license prevented the defendant from earning a living, Elliott gave the defendant's case priority over other legal matters and assigned various aspects of the case to employees of the firm. The plaintiff was successful in having the defendant's dental license reinstated, but the defendant failed to pay the plaintiff in accordance with the retainer agreement. The plaintiff, therefore, commenced this collection action.
The trial court concluded that the work done by the firm was reasonable and necessary and that the result obtained was "almost miraculous" because the defendant's license to practice dentistry was reinstated on January 5, 1996, approximately six weeks after it was suspended. The trial court awarded the firm $13,637.33 for services rendered before the commission, $2275.73 in interest and $15,000 in attorney's fees for the collection action, plus costs. The defendant appealed.
Three of the defendant's claims on appeal are of an evidentiary nature. (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Paige v. St. Andrew's Roman Catholic Church Corp., 247 Conn. 24, 37, 718 A.2d 425 (1998).
The defendant's first claim is that the trial court improperly sustained the plaintiffs objections to the defendant's cross-examining members of the firm with respect to the reasonableness of the services rendered and the fees charged. We disagree.
The portions of the defendant's cross-examination relevant to our analysis follow.
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(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 153, 575 A.2d 206 (1990). The testimony that the defendant attempted to put into evidence as cited above is not material because, as the trial court correctly...
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