Robert Parker and Miles White, Appellants v. William Overman

Decision Date01 December 1855
Citation15 L.Ed. 318,59 U.S. 137,18 How. 137
PartiesROBERT A. PARKER AND MILES WHITE, APPELLANTS, v. WILLIAM OVERMAN
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

THIS was an appeal from the circuit court of the United States, for the District of Arkansas.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

It was argued by Mr. William Shepard Bryan, for the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. Lawrence, for defendant.

The points made by Mr. Bryan, which are decided by the court, were the following:——

1. That by the true construction of the act, such a deed is made evidence only of those facts which are recited in it.

2. That in order to establish the regularity and validity of a sale of land for taxes, the deed should show, upon its face, that every essential preliminary required by the statute has been performed.

3. That the deeds set out in the record, fail to recite several of these essential preliminaries; and that, therefore, they do not furnish evidence of the validity of the sale in question.

There are no recitals in the deeds, that the sheriff filed his assessment list, on or before March 25; that he gave ten days' notice in each township, that the list would be laid before the next county court; that he laid the list before the county court, at the term next succeeding March 25; that the court, at that term, adjusted this tax to be paid; that on or before the first Monday in August, he filed a list of the lands of non-residents with the auditor; that the list was corrected by the auditor, and advertised when corrected. 13 How. 472; 8 Eng. (Ark. Rep.) 242; 14 Pet. 322; 4 Wheat. 77; Arkansas Revenue Act, (Dig. c. 139, § 112.)

6. That all the testimony taken together (even if the incompetent testimony on the part of the petitioner be considered) shows that the sheriff and collector did not strictly pursue the authority to sell the land for taxes, given him by the revenue act, but that he omitted several important particulars.

He filed his assessment list too late; he neglected to give the ten days' notice required by law; he laid the list before the county court one term too late; and he was too late in filing with the auditor a list of the lands of non-residents.

Mr. Lawrence:——

The deed which was given in evidence was prim a facie, and, in the absence of positive proof of irregularity, conclusive evidence of the regularity and legality of the tax sale. Rev. Stats. c. 128, § 96, p. 687. Roberts v. Pillow, 13 How. 472.

By the 97th section of the Revenue act, p. 687, Rev. Stats., it is enacted, that 'no exception shall be taken to any deed made by a collector,' &c., 'but such as shall apply to the real merits of the case, and are consistent with a liberal and fair interpretation of the intention of the general assembly.'

It is insisted that no objection which is taken to the proceedings in this case has any merit, considered with regard to the intention of the general assembly.

So far as the proceedings connected with the sale are concerned, a strict compliance with the statute is shown.

The only want of compliance with the literal requirements of the act, is in the fact that the affidavit of the assessor, required by section 7, was not filed till the 15th March, 1845, and the assessment list was not filed in the office of the county clerk, on or before the 25th March, as required by section 26.

Dallas county was created by act approved January 1, 1845, which act passed the lower house, 24th December, 1844, and the senate, on the 28th of the same month.

By the 9th section of that act, an election was to be held on the fourth Monday of January, of all the officers necessary for the organization of the county, except justices and constables.

The first officers of Dallas county were sworn in about the 1st March, 1845.

The sheriff filed his affidavit as assessor, 15th March, 1845, and on the 28th April, 1845, filed his assessment list in the county court. The county court, at its first term, adjudged the list as required by law, and all the proceedings thereafter were in strict accordance with the revised statutes.

It is submitted, first, that the objection, that the assessor's oath was not filed on the 10th day of January, and the assessment list on the 25th of March, has no substantial merit, because the list was to be made out and filed, in order to be adjusted by the court, upon the appeal of any one aggrieved by the amount assessed on his property.

So far as regards the land in question, they were assessed at the lowest amount permitted by the law. Of course, no advantage would have happened from an earlier notice of that which he could not object to.

And, secondly, it is submitted that the act erecting Dallas county was a legislative suspension of such portions of the revised statutes as the act, by its requirements, rendered impossible.

Mr. Justice GRIER delivered the opinion of the court.

As some doubts were entertained, and have been expressed by some members of the court, as to its jurisdiction in this case it will be necessary to notice that subject, before proceeding to examine the merits of the controversy. It had its origin in the state court of Dallas county, Arkansas, sitting in chancery. It is a proceeding under a statute of Arkansas, prescribing a special remedy for the confirmation of sales of land by a sheriff or other public officer. Its object is to quiet the title. The purchaser at such sales, is authorized to institute proceedings by a public notice in some newspaper, describing the land, stating the authority under which it was sold, and 'calling on all persons who can set up any right to the lands so purchased, in consequence of any informality, or any irregularity or illegality connected with the sale, to show cause why the sale so made should not be confirmed.'

In case no one appears to contest the regularity of the sale, the court is required to confirm it, on finding certain facts to exist. But if opposition be made, and it should appear that the sale was made 'contrary to law,' it became the duty of the court to annul it. The judgment or decree, in favor of the grantee in the deed, operates 'as a complete bar against any and all persons who may thereafter claim such land, in consequence of any informality or illegality in the proceedings.'

It is a very great evil in any community, to have titles to land insecure and uncertain; and especially in new States, where its result is to retard the settlement and improvement of their vacant lands. Where such lands have been sold for taxes, there is a cloud on the title of both claimants, which deters the settler from purchasing from either. A prudent man will not purchase a lawsuit, or risk the loss of his money and labor upon a litigious title. The act now under consideration was intended to remedy...

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