Roberto Eudela, M.D. v. John P. Rogers.

Decision Date07 January 1983
Docket Number83-LW-4791,L-82-211
PartiesRoberto EUDELA, M.D., Relator, v. John P. ROGERS, et al., Respondents.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

William M. Connelly and Steven R. Smith, for relator

William J. Brown, Attorney General by Michael A. Noonan, Assistant Attorney General, for respondents.

OPINION

RICHARD B. MCQUADE, Judge, Sitting by Assignment.

On July 22, 1982, Dr. Roberto Eudela filed this action in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Lucas County. Relator is a duly qualified and licensed physician in the state of Ohio. The complaint alleges that respondents, officials of the State of Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, terminated his appointment as an unclassified employee at the Toledo Mental Health Center. Relator's prayer is for a writ of mandamus to issue, compelling respondents to hold an informal hearing at which relator will be informed of the specific acts charged against him and allowed an opportunity to present a defense. He further requests that he be reinstated with back pay until such a hearing is held, and for other relief which the court may deem proper.

On August 4, 1982, respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the petition was defective on its face. On August 16, 1982, relator filed a motion to amend by interlineation, in addition to a memorandum in opposition to respondents' motion to dismiss. This court dismissed the petition for writ of mandamus on the same date. On August 19 1982, relator filed a motion for reconsideration, and to reinstate the case on the docket, which was subsequently granted by this court on August 26, 1982. On September 7 1982, respondents filed a motion for reconsideration and to dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus, which motion was denied by the court on September 7, 1982. The matter is now before the court on its merits.

The following facts are pertinent to the issues presented by relator's petition for a writ of mandamus. Upon completion of his residency in psychiatry at the Medical College of Ohio in 1979, Dr. Eudela was employed at the Toledo Mental Health Center (T.M.H.C.). As an "unclassified employee," Dr. Eudela served, without tenure, at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Dr Eudela was engaged in psychiatry at T.M.H.C. from June 19, 1979, until June 4, 1982.

Respondent John P. Rogers has been the Superintendent of the T.M.H.C. since October 11, 1981. On May 26, 1982, he gave Dr. Eudela notice that the former was considering revoking Dr. Eudela's unclassified appointment in psychiatry as a result of alleged incidents of sexual harassment toward female employees at T.M.H.C. Dr. Eudela received a statement of options available to unclassified employees, which provided that the employee could request an informal hearing with the appointing authority to discuss the statement of reasons for his termination, at which his attorney could be present.

In compliance with Dr. Eudela's May 26, 1982 request, an informal meeting was held on May 27, 1982. Mr. Rogers, Dr. Eudela, accompanied by his two attorneys, and three doctors from T.M.H.C., were present at the hearing. On June 3, 1982, Dr. Eudela received a notice from Mr. Rogers stating that his unclassified employment to the position of psychiatrist at T.M.H.C. was being revoked effective June 4, 1982. Dr. Eudela thereafter appealed this decision to respondents Meyers R. Kurtz, Director of the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, and Howard Sokolov, M.D., Commissioner of the Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, who refused relator his requested relief. Respondents do not challenge relator's assertion that he exhausted all of his administrative remedies prior to filing his petition for writ of mandamus with this court.

Initially, we address respondents' claim that relator's petition for reinstatement to unclassified service with the state of Ohio is not a proper mandamus action. Respondents assert both that their actions in dismissing Dr. Eudela were discretionary, thus precluding mandamus, and that Dr. Eudela has an adequate remedy at law. In rebuttal, relator maintains that mandamus properly lies to compel respondents to conduct an informal hearing, at which he would be informed of the specific charges against him and provided an opportunity to refute those charges. Relator additionally maintains that other equitable or legal remedies would be inadequate.

Mandamus is defined as follows:

"Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal, a corporation, board, or person, commanding the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station." R.C. 2731.01.

It is additionally provided that:

"The writ of mandamus must not be issued when there is a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." R.C. 2731.05.

The prerequisites of an action in mandamus are set forth as follows:

"Where a public officer or agency is under a clear legal duty to perform an official act, and where there is no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law, an action in mandamus will lie originally in the Supreme Court or in the Court of Appeals." State, ex rel. Trimble v. State Board of Cosmetology (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 283, 284, citing State, ex rel. Pressley, v. Industrial Commission (1967), 11 Ohio St.2d 141 (para. 1 of syllabus).

See also State, ex rel. River Grove Park, Inc., v. City of Kettering (1962), 118 Ohio App. 143.

Lastly, it must be remembered that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. City of Wapakoneta v. Helpling (1939), 135 Ohio St. 98, 103.

Relator presents two arguments to support his contention that respondents are under a clear legal duty to grant him an informal hearing: First, relator maintains that he was deprived of property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; second, relator relies on Rule 5119-7-11(F)(5) of the State of Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation personnel rules and regulations, which provides as follows:

" If a request for an informal meeting is received, the appointing authority shall set a date for the meeting. At the informal meeting the employee shall have an opportunity to discuss with the appointing authority the reasons why he believes his unclassified appointment should not be revoked. Although this meeting is considered to be an informal discussion, the employee may be accompanied by an attorney or another representative of his choice."

We will address relator's second contention first.

Pursuant to the rules and regulations of the State of Ohio Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, relator could, and did, request an informal meeting.®1¯ The question is whether the informal meeting which was held on May 27, 1982, conformed with Rule 5119-7-11(F)(5). At that meeting, relator was not informed of the specific nature of the charges against him, the dates that the alleged acts took place, where the alleged acts took place, or the identity of the party or parties who had made the allegations.

The thrust of the regulation pertaining to informal meetings is that an employee should have the opportunity to persuade his employer that his unclassified appointment should not be revoked. We fail to see how relator could have been successful in such an attempt when presented with only vague and unspecified allegations. Implicit in the regulation's grant of an informal meeting is the concomitant duty on the part of respondents to provide relator, at minimum, with the specific charges. Based on the foregoing, the court holds that respondents are under a clear legal duty to conduct a second hearing. See State, ex rel. Great Lakes College, Inc., v. Medical Bd. (1972), 29 Ohio St.2d 198.

We now review relator's contention that he does not have a plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. Relator argues that an appropriate remedy at law, such as a breach of contract action, would be inadequate in that he is not asking for damages. Relator further argues that an equitable remedy, such as an injunction, would be inadequate, as that remedy would not clear his name and reputation.

The "plain and adequate" remedy contemplated by the statute must be a remedy complete in its nature, beneficial and speedy. State, ex rel. Paul Stutler, Inc., v. Yacobucci (1958), 108 Ohio App. 41, aff'd. (1959), 169 Ohio St. 20. Nor does the mere existence of another remedy bar the issuance of a writ of mandamus. State, ex rel. Wright, v. Cohen (1962), 174 Ohio St. 47. Where an ordinary legal remedy is not adequate, the availability of such an inadequate remedy will not preclude the remedy of mandamus. State, ex rel. Emmich, v. Industrial Commission (1947), 148 Ohio St. 658. It appears to this court that relator's desire to clear his name and reputation can only be served by an action in mandamus. Therefore, we exercise our discretion and determine that mandamus is appropriate in this instance. See State, ex rel. Trimble, v. State Board of Cosmetology, supra.

Having determined that an action in mandamus properly lies, the scope of relator's...

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