Roberto v. Honeywell, Inc.

• Decision Date: 07 April 1994
• Citation: 33 Conn.App. 619,637 A.2d 405
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Stacia L. ROBERTO v. HONEYWELL, INC., et al. 11705.

Page 405

637 A.2d 405

33 Conn.App. 619

Stacia L. ROBERTO v. HONEYWELL, INC., et al.

11705.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Oct. 27, 1993.

Decided Feb. 15, 1994.

Certification Denied April 7, 1994.

Karen L. Murdoch, with whom were Wesley W. Horton and, on the brief, M. Hatcher Norris, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Andrew J. O'Keefe, with whom were Denise Radosevich and, on the brief, Michael J. Walsh, for the appellees (defendants).

Before LANDAU, FREDERICK A. FREEDMAN and SCHALLER, JJ.

LANDAU, Judge.

In this negligence action, the plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the trial court rendered on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) granted the defendants' request to amend their answer, and (2) applied Practice Book § 220(D) ¹ to her offer of a rebuttal expert witness.

The following facts are relevant to this appeal. On October 7, 1988, a one car collision occurred in Glastonbury. The plaintiff, Stacia L. Roberto, and the defendant, Shannon Garrett, were occupants of the motor vehicle. ²

On August 15, 1990, the plaintiff commenced an action, sounding in negligence, to recover damages for injuries sustained as a passenger in the vehicle as a result of the collision. Her complaint alleged that the defendant Garrett was the driver of the car and that Garrett's negligent operation of the vehicle caused the plaintiff's injuries. The defendants filed an answer on September 30, 1991, denying the allegations of negligence and pleading insufficient knowledge to all the remaining allegations, including the allegations relating to the identity of the operator of the motor vehicle. On January 28, 1992, the case was claimed to the trial list. On March 24, 1992, Garrett, in response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, denied that she was operating the car at the time of the collision. ³ On June 1, 1992, pursuant to Practice Book § 220(D), the defendants timely disclosed Edward McDonough, deputy chief medical examiner of the state of Connecticut as an expert witness. The plaintiff's motion to preclude the defendants' expert testimony was denied. The court ruled that the defendants disclosed their expert within the time specified in § 220(D). The trial court allowed the plaintiff the opportunity to depose McDonough. ⁴ On June 1, 1992, the defendants also moved to amend their answer; the amended answer denied the plaintiff's allegation that Garrett was driving the vehicle at the time of the collision, and added a special defense alleging that the plaintiff was operating the vehicle and was negligent in that operation. The trial court granted the defendants' motion to amend and overruled the plaintiff's objection. Jury selection began on June 4, 1992; the plaintiff began presenting evidence on June 16, 1992.

On June 25, 1992, McDonough testified for the defendants concerning the nature of the plaintiff's injuries and the consistency of those injuries with the defendants' theory that the plaintiff was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident. On the same day, the defendants' case was concluded, and the plaintiff sought to call an accident reconstructionist as a rebuttal expert witness. The plaintiff had not disclosed previously this expert witness. ⁵ The trial court sustained the defendants' objection to the plaintiff's rebuttal expert. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on June 26, 1992; ⁶ the trial court denied the plaintiff's motion to set aside the verdict. This appeal ensued.

The plaintiff's first claim challenges the trial court's granting of the defendants' motion to file an amended answer. The trial court allowed the defendants to amend their answer on June 16, 1992, the day the plaintiff's case commenced. The amendment denied the plaintiff's allegation that Garrett was driving the vehicle, ⁷ and added a special defense alleging that the plaintiff was the operator of the vehicle at the time of the accident, and was negligent. The plaintiff argues that the trial court should not have allowed the amendment because, even though Practice Book § 176 permits a party to amend his pleading at any time upon request to the court, such amendment should be denied if the parties are unable to join issue in a reasonable time for trial. ⁸ The plaintiff claims that allowing the amendment caused "prejudice" and "injustice" in the presentation of her case, and thus was an abuse of discretion. The defendants argue that the trial court's ruling was an appropriate exercise of its discretion. In addition, the defendants contend that the plaintiff cannot claim unfair prejudice or surprise because she was sufficiently forewarned that the defendants disputed the claim that Garrett was the operator of the car at the time of the accident. We agree that the trial court did not exceed its discretion.

"A trial court has wide discretion in granting or denying amendments to the pleadings and rarely will [a reviewing] court overturn the decision of the trial court.... We will not disturb the ruling of the trial court in granting or denying amendments to the pleadings unless an abuse of discretion is clearly evident." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Howard v. Robertson, 27 Conn.App. 621, 627-28, 608 A.2d 711 (1992). "In reviewing claims that the trial court abused its discretion the unquestioned rule is that great weight is due to the action of the trial court and every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of its correctness; the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rokus v. Bridgeport, 191 Conn. 62, 72, 463 A.2d 252 (1983). In the present case, the amendment was permitted because the trial court deemed the special defense "necessary to proceed with trial." From our review of the record, we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably concluded as it did, and thus acted within its discretion.

The plaintiff next claims that the trial court acted improperly in its application of Practice Book § 220(D). The plaintiff argues that § 220(D) does not apply to rebuttal expert witnesses. She contends that the exclusion of her expert witness' testimony on rebuttal was prejudicial to her case and, thus, the trial court exceeded its discretion. The defendants argue that because the plaintiff did not disclose the rebuttal expert within the sixty days after the date the case was claimed to the trial list, her rebuttal expert is precluded from testifying, pursuant to § 220(D).

Practice Book § 220(D) applies to rebuttal expert witnesses. The rule provides that if the name of any expert is not disclosed in accordance with this subsection, the expert shall not testify except in the discretion of the trial court for good cause shown. Practice Book § 220(D). " 'The rules of statutory construction apply with equal force to Practice Book rules.... A basic tenet of statutory construction is that when a statute [or rule of practice] is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction.' " State v. Charlton, 30 Conn.App. 359, 364, 620 A.2d 1297, cert. denied, 225 Conn. 922, 625 A.2d 824 (1993). Clearly, § 220(D) accommodates the circumstance in which a plaintiff finds it essential to rebut testimony through the use of an expert opinion after the disclosure time limit has expired. The rule provides a safety valve wherein the determination of whether such an expert will be allowed to testify is a discretionary decision to be made by the trial court after good cause is shown. See Knock v. Knock, 224 Conn. 776, 782, 621 A.2d 267 (1993); Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 800, 614 A.2d 414 (1992).

In the present case, the trial court applied § 220(D) and excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert on rebuttal. After noting that the plaintiff failed to make a timely disclosure, the trial court found that the admission of testimony of the rebuttal expert would cause prejudice to the defendants and undue delay. Section 220(D) permits the trial court the discretion to allow the plaintiff's expert witness to testify, despite noncompliance with § 220(D) time limitations, if good cause is shown. Knock v. Knock, supra. The trial court did not apply the standard set out in the rule, i.e., good cause. We recognize that "[n]either § 220(D) nor the cases interpreting it define what constitutes 'good cause.' The language of the rule, however, makes clear that the trial court is to exercise broad discretion in determining whether good cause exists in a given case...." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Berry v. Loiseau, supra. The decision of the trial court is given great weight and deference because "the trial court is in the best position to assess the...