Roberts v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., Civ. No. K-84-3073.
Decision Date | 09 November 1984 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. K-84-3073. |
Citation | 597 F. Supp. 311 |
Parties | Fred M. ROBERTS v. CITICORP DINERS CLUB, INC. a/k/a the Diners' Club, Inc. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Ronald A. Karp and Chaikin, Karp & Greenberg, Washington, D.C. and Barbara E. Palmer, Upper Marlboro, Md., for plaintiff.
J. Hardin Marion and Valerie A. Zimkus, Baltimore, Md., for defendant.
After plaintiff, apparently a citizen of the State of Maryland, commenced this action in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland, defendant, a New York corporation with its principal place of business in the State of Illinois, timely removed this case to this court and plaintiff timely filed a motion to remand to the state court. Plaintiff alleges that during plaintiff's employment by defendant, plaintiff was injured, successfully sought workmen's compensation benefits pursuant to Maryland law, and was thereafter wrongfully discharged by defendant in retaliation for plaintiff's obtaining such benefits. Defendant's removal petition rests upon diversity of citizenship and upon defendant's status as a noncitizen of Maryland. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (b).1 Plaintiff's remand motion is stated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) which provides:
(c) A civil action in any State court arising under the workmen's compensation laws of such State may not be removed to any district court of the United States.
The question presented in this case is whether the within cause of action stated by plaintiff is one "arising under the workmen's compensation laws." That question requires analysis, first, of Maryland law, and then of section 1445(c).
Md.Ann.Code art. 101, § 39A reads as follows:
While section 39A(a) prohibits the type of retaliatory discharge alleged herein by plaintiff, no section of Maryland's statutory law provides any civil remedy to a discharged employee. Plaintiff, however, asserts such a right pursuant to Adler v. American Standard Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981) (Adler I). In Adler I, Chief Judge Murphy, writing for the Court of Appeals of Maryland, considered two questions certified by Judge Harvey of this Court, namely—
(1) Is a cause of action for abusive discharge recognized under the substantive law of the State of Maryland?
(2) Do the allegations of the amended complaint, if taken as true, state a cause of action for abusive discharge under the substantive law of the State of Maryland? Judge Murphy answered "Yes" to question (1) and "No" to question (2). In so doing, Judge Murphy noted:
Then, after reviewing the case law in a number of jurisdictions, Judge Murphy wrote:
With few exceptions, courts recognizing a cause of action for wrongful discharge have to some extent relied on statutory expressions of public policy as a basis for the employee's claim. Courts holding that at will employees failed to state a cause of action, but recognizing implicitly or expressly that a cause of action would be recognized under proper circumstances, generally do so on the grounds that no clear mandate of public policy was contravened by the discharge.
Adler points to two sources of public policy. First, he contends that the misconduct of the Corporation's defendant's employees involving the payment of commercial bribes and the falsification of corporate records—the disclosure of which prompted his plaintiff's discharge—was in violation of the criminal law of the State, Md.Code (1957, 1976 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 174. Second, he urges that practices such as commercial bribery and the falsification of corporate records are so clearly against public policy that he need not identify any statute or rule of law specifically prohibiting such improper and possibly illegal practices.
Before concluding (at 47, 432 A.2d 464) that "Maryland does recognize a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of public policy" but that Adler had not alleged such a cause of action, Judge Murphy also wrote:
As indicated, the Court has not confined itself to legislative enactments, prior judicial decisions or administrative regulations when determining the public policy of this State. We have always been aware, however, that recognition of an otherwise undeclared public policy as a basis for a judicial decision involves the application of a very nebulous concept to the facts of a given case, and that declaration of public policy is normally the function of the legislative branch. Citations omitted. We have been consistently reluctant, for example, to strike down voluntary contractual arrangements on public policy grounds.
After the Court of Appeals of Maryland filed its opinion in Adler I, Judge Harvey, in Adler v. American Standard Corp., 538 F.Supp. 572 (D.Md.1982) (Adler II), permitted plaintiff further to amend plaintiff's complaint (at 575) and wrote that Id. at 575. Judge Harvey concluded (at 578) that the said amended complaint "now recites with the requisite degree of specificity the manner in which certain statutes were offended so as to constitute a violation of the public policy of this State."
The words "arising under" appear in a number of sections of Title 28 of the United States Code, including section 1331 which provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
Those words also appear under particular grants of jurisdiction, as for example in sections 1337 (antitrust), 1338 (patents, etc.), 1340 (Internal Revenue, etc.), 1441(b) and 1445(c). The meaning of those words, as used in each of those statutory provisions, would appear to be the same. See 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3561, at 397 n. 28.
Hayes v. National Con-Serv, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 1034, 1035-36 (D.Md.1981) (footnotes omitted).
In the within case, the "underpinnings of the within plaintiff's cause of action" are the public policy remedy created by the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Adler I in order to permit an employee to recover damages in a civil case if he has been wrongfully...
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